# K: Security—Neg

# Core

### Core: 1NC Shell

#### << Choose link >>

#### Securitization causes endo-colonization---that makes ecological collapse, global war, and structural violence inevitable through a fear of difference---question their impacts because they’re founded on a simplified interpretation of the world

^^ Also a tech modernization link

**Lacy 15**, Mark---Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, 2015 (“Security, Technology, and Global Politics: Thinking with Virilio, PRIO New Security Studies, pp. 8-10)

For Virilio, attempts to contain the insecurity of geopolitics through improved global governance, 'free markets' and the liberal peace might transform security and war around the world, creating a world of perpetual peace and prosperity. The global economy - coupled with the acceleration of technology - might generate harmonious and creative societies where the unpleasant jobs have been replaced by machines and where there is a growing consensus that we need to accelerate and intensify distributive justice around the planet. Technology will not only improve our health and security - it will foster a cosmopolitan society built on the information technologies that expand the possibilities for dialogue. The war game will become the peace game that aids the improvement of the human condition. Virilio isn't so sure about the optimistic liberal view of history. For Virilio, **we are surrounded by the 'propaganda of an endless progress', the promise of a world where technology and capitalism will overcome the problems and suffering that have blighted the human condition;** the 'propaganda of progress' is the vision of the future one often finds in corporate depictions of the future that illustrate how new products will transform life, creating an existence where a multitude of technologies are effortlessly integrated into everyday life to create more rewarding and efficient work and relationships.27 Virilio is less certain that technology and capitalism will improve the human condition, asking us to **pay attention to what lies underneath this propaganda of progress** **in the world around us - in the stress, suffering, paranoia, control, exhaustion and inequality that** he thinks might **intensify** in coming decades. **Progress (and the peace game**), on this view, **is a progress in the arts and technologies of control designed to manage the growing numbers of the 'living dead' that are excluded from the 'legitimate' economy, to control those that seek to exploit vulnerabilities in 'network' society.** As we see later, for Virilio **the peace game is the war game turned inward**, **toward** what he calls **the endo-colonization of society**, **the attempt to control the constantly mutating terrains of security in the post-Cold War world**. The other side of the 'propaganda of an endless progress' is the 'administration of fear': Virilio suggests that **we need to pay attention to the way fear** (usually fear **of otherness and difference**) **is used to distort debate over the problems we confront** (so, for example, when fear of immigrants is presented as the cause of our economic woes and societal implosion - and the route to further disorder). For Virilio, **we need to negotiate our way through both the propaganda of progress and the administration of fear, to pay attention to the way we can be captured by these 'easy' modes of responding to the world around us, to be constantly aware of these two very different traps**. 9 Our world might be heading toward the realization of the liberal dream of progress but Virilio looks around and sees a world of accelerating ecological, economic and social degradation; **politics becomes an increasingly narrow attempt to manage the insecurity and messiness in societies intent on realizing the dream of a fast and efficient consumer lifestyle.** On this view, **the politics of security** that promises to control the messiness **has a tendency to get out of control, nourishing the 'war-machine' and the 'military scientific complex', producing misguided security projects that generate chaos in the realization of policies that are often driven by fear, technological optimism about what technology and war can achieve, and a sense of cultural and racial superiority**. 28 **We might believe that we will learn from our mistakes** (such as the wars that have dominated the first decade of the twenty-first century after 9111) **but that is to become caught up with the 'propaganda of endless progress'.** **There is an excess to security that results in 'unnecessary wars' that become experimental zones for new technologies** - **and there is desire to control all aspects of life in increasingly intensive and extensive ways that risks to undermine civil liberties, tipping the balance of liberty and security toward the endo-colonization of society**; **an excessive focus on the problems of 'otherness' to the exclusion of the insecurity that comes from inside, from our financial systems or modes of consumption**. **Military and political elites get caught up in the seductive possibilities offered by new technologies, the god-like ability to control the world**. Virilio comments that: the nature of absolute speed is also to be absolute power, absolute and instantaneous control, in other words an almost divine power. Today, we have achieved the three attributes of the divine: ubiquity, instantaneity, immediacy; omnivoyance and omnipotence. 29 We can see an example of this excess of security and the desire to obtain these attributes of the divine in the discovery in June 2013 that the National Security Agency obtained direct access to the digital infrastructures of Google, Facebook, Apple and other companies, allowing the PRISM program to access the emails, file transfers, search histories and live chats of all citizens, the metadata of the world. While this desire to become an omnipotent machine of surveillance might confront ethical and limits - or might confront the limits of what is possible, the excess of information - the intention is clearly to know everything. 30 Or **we can see this desire to control the world from a distance in the development of drone technology: machines of vision and death that make possible control-at-a distance.** In his preface to The Administration of Fear, Betrand Richard notes that 'this son of an Italian communist and a catholic from Brittany traces the rules of the game in which we are caught. And that we must escape' .31 **We are trapped in a perverse situation where our societies are obsessed with security - but are governed with a security politics and economic policy that appears to be making the societies we live in more fragile (and thus requiring more 'security' and 'protection sciences').** The question that Virilio leaves us with is - after we negotiate through the propaganda of progress and the administration of fear - how do we escape the dangers of our accelerating reality, the darker possibilities made possible by the modem world? There is a sense in Virilio's work that past attempts to re-design how we live were not up to the task, producing new 'traps', new types of control. 10 So the optimistic 'liberal' student of international politics won't find much to agree with in Virilio's vision of politics and security. For the liberal optimist, the modem age has made it possible for our 'rationality' to overcome the irrational and dangerous aspects of the human condition; while there is much more to 'overcome' we are heading in the right direction and progress in this overcoming will be aided by new 'tools' and technologies; human existence is more civilized and secure than at any point in our history.32 **The liberal will reply that information technologies are creating the foundation for a global public sphere that generates a 'transparent society' that makes it harder for states to hide what they do**; Virilio replies that **information technologies create new types of control and incarceration**. **Freedom and progress in this world order are illusions that mask the stress, control and inequality created by the system**. The liberal will suggest that the continued growth in a interconnected global economy - where crisis is simply a glitch on the way to a world of progress for everybody around the planet - is a sign of the liberal capitalist world's resilience, its superiority to other ways of organizing human life.33 Virilio would reply that **we should be careful not to mistake this resilience as proof of the universal or 'timeless' vitality or appeal of a capitalist (and not necessarily liberal) world order.** The liberal sees global mobility as a symbol of the emerging cosmopolitan world order that overcomes the limits of locality and nationalism. Virilio sees global mobility in terms of forced migration, of border camps, of climate refugees, of habitats that can no longer support human life. Writing about Michel Foucault's studies of prisons and asylums Virilio comments: 'I think that the real imprisonment is just ahead. '34 For Virilio, the problems on the horizon will expose the fragility of the ways of organizing life that were enjoyed in the West through the second half of the twentieth century: rapid technological, ecological and geopolitical transformation will force us to confront a reality where it becomes difficult to hold on to the values and ideas that shaped political imaginations in the West during much of the previous century.

#### Vote neg to reject the 1AC in favor of insecurity---that interrogates and disrupts the epistemological failures of the 1AC

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Securitization and desecuritization ¶ The ceteris paribus normative push, and political recommendation of the securitization approach has been ‘less security, more politics’, and the development of ‘possible modalities’ for **the desecuritization of politics** (Wæver 1989a, 52): it **is** generally (which can only be assessed in practice though) **more conducive to treat identities as identities, religion as religion, the environment as the environment, and so on, and to engage** their **politics through the particular modalities and rationalities of those fields rather than those of security**. In the received reading, whilst securitization raises issues into the realm of security policies and practices (arrow 2a in Figure 1), **desecuritization lowers issues back into the realm of ‘regular politics’ or removes issues from the political agenda altogether** (arrow 1 in Figure 1). ¶ **Desecuritization can be achieved through a number of options: by simply not talking about issues in terms of security, by keeping responses to securitized issues in forms that do not create security dilemmas** **or other vicious spirals**, **and by moving security issues back into ‘normal politics’** (Wæver 2000, 253). These options can follow objectivist, constructivist or deconstructivist strategies in bringing about desecuritization (Huysmans (1995, 65–67). These strategies differ in regard to how the process relates to the claimed threat: has the threat been dealt with, can the security drama be somehow handled from without, or can identities beyond security threats be produced from within the process. ¶ **Beyond conceptualizing desecuritization as an option or a strategy, it has also been viewed from the viewpoint of political actors** (de Wilde 2008, 597), **and their political moves in games of contestation and resistance** (Vuori 2011a, 2015). **There can be desecuritizing actors who evade, circumvent or directly oppose securitizing moves** by, for example, emphasizing competing threats (de Wilde 2008, 597). Security policies aim at desecuritization (the solution to the threatening situation), but desecuritization can also happen independently from the actions of securitizing or desecuritizing actors: the original security problem may be solved, institutions may adapt through new reproductive structures, discourses may change (e.g., with the loss of interest or audiences), and the original referent object may be lost (de Wilde 2008). ¶ **A key issue of debate has been on whether desecuritization can be considered to be an active political process, or whether desecuritization can only happen as a fading away of the issue** (Behnke 2006, 65): the question is whether the logic and possibility of securitization is necessarily retained in explicit discussions of whether an issue has retained the status of a security issue. **As empirical studies of securitization and desecuritization dynamics** (e.g., Salter and Mutlu 2013; Lupovici 2014; Vuori 2015; Donnelly 2015) have shown, **it is difficult to point to a definitive end point for either securitization or desecuritization: political and social situations evolve**. Whichever the philosophical stance on how and whether desecuritization can be achieved (Vuori 2011a), such **empirical studies show that political actors do make active desecuritization moves**. ¶ Indeed, systematizing empirical studies of desecuritization, Hansen (2012, 529; 539–545) has identified four ideal type forms for the concept. In regard to its issues of concern, namely the status of enmity and the possibility of a public sphere, when a larger conflict is still within the realm of possibility, but **when a particular issue is presented with terms other than security, we have an instance of (1) ‘change through stabilisation**’ (arrow 2b in Figure 1); when another issue takes the place of a previously securitized issue, **we have (2) ‘replacement’; when the originally phrased threat is resolved, we have** (3) **rearticulation**; and finally**,** when potentially insecure subjects are marginalized through depoliticization, we have (4) ‘silencing’ (types 2–3 are represented by arrow 1 in Figure 1). ¶ The previous literature on both securitization (arrow 2a in Figure 1) and desecuritization (arrow 1 in Figure 1) has produced ample illustrations of both dynamics. As a brief example of how both dynamics can alter between the same political actors, we can use some of the vicissitudes of Sino-Soviet relations. ¶ China entered the Cold War in the Soviet camp and relied on the Soviet Union as the guarantee of the international security of the new People’s Republic. Chinese views in the late 1940s clearly structured the world into two opposing camps, with China firmly in the Soviet one (Mao 1949). In the 1950s, however, Sino-Soviet relations soured, and the following ‘Sino-Soviet split’ (Lüthi 2008) has been used as an example of the capacity of ‘parochial’ securitizations to become disaffected by or even be withdrawn from dominant ‘macrosecuritizations’ (Buzan and Wæver 2009, 257). ¶ Following the split, Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s were characterized by intensive ideological conflict, and Mao Zedong securitized Soviet revisionism as a major threat for the Chinese Communist Party (Vuori 2011b). Indeed, newly available documents suggest that it was the Chinese side, in effect Mao Zedong, which was more active in the pursuit of ideological conflict (Lüthi 2008, 2). In his securitization of the Soviet Union, Mao linked the revisionism he identified there to that which he also securitized domestically (Vuori 2011b), and the issue of revisionism was presented as an issue of life and death for the party. ¶ Sino-Soviet relations began to mend in the 1980s with the removal of a number of political obstacles and with the intensification of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union (Wishnick 2001). Yet, it is only with the fall of the Soviet Union that we can see an overall desecuritization in the form of rearticulation (Hansen 2012, 542–544) taking place in Sino-Russian relations. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, China’s line was not to take the lead in international affairs. China worked towards ‘world multipolarization’, which was exemplified with China and Russia forming a ‘strategic partnership’ in 1996. China and Russia even shared the same ‘threat package’ of ‘terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism’ (the ‘three evils’) within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Jackson 2006, 310). These are strong indicators of how the two states have managed to reform their identities away from the Sino-Soviet antagonism. In the overall state relations then, we can see a rearticulative desecuritization tactic at play on both sides: ever since the early 1980s, China’s policy towards the Soviet Union (and later Russia) shifted from antagonism to one of collaboration and negotiation rather than securitization.¶ **Desecuritization can be conceptualized** in the above manner **as a negative ontological corollary to securitization**. Yet, **it is also prudent to investigate securitization and desecuritization as political moves in order to potentially understand the logic of when and how they are wielded in practical politics**. It is proposed here that in addition to instances where a securitized situation is dismantled (arrow 1 in Figure 1), **desecuritization can also be viewed as a political move that can be deployed before ‘securitization plays’ in a game** of securitization (arrow 2a in Figure 1). In other words, **desecuritization moves** – **both in terms of discourse and practice** – **can be used in a pre-emptive manner before the threshold of securitization is reached** (arrow 2b in Figure 1). For Wæver (2000, 254), silencing can be a strategy to ‘pre-empt or forestall securitization’. We argue here that beyond silencing, **active desecuritization efforts can be made to block the escalation of a contention**. Thereby, in addition to change through stabilization (Hansen 2012) and the silencing of an issue (Wæver 2000), **there can be explicit rebuttals of security frames and claims before they are solidified into policy. This tactic can be termed ‘pre-emptive desecuritization through rebuttal’.**

### Core: FW—2NC

#### 1---counter-interpretation---epistemology comes first---if we disprove the justifications of the plan, it means you should be suspect about the aff’s conclusions and the efficacy of the aff

#### 2---clash---our model is best for it---the aff chose their reps, they should be prepared to defend them---ensures in-depth debates about the aff instead of stale and generic debates about implementation

#### 3---implementation is unrealistic---the aff doesn’t actually get implemented if you vote for them, which means you should prioritize subject formation from our epistemological orientations

#### 4---Epistemology comes first---IR constitutes itself through linguistic and discursive practices like the aff---policy cannot be disentangled from its epistemological justifications

**Ringmar 14** – Erik Ringmar is professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at İbn Haldun Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey; 2014 (“Performance, Not Performativity: An Embodied Critique of Post-Structural IR Theory”, *Performativity and Agency in International Politics*, Available online at <https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/files/6266345/7512005.pdf>, Accessed 03-08-2021)

**When applied to** the study of **international politics**, **this position turns into a critique of** **the state**, or rather, a critique of sovereignty. **There is no state**, say post-structural international relations scholars such as Cynthia Weber and David Campbell, **at least if we take the state to constitute a pre-existing subject to which sovereignty can be attached as an attribute.9 Focusing** on “institutions,“ the “people,“ or perhaps on the state as a transcendental idea, **mainstream accounts always presuppose that which they intend to prove**. Instead **sovereignty must be understood as the process through which political subjects** **come to constitute themselves as such**. “I suggest,“ says Weber, “that sovereign nation-states are not pre-given subjects but in process and that **all subjects in process** (be they individual or collective) **are the ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted**.”10

Weber's idea of “performatively enacted practices” needs further elucidation.11 Even if we reject the idea of a pre-given self, there is certainly the illusion of such a being, and the question thus becomes how that illusion arose. According to poststructural theory, **the self is created through reiterative linguistic practices**. **Language precedes the** **human subject**, they explain; **we are born into language**, **and language is best understood** **as a semiotic structure where** the **meaning** of each word **is constituted by** its **difference** **from other words**. It is, as Ferdinand Saussure once argued, the structure as a whole that ultimately determines what things mean. According to performativity theorists, in other words, structure is to practice as langue is to parole; as the abstract rules that make possible the production of grammatical sentences, that is, are to the production of an actual sentence.12 A structure, like langue, is a complex of rules with a virtual existence whereas practice, like speech, is an enactment of these rules in space and time.

But a semiotic structure is not yet a sovereign self. **We move closer to the subject once we** **realize that words do not only mean things but also do things in the world**. Words have what John Austin's in How to Do Things with Words, 1962, called a “perlocutionary force.”13 The proverbial example is the “I do” of the wedding ceremony. By speaking the words, you are not merely conveying meaning, you are also doing something, you are constituting a marriage. The words are performed and thereby enacted.14 Adding to Austin's conclusions, Derrida emphasizes what he calls the “citational” quality of even the most pragmatic forms of language use. That is, **the texts we invoke always cite seemingly absent contexts from which they ultimately derive their meaning.** “Could a performative utterance succeed,” Derrida asks,

if its formulation did not repeat a “coded” or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a “citation”?15

This is how the subject comes to constitute itself. “The subject is inscribed in language, is a 'function' of language, becomes a speaking subject only by making its speech conform … to the system of the rules of language as a system of differences.”16 The human subject is “a being devoid of Being until it is organized by a system of codes.”17

This is an argument further developed by Judith Butler.18 **Our identities take shape**, she says, **through the perlocutionary force of the discourse we apply to ourselves**. Talking about the being that we take our selves to be, **we quote statements that connote normalcy and imply acceptance** much as a lawyer might cite supporting precedents in a court of law. **By making performative statements**, and applying them to ourselves, **a certain person comes into being**; performativity is “a compulsory reiteration of those norms through which a subject is constituted”; “subjectivity is performatively constituted by the ritualized production or codified social behavior.”19 **These statements**, says Butler, **are not only repetitive** and ritualistic **but also socially determined**. If we misquote the established discourse and fail to construct an appropriate self for ourselves, we are punished through various, often surprisingly severe, social sanctions.20

This is the argument which Cynthia Weber and David Campbell apply to the study of international relations. “There is no sovereign or state identity behind expressions of state sovereignty,“ Weber summarizes. “**The identity of the state is performatively constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its results**.”21 **States**, Campbell concurs, **are “unavoidably paradoxical entities which do not possess pre-discursive**, **stable identities**.”22 **Foreign policy discourse is “a persistent impersonation that passes as the real**”; **states state and through their statements they instate and reinstate themselves as sovereign actors**. This is a constantly ongoing process. “For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death.“23 Weber talks about sovereignty as a form of simulation, but while simulations usually are defined through their likeness to the real, the world politics which she describes contains no originals.24

As an illustration, **consider** Thomas **Hobbes'** solution to the problems of life in the state of nature.25 By handing over their right to self-defense to a common power who guarantees their security, individuals no longer threaten each other. Yet **prior to the signing of this contract**, **there was no people**; **the people literally declared itself into existence**.26 Derrida analyzes **the American Declaration of Independence** of 1776 in the same terms.27 **The authors of the declaration**, he says, **referred to themselves as the** “**Representatives**” of “the good People of these Colonies,” **but these** people **did not exist** **prior to the issuing of the declaration** itself. It was only through the signatures that the people came to constitute itself as such. “The people” who authorizes their representatives to make the declaration is invented by the declaration they authorize.28

**Or consider the case of military interventions**, as discussed by both Weber and Campbell. Interventions are violations of independence, but as such they exemplify the power of the same performative practice. Military interventions, we might say, constitute a discursive boundary along which the principle of sovereignty breaks down. By analyzing where and how this boundary is drawn, we learn where and how sovereignty is produced.29 It is for that reason interesting to see how military interventions have been justified. In Writing Security, **Campbell discusses a striking example**: **the Requerimiento**, **the short proclamation which the conquistadors read** to the native populations of the New World **before they took possession** of their land and imposed European laws on them.30 “Therefore I beg and require you as best I can,” the conquistadors declared, in Spanish, to the puzzled locals, “...

we will not compel you to turn Christians. But if you do not to it … with the help of God, I will enter forcefully against you, and I will make war everywhere and however I can, and I will subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and His Majesty, and I will take your wives and children, and I will make them slaves ...31

As Weber shows in Simulating Sovereignty, **the right to violate sovereignty has continued to be a privilege of the most powerful** states. At the time of World War I, **national self-determination was enshrined as an absolute principle**; absolute, that is, **as long as it did** **not run up against the** fundamental **interests of** the **leading states** — compare the invasion in support of the Whites after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Sovereignty continues to be the core principle of the international system to this day, except when it is in the interests of the United States and its allies to violate it ― witness Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 (and, we might add, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003). As Campbell points out, **the sovereign state continues to be defined through its opposite** ― **the “failed states” which exist outside** the peaceful, democratic and prosperous core administered by the Americans.32 It is consequently only by extending U.S. hegemony that problems such as terrorism can be addressed. **This too is a performative practice**: **interventions are a way of specifying “the way the world (now) is,” and like all similar** **geopolitical descriptions it contains a prescription for how to “put the world right.**”33

#### 5---our model is fair---the aff still wins the debate if they prove their epistemology is good---the 1ac is still the stasis point of the round

### Core: A2—“Perm do both”

#### Either links are disads to the perm or it severs the aff’s reps---makes the aff a moving target and guts stable neg ground---reason to reject the perm

#### Sequencing DA---reps come prior to the aff---embracing *in*security is the only way to intervene in the normalization of security in everyday politics---the alt is a prerequisite to the aff---that’s Bourbeau

#### The perm masks the violence of the 1ac by instrumentalizing the alt

Laura **Sjoberg 13**, Department of Political Science, University of Florida , Gainesville The paradox of security cosmopolitanism?, Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, 29-34

Particularly, **Burke** suggests that security cosmopolitanism ‘rejects a procedural faith in strongly post-Westphalian forms of government and democracy’ (p. 17) and **reiterates that such an approach includes ‘no automatic faith in any one institutional design’** (p. 24). This seems to move away from one of the prominent critiques of, in Anna Agathangelou and Ling’s (2009) words, the ‘neoliberal imperium,’ as reliant on Western, liberal notions of governance to the detriment of those on whom such a form of government is imposed. Burke clearly problematizes this imposition, framing many of the serious problems in global politics as a result of ‘choices that create destructive dynamics and constraints’ (p. 15) at least in part by Western, liberal governments – characterizing modernity as culpable for insecurity. **At the same time, the solution seems to be clearly situated within the discursive framework of the problem.** Burke suggests that there should be a primary concern for ‘effectiveness, equality, fairness, and justice – not for states, per se, but for human beings, and the global biosphere’ (p. 24). Unless the only problem with modernity is the post- Westphalian structure of the state (which this approach does not eschew, but claims not to privilege), then this statement of values might entrench the problem. Many of the ideas of equality, fairness, and justice that come to mind with the (somewhat rehearsed) use of those words in progressive politics are inseparable from an ethos of enlightenment modernity. This may be problematic on a number of levels. First, **it may fail to interrupt the series of choices that** Burke suggests **produce a cycle of insecurity**. Second, it may fold back onto itself in the recommendations that security cosmopolitanism produces. This especially concerned me in Burke’s discussion of how to end ‘dangerous processes,’ where **he places ‘greater faith in the** ethical, normative, and **legal suppression of dangerous processes** and actions than in formalistic or procedural solutions’ (p. 24). It seems to me that there is a good argument that ‘**suppression’ is itself a ‘dangerous process**,**’ yet Burke’s framework does not really include a mechanism for internal critique.** Another problem that seems to confound security cosmopolitanism is evaluating the relationships between power, governance, and governmentality. There are certainly several ways in which Burke uses a notion of the state that distinguishes security cosmopolitanism from the mainstream neoliberal literature. For example, he characterizes the ‘state as an entity whose national survival depends on its global participation, obligations, and depen- dencies,’ (citing Burke 2013a, 5). This view of the state sees it as not only survival-seeking (in the neo-neo synthesis sense) but also dependent on its positive interactions with other states for survival. Burke’s approach to government/governance initially appears to be global rather than state-based, another potentially transformative move. For example, he sees the job of security cosmopolitanism as to ‘theorize and defend norms for the respon- sible conduct and conceptualization of global security governance’ (p. 21). At the same time, later in the article, Burke suggests entrenching the current structure of the state. His practical approach of looking for the ‘solidarity of the governing with the governed’ seems to simultaneously interrogate the current power structures and reify them. Burke says: Such a ‘solidarity of the governed’ that engages in a ‘practical interrogation of power’ ought to be a significant feature of security cosmopolitanism. At the same time, however, security cosmopolitanism must be concerned with improving the global governance of security by elites and experts. (p. 21) **This attachment to the improvement of existing structures of governance seems to be at the heart of what I see as the failure of the radical potential in the idea of security cosmopolitanism.** When discussing how the power dynamics between the elite and the subordinated might change, Burke suggests that ‘voluntary renunciation of the privileges and powers of both state and corporate sovereignty will no doubt be a necessary feature of such an order’ (p. 25). **Relying on the voluntary renunciation of power by the powerful seems both unrealistic and not particularly theoretically innovative. This seems to be at the center of a paradox inherent in security cosmopolitanism: Faith in the Western liberal state is insidious, but the Western liberal state does not have to be.** **Modernity causes insecurity, but need not be discarded fully.** Some universalizations are dangerous, others are benign. **Dangerous processes must be stopped, even if by dangerous processes**. Moral entrepreneurship is the key, but ther e is no clear foundation for what counts as moral. The security cosmopolitanism critique is inspired by consequentialism, but lacks deontological foundations despite deontological implications. Burke calls for (and indeed demands) to ‘take responsibility for it’ (p. 23) in terms of ‘both formal and moral accountability’ (p. 24). In so doing, he endorses (Booth’s vision of) ‘moral progress’ (p. 25), despite understanding the insidious deployment of various notions of moral progress by others. **Security cosmopolitanism**, then, **is a proclamation for radical change that is** initially **stalled by its internal contradictions** **and** further **handicapped by its lack of capacity to enact the very sort of radical change** Burke sees it as fundamental to righting the wrongs he sees in the world. **The result seems to be the** (potential) **reification of existing governments/governmentality through what essentially appears to be a** non-anthropocentric ‘**human security’ which cannot be clearly distinguished from current notions of human security** (p. 15). **It appears to remain top-down and without clear moral foundation while claiming significant improvement over existing approaches**. **This appearance/seduction of improvement without real promise for change might be more insidious than** the **nihilism** of which many post-structuralists are accused, **as it seductively appears to solve a problem it does not solve**.

# Links

### L: AI Regs

#### The securitization and regulation of AI creates an algorithmic settler colonialism---relegating AI to elitist legal discourse disavows policymakers from the violent and exploitative effects of AI securitization

**Stark et al 20**, Luke Stark---Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Information and Media Studies at the University of Western Ontario, Daniel Greene--- Assistant Professor of Information Studies at the University of Maryland, Anna Lauren Hoffman---Assistant Professor with The Information School at the University of Washington (“Critical Perspectives on Governance Mechanisms for AI/ML Systems,” in The Cultural Life of Machine Learning: An Incursion into Critical AI Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, pp. 269-271)

However, this **emphasis on AI through the lens of already existing cybersecurity discourses and as a national security problem risks further entrenching AI policy in the hands of the few**. **Securitization theory argues that discourses around “security” deploy particular “grammars of securitization” to connect “referent objects, threats, and securitizing actors together” to both depoliticize and control particular sociotechnical arenas** (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009). AI’s securitization shares similar traits with those of cybersecurity more broadly (which itself draws strongly from Cold War discourse around nuclear arms). **AI’s “grammar of securitization” both reinforces AI’s status as an elite technical discourse and distracts from the effects of that same discourse on AI policymaking across the board**. Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009) identify **three “securitization modalities**” which they suggest are particularly powerful in broader cybersecurity discourse: **hyper-securitization** or “**a tendency both to exaggerate threats and to resort to excessive countermeasures**”; **everyday security practices, i.e., “situations in which private organizations and businesses mobilize individual experiences” to “make hyper-securitization scenarios more plausible** by linking elements of the disaster scenario to experiences familiar from everyday life”; **and technification, “a particular constitution of epistemic authority and political legitimacy” whereby some subjects are depoliticized into the realm of the “expert**” (p. 1164). The concept of technification aligns closely with our observations in past work (Greene et al., 2019) and above: that **most AI vision statements or sets of ethical principles seek to restrict debates around the societal impacts of AI to a coterie of technical experts whose positions are posited, chiefly by themselves, as technocratic and thus apolitical**. **Securitization rhetoric thus allows both industry and governments free reign to set the parameters for AI governance on their own terms**. In its simultaneous insistence on the inevitability of AI technologies and that experts’ hold responsibility for ethical AI governance, much **AI discourse also performs a flavor of hyper-securitization, hyping the disruption being produced by AI systems while disavowing the role of policy choices in accepting the deployment of problematic technologies**. And in line with other surveillance technologies such as CCTV cameras, institutional actors are rapidly securitizing AI as a threat in itself if deployed by the wrong hands, while also advocating its use as a means to identify threats to the national polity (Cassiano, 2019; Chen & Cheung, 2017). **The securitization of AI discourses and technologies also further exacerbates existing patterns of digital inequality and power asymmetries between the global North and South**. Rumman Chowdhury and Abeba Birhane argue **the extractive data practices of many AI firms constitute “algorithmic colonialism,” a digital analogue to the exploitative material extraction of natural resources and human capital to which the Global South has been subjected for centuries** (Chowdhury, 2019). **Algorithmic colonialism entails both the depredations of neocolonial powers** (in particular the United States and China) **and those of local elites supported by broader networks of global capital** (Couldry & Mejias, 2019); **it also includes algorithmic settler colonialism, through which settler colonial states look inward to exploit and dispossess the data heritage of indigenous populations** (TallBear, 2013). Finally, **it relies on globalized digital infrastructures to outsource and occlude the immense amounts of human labor of which “AI” services often actually consist: workers around the world are paid meagerly to clean and tag data, train models, and facilitate other purportedly automated services, while the more privileged developers of these systems reap the lion’s share of the financial reward** (Gray & Suri, 2019; Poster, 2019a, 2019b). **Securitization discourse, particularly around technification, thus seeks to push AI/ML systems out of the hands of citizens** in both the global North and South **and to install them as yet another weapon in the game of neoliberal great power politics**. More broadly, **securitization supports and underpins the various regulatory, technical, and discursive proposals outlined above designed to narrow the range of people and institutions able to have a say in the governance of AI**/ML—to varying degrees, the proposed governance mechanisms for these technologies ensure their fate lies with a particular subset of more or less privileged individuals.

### L: China

#### China threat discourse is a self-fulfilling prophecy---securitization legitimizes colonial occupation to create the conditions for miscalculation and militarization

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**The China threat discourse is linked to a bipolar worldview. Through the workings of Western historical analogy, China replaces past enemies, such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, as the ‘Other’ against which the West defines and understands itself** (Kopper & Peragovics, 2019). Western and metropolitan states frequently contrast their own benignity with the China threat. As a result, despite arguments that engagement with China threatens islanders' ability to act in their own interests (due to ‘debt traps’), threatens island ecosystems (due to environmental destruction), and threatens the demographic dominance of islander populations (due to large-scale immigration), such island-centred arguments rapidly recede in the face of assertions of Western superiority.

**The China threat discourse is not merely a means of distancing an island or archipelago from China but also a means of bringing an island or archipelago into closer relation with its existing colonial or metropolitan state. The USA is prominent here both because it has militarised numerous island territories worldwide and because other Western and metropolitan powers** (e.g. Japan relative to Okinawa, Denmark relative to Kalaallit Nunaat, Australia relative to Papua New Guinea, France relative to New Caledonia) **cannot represent themselves as equal competitors with China in a multipolar world and must position themselves as allies of the USA and potential alternatives to China**. Such a bipolar perspective is unhelpful for **islanders**, who **are cast as “pawns in a geopolitical chess game between larger powers**,” included within this or that sphere of influence, **rather than as actors in their own right** (Davis, Munger, & Legacy, 2020).

5.2. Choosing sides

Western and metropolitan powers frequently seem more concerned with islands’ locations than with islanders (Flint, 2021). All our narratives involve instances of forced relocation. These are not exceptional. For example, between 1967 and 1973, the British government undertook the wholesale eviction of the Chagos Islanders to Seychelles and Mauritius, making way for a joint British-USA military base. Similarly, the histories of USA and French nuclear testing in Oceania illustrate the impact of remoteness from the metropole: it is easy to ignore the welfare of distant Indigenous populations.

In the past, “loss of land in one colonial site precipitated the extraction of labourers from another and vice versa” (Banivanua Mar, 2016, p. 46). The same is true today, when the time and place of USA military presence depends on constantly shifting geostrategic factors. Plans are made to move US Marines from Okinawa to Guåhan at the same time as plans are made to construct new military facilities at Henoko Bay on Okinawa. The Japanese government's attentiveness to conditions on Okinawa's smaller islands seems largely driven by military concerns in Tokyo. Kalaallit Nunaat is now at the centre of discussion in both Denmark and the USA, Jamaica feels itself under military pressure from the USA, and the USA and Australia plan to strengthen their military presence in Papua New Guinea by expanding Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island—not due to any obvious Chinese military threat to Western and metropolitan interests but instead due to a Chinese economic challenge to Western and metropolitan dominance. As Davis (2011, p. 221) notes of USA overseas military bases in Oceania and the Caribbean, “**the imposition of bases on** these **islands comes with a painfully obvious political irony. The US is using territories denied basic rights of freedom and self-determination to use military force that, ostensibly, is being used to promote these same values**.”

It is not lost on island governments that **heavy military or economic engagement with a Western or metropolitan state is prone to be interpreted as a wholesale rejection of military or economic engagement with China—and vice versa**. Thus, Kalaallit Nunaat's acceptance of Danish and USA investment is widely seen as a promise that Chinese businesses will not be permitted to play a major role in Kalaallit Nunaat's economy, and the Jamaican government must constantly weigh the potential economic benefits it receives from China against the risk of being deemed a threat to USA security. Similarly, it is suggested that long-term maintenance of aid and development assistance from New Zealand to Niue and the Cook Islands and from Australia to Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands is contingent upon these island territories pulling back from engagement with China. Western engagement in Oceania appears increasingly “reactionary,” with New Zealand and Australia playing catch-up on aid and the USA explicitly highlighting the China threat as the key reason for boosting its presence (Szadziewski, 2020, p. 3). The bipolar perspective on international politics seeks to force island states and territories to choose sides between China and the West.

5.3. A USA threat?

In our island narratives, **militarisation by colonial or metropolitan powers is explained in part by the threat of Chinese aggression. This argument is circular, given that it is precisely the presence of Western military installations and USA colonial outposts that could make these islands sites of military conflict**. At heart are “competing securities” (Davis, 2020, p. 42), with the metropolitan state's “national security” often existing in tension with islanders' own conceptions of ‘security’. “Danger is not an objective condition” (Campbell, 1992, p. 1), and “viewing continental geographies from the perspective of the sea” (Bremner, 2016) can clarify aspects of both island-mainland and mainland-mainland relationships.

Some colonisers and metropolitan powers seek to entrench their interests in island territories by deploying the USA as a bogeyman: while China in all cases remains the primary discursive threat, the governments of Denmark and Japan have warned their respective colonised islands that engagement with China or failure to accede to metropolitan desires risks the USA just doing what it wants regardless. In the case of Okinawa, this involves building and retaining military bases despite local protests, and in the case of Kalaallit Nunaat, it involves warnings of USA military intervention should the island open itself up to Chinese businesses. Even though the only actual military presence on these islands belongs to either the USA and/or the coloniser (China currently possesses one overseas military base, located in Djibouti), and even when metropolitan politicians hint of USA military invasion in the face of Chinese business activity, it is China that is the primary enemy in the discourse.

5.4. Neocolonial entrenchment

**When China is discussed in relation to colonised islands, it is often as a monolithic state entity**, with little or no distinction between individuals, private companies, state-owned enterprises, universities, and central and local government bodies. Furthermore, island perspectives on China tend to focus on triangular (Guåhan-USA-China or Jamaica-USA-China) or four-sided (Kalaallit Nunaat-USA-Denmark-China or Okinawa-USA-Japan-China) power relationships, with little reference to other colonised peoples and territories. Despite the bonds of transnational Indigenous activism, regional cultural and business bodies, regional governance institutions, etc., islanders largely remain within colonially structured understandings of their islands’ places in the world. Some islanders believe the USA is acting oppressively, but we find little evidence of islanders seeking to use the expansion of Chinese economic activity to challenge the USA. In Kalaallit Nunaat, however, engagement with China and the USA is seen as a means of challenging the coloniser, Denmark (Kwong & Wong, 2020). Colonised societies may be open to wielding whatever decolonial tools are at their disposal, even when this means navigating conflicting sources of and responses to colonial power (Harrison & Popke, 2018).

**The existential nature of the purported China threat—with its military conflict, violently extractive environmental devastation, and population replacement—is used to justify neocolonial entrenchment by the coloniser or metropolitan power**. Traditional methods of maintaining influence in and reaping benefits from former colonies are coming under increasing critical scrutiny. As colonisers struggle to portray tied aid, immigration schemes, and modernisation programmes as purely beneficent, **the China threat discourse presents an opening for continued privileged influence. Metropolitan essentialisations of Indigenous peoples as part of nature and thus as fundamentally irrational and non-modern** (Chandler & Reid, 2019) furthermore **preclude Indigenous peoples from making their own decisions on matters within the realm of rationality and modernity, thereby justifying Western paternalistic policymaking**.

Optimistically, we may speak of places such as Niue, Barbados, the Maldives, and the Solomon Islands being able to weigh the options and choose the partners that best suit their strategic needs. Often though, this means using the China threat that has been deployed by the coloniser to extract further economic support from the coloniser, which may be what the coloniser wanted all along. Although the acquisition of funds to pay for islander priorities is positive, it remains in the interests of the colonial or metropolitan state to use such funds to maintain influence.

For example, Kalaallit Nunaat certainly benefits from having Danish investment in its airports, but Denmark uses this investment to reinforce the idea that Kalaallit Nunaat cannot survive without Danish support. The Danish and USA governments are actively driving away potential Chinese investors and business partners and then offering to fill the subsequent funding gaps. This follows a wider pattern of Western and metropolitan governments simultaneously 1) affirming islanders' rights to make their own decisions, 2) presenting island-metropole economic linkages as indicative of the former's negative dependence on the latter, and 3) working to prevent islands from forming alternative or parallel dependencies (Grydehøj, 2020b).

**Western warnings that China engages in ‘debt trap diplomacy’** and that Chinese loans, grants, and investment should be avoided at all costs **thus seem self-serving. For many islands, the choice may be between making deals with Chinese actors or making even worse deals with other actors**. Jamaica's indebtedness, for example, long predates its receipt of Chinese aid and investment, with the island state being placed under heavy financial and political obligations to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in particular. In fact, funds derived from Chinese investments in Jamaica have been crucial to repaying Jamaica's IMF debt (Johnston, 2015). Across Oceania, openness toward engagement with China has partly been in response to the impacts of Western aid contingent upon neoliberal structural reforms and other burdens (Rodd, 2020; Szadziewski, 2020). **Guåhan receives an increasing number of Chinese tourists, but the territory's fortification and militarisation have been so thorough as to raise the question of what would become of the island without a Chinese or other existential threat. Alternative futures are difficult to envision when one's whole island has been conceptualised as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier**” (Perez Santos, 2019). **Island dependence becomes self-reinforcing**.

**One advantage to economic engagement with China is precisely that, although strings may be attached, these strings are not colonial**. The governments and peoples of Guåhan, Kalaallit Nunaat, Okinawa, and Jamaica struggle with dependence on economic actors that gain and maintain leverage by insisting on the necessity of following Western or metropolitan practices and relying on Western or metropolitan expertise. Islands should always exercise caution when engaging with powerful external economic actors. However, Chinese corporate focus on profit and state focus on expanding trade and exercising soft power may be a relief for island societies with long histories of outsiders coming in, destroying Indigenous cultures and/or populations, devastating ecosystems, extracting resources for the benefit of the metropole (frequently through enslaved or coerced labour), and then blaming islanders for failing to more closely resemble their colonisers. Chinese business engagement (whether with positive or negative effects on island communities) simply lacks this emotional baggage in most parts of the world. One author of this paper has herself experienced this paternalism in Kalaallit Nunaat, where the Danish system and thought processes are presented as the only proper way of doing things: failure at adapting to these systems is regarded as ineptitude, while desire to try other methods is regarded as a wholesale rejection of Danish people, culture, and influence. In this context, warnings emanating from Denmark regarding both China and the USA and the purported incompatibility of their cultural and political systems with Kalaallit Nunaat reinforce the idea that Inuit are incapable of making their own reasoned decisions.

Across our island narratives, it is warned that increased Chinese tourism and the entrance of Chinese business ventures risk overrunning, overwhelming, or outcompeting island populations. **The spectre of Chinese political and economic domination looms large in the discourse of Western and metropolitan political actors. Yet for many colonised islanders, colonisation and domination by a foreign people is already a fact of life. The epistemic privilege through which the West takes for granted its own centrality has contributed to island engagement with China being conceptualised as a form of neocolonialism in the absence of prior colonialism**. A concept that arose in the context of subaltern revolt against Western domination has been repurposed into a Western tool for buttressing its privilege—a privilege that is largely invisible to the West itself but is omnipresent in the eyes of the colonised.

### L: China—2NC

#### Empirics prove China won’t escalate conflict

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(Joshua, “The rise of China, balance of power theory and US national security: Reasons for optimism?” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 43)

This framework carries large implications for scholars and policymakers seeking to understand China’s strategy as its power grows and US relative power declines. As noted, many analysts fear that a rising China will embark on a predatory course designed to push the United States down or from the great power ranks. Although it is difficult in the abstract to describe what the particular elements of Chinese predation may entail, the general concern seems to be that China will adopt steps that will **rapidly shift the distribution of power** its favour by enacting policies that are increasingly costly for a relatively declining United States to overcome, pushing the United States to exhaust itself competing or to surrender the issues at stake, and thus **imperil** the United States’ position as a great power. Elements of this approach might involve Chinese efforts to engage in economic warfare by hindering US economic competitiveness and limiting American economic opportunities; adumbrate US military advantages; undercut US credibility and prestige; and weaken US alliances in East Asia or beyond.55 Furthermore, recent Chinese actions in and around East Asia seemingly give credence to such concerns. After all, the last decade has witnessed China take an increasingly assertive stance in its maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas56 ; enact an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea57 ; make political and economic inroads into Central Asia and Africa58 ; influence the domestic politics of Asia-Pacific states to favour pro-China policies; and expand its defence budget.59 Concurrently, trade tensions with the United States are rising, and the Chinese government has tried to buttress its authority by cracking down on domestic opponents.60

China’s current strategy: Mixed

**It is too early**, however, **to declare Chinese predation a fact**, just as there are reasons to question whether Chinese predation is likely in the future. On one level, and consistent with research by scholars such as Avery Goldstein, Alastair Iain Johnston and others, there are **less-competitive elements** **embedded** in current Chinese strategy.61 **Chinese land reclamation** and military deployments **in the East** and South China Seas, for instance, have mostly involved territories **previously claimed** by the Chinese government – **China has not expanded its maritime claims** so much as **taken a unilateral approach towards resolving existing disputes**.62 Similarly, **China’s ADIZ** move **came after Japan expanded its own ADIZ** and began consolidating control over the disputed Senkaku Islands.63

It is also important to recognise that there are steps China **could** plausibly **have undertaken** in recent years **yet chose not to**. Despite concerns over a Chinese military build-up, for instance, China did not increase the share of state wealth allocated to military spending; military expenditures have remained at 1.9 per cent of Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) since 2009.64 Likewise, China has sustained a **minimalist** nuclear deterrent even though this force is vulnerable to disruption.65 Above all, **China has not tried to form an anti-US alliance** in East Asia – in fact, there is some evidence that China has **sought to keep the United States engaged** in East Asia **rather than exclude it**.66 For example, not only did Chinese President Xi Jinping tell US President Barack Obama in 2014 that the ‘Pacific Ocean has ample space to accommodate our two great nations,’ but China’s Xinhua news agency greeted Donald Trump’s election – after a campaign marked by calls for a reduced US role in the world – with a warning against US isolationism.67 **These moves are not consistent with a predatory campaign**: China is pursuing a mixed strategy that blends both cooperative and competitive elements.

Of course, it is possible that Chinese strategy may give way to predation in the future. Still, the approach developed above highlights that China’s future course will ultimately depend upon China’s threat environment and the constraints and opportunities this imposes. And on this basis, a series of **quantitative** and qualitative indicators provides room for **cautious optimism** that China **will at worst continue its mixed strategy** vis-à-vis the United States. As importantly, there are reasons that China may – under certain conditions – adopt a supportive strategy. The logic here is simple: not only is China’s threat environment such that it is far from clear whether the PRC **would be able to systematically challenge** the United States without **significantly harming its security**, but China faces competitors besides the United States. Combined, these factors should give China pause before pursuing a predatory course, and may even offer ground for supporting the United States.

#### China threats are constructed to justify aggression towards China to protect American identity---makes their impacts a self-fulfilling prophecy

**Turner 13**, Oliver---Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute, 2013 (“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, pp 1-22)

**The modern day China ‘threat’ to the U**nited **S**tates **is not an unproblematic, neutrally verifiable phenomenon. It is an imagined construction of American design and the product of societal representations which**, to a significant extent, **have established the truth that a ‘rising’ China endangers US security.** This is an increasingly acknowledged, but still relatively under-developed, concept within the literature.121 The purpose of this article has been to expose **how ‘threats’ from China towards the U**nited **S**tates **have always been contingent upon subjective interpretation**. The three case studies chosen represent those moments across the lifetime of Sino-US relations at which China has been perceived as most threatening to American security. The ‘threats’ emerged in highly contrasting eras. The nature of each was very different and they emerged from varying sources (broadly speaking, from immigration in the nineteenth century and from ‘great power’ rivalry in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). Yet in this way they most effectively demonstrate how **China ‘threats’ have repeatedly existed as socially constructed phenomenon. Collectively they reveal the consistent centrality of understandings about the U**nited **S**tates **in perceptions of external danger**. They demonstrate that, **regardless of China's ability to assert material force or of the manner in which it has been seen to impose itself upon the U**nited **S**tates, **the reality of danger can be manufactured and made real. China ‘threats’ have always been threats to American identity so that the individual sources of ‘danger’**— whether a nuclear capability or an influx of (relatively few) foreign immigrants— **have never been the sole determining factors.** As James Der Derian notes, danger can be ascribed to otherness wherever it may be found.122 During the mid-to-late nineteenth century and throughout the early Cold War, perceptions of China ‘threats’ provoked crises of American identity. The twenty-first-century China ‘threat’ is yet to be understood in this way but it remains inexplicable in simple material terms. As ever, **the physical realities of China are important but they are interpreted in such a way to make them threatening**, regardless of Beijing's intentions. Most importantly, this article has shown how processes of representation have been complicit at every stage of the formulation, enactment, and justification of US China policy. Their primary purpose has been to dislocate China's identity from that of the United States and introduce opportunities for action. Further, those **policies** themselves **have reaffirmed the discourses of separation and difference which make China foreign from the U**nited **S**tates, **protecting American identity from the imagined threat**. Ultimately, this analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of US China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent that ideas are subordinated or even excluded. Joseph Nye argues that the **China Threat Theory** has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Based upon a crude hypothetical assumption that there exists a 50 per cent chance of China becoming aggressive and a 50 per cent chance of it not, Nye explains, to treat China as an enemy now effectively discounts 50 per cent of the future.123 In such way he emphasises the ideational constitution of material forces and the power of discourse to create selected truths about the world so that certain courses of action are enabled while others are precluded. Assessments such as those of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March 2011 **should therefore not only be considered misguided, but also potentially dangerous.** For while they appear to represent authoritative statements of fact **they** actually **rely upon subjective assumptions about China and** the **material capabilities** he describes. In late 2010 President Obama informed Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that ‘the American people [want] to continue to build a growing friendship and strong relationship between the peoples of China and the United States’.124 The hope, of course, is that a peaceful and cooperative future can be secured. Following the announcement that the Asia Pacific is to constitute the primary focus of Washington's early twenty-first-century foreign policy strategy, American interpretations of China must be acknowledged as a central force within an increasingly pertinent relationship. The basis of their relations will always be fundamentally constituted by ideas and history informs us that particular American discourses of China have repeatedly served to construct vivid and sometimes regrettable realities about that country and its people. Crucially, it tells us that they have always been inextricable from the potentialities of US China policy. As Sino-US relations become increasingly consequential **the intention must be for American representations of the PRC**— and indeed Chinese representations of the United States— **to become the focus of more concerted scholarly attention**. Only in this way can the contours of those relations be more satisfactorily understood, so that the types of historical episodes explored in this analysis might somehow be avoided in the future.

### L: Deterrence

#### The attachment to credible deterrence creates imperial violence and instability---sustained and predictable deterrence postures are impossible in IR, which instead becomes a justification for military interventions

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Siba N. Grovogui, “Time, technology, and the imperial eye,” Time, Temporality and Violence in International Relations: (De)fatalizing the present, forging radical alternatives, 2016, 49-51, <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315883700>

Importantly, **the predicates underlying this ideological formulation of the relationship between the West and others suggests necessity and enforcement through cooperation** or confrontation. In either case, **the contemporaneous Western language of geopolitics has provided pre-ordained answers: redress through treaty** **enforcement**, wars of attrition, **and enforcement through military interventions.** As a result, from the discovery of the New World through the slave trade and colonialism and decolonization, the relations between, on the one hand, continental Europe **states and** European **entities dispersed through the world and**, on the other**, political and cultural entities elsewhere have been mediated by a language of command unilaterally directed at others: the assumption of the sovereign right to defend the ‘national interest’** and unidirectional extra-territoriality.

**There is no standard of violence in this context other than that deemed necessary or sufficient by those with the sovereign right to intervene**. Hence, **it is almost an article of faith that anyone disrupting the prescribed order must pay in discomfort (military coercion),** materials (expropriation under occupation), and sovereignty (stripping local sovereignties of the essential dimensions of sovereignty allowable to the hegemon).

**This predetermination of the terms of the relationships** between Europe and **others has necessarily prescribed a commensurate commitment to the requisite technologies of intervention**. One need not endorse Vijay Prashad’s The Darker Nations (2008) to concur with him that **European violence in non-European empires has been deliberately wedded to the ideology of pre-ordainment**: if no longer the path of God, it is still the path of reason and pragmatism. In any case, to reprise an earlier statement, **the idea that the West has a right of intervention is given, as is the determination to intervene**. Related without dispute are the following: by faith or reason (or today’s rule of law), **Europe is responsible for those who might be outside it; the West is answerable for,** and by right concerned with, **what happens all over the globe; the West will generate** (when necessary in consultation with others) **the principles, norms, and symbols of communications through which assurances are given to the self and others;** **the West alone determines the values or standards by which conformity with and transgressions of its proclaimed universal values are measured**.

**‘Just’ use of violence in this context is measured by its propriety as technique, coterminous with an imperial desire**, to bring pagans, miscreants, and other metaphorically fallen entities back into the fold. This can only be done through intervention by self-professed masters of the universe **to protect themselves and their pre-ordained destiny as inheritors of the Kingdom**, **dispense with illegitimate sovereigns who endanger the Kingdom, and conquer and subordinate** (once in God’s name and now by reason) heathens and other **‘unknowing’ sinners** for their redemption. **This outlook remains central to modern empires and is a key structuring event of international relations [IR].**, morality, **and existence**.

Time, consciousness, affectivity, and law

**The right to intervene has ideational**, constitutional**, and institutional requirements**. **These operate mostly** in the domestic realm when life decisions are made, **particularly in security**, access of resources, and their production, distribution, and consumption. In these latter instances, **questions of t**he constitution and **institutions** such as the state **are not merely standards for determining the propriety of conduct of national officialdom** or measures of the satisfaction of citizens with the nature of their relationships with the state. Appreciation of the law, morality, and ethics appears in the national context differently than **in IR where clarification is demanded in the relationships between self and others**, between the freedom and security of nationals and of other nationals, **between the security of one state and other states**. **The responses to these demands depend on intangibles and tangibles**. **The intangibles include psychic dispositions (toward fear**, for instance), **psychological factors** (pertaining to, say, consciousness or awareness, feeling, and motivation) **and symbolic resources (intellectual assets, knowledges).** Together, **these define the sense individuals and collectives have of the physical and moral landscape of international relations**. **By landscape, I mean** not only regions and the mechanisms and institutions connecting them but also **the flows and dynamics traversing them**. The natural corporeal and non-corporeal endowments providing access to this landscape do so through the senses and are expressed through the faculty by which the body perceives external entities.

**From the prior formulation, two kinds of sense are implicated into one another**. **The first is an historical sense** (or appreciation) **of the operation of the senses** (or faculties) **on its objects**. This is determined by the psychology and other sciences of the brain. **The second is a sense producing the faculties that is itself the product of their operations**. One such product is consciousness, also a faculty. **Each influences the other** (Jay 2011). It is often assumed consciousness is formed through the interactions of fundamental entities: time, space, and matter. **Each entity has unique properties, but all are intricately connected in the manners in which knowledge operates**, previously by psychology and now by neuroscience and psychophysics.

To be precise, **the relation relevant to me is not one implicated in the physicality of space-time or time-space**. Rather, **it is phenomenological** – that is, **the manners in which time-space relations are experienced in concrete circumstances**. In this context, consciousness manifests itself as a factor of appreciation of time and space and as a means to integrate the dynamics and flows of time and within space. Consciousness is not the sum of all knowledges available to the individual mind **as it synthesizes the landscape of social relations, regional connections, and human activities in conjunction with temporal** and cultural **understandings of the requirement of life for self and others**. What is it then?

**International relations does not depend on** either constitutional self-understandings by states or **observances of international legal stipulations on global coexistence**. Rather, **the existing** constitutional and **legal dispositions are augmented by temporal factors, including the imperial drive to conquer and colonize any related spatial affects.** Whether these may be called national cultures or not, **spatially defined entities historically internalize feelings toward self and others that leave significant impressions on the mind**, shaping reflexes and moving intellect and body at the time of decision. **These affects**, the way **they shape responses**, **and** the extent to which **they characterize actions** can be filed under the rubric of affectivity.

### L: Miscalc

#### The threat of “miscalc” presumes that risk can be managed through rational decision-making---this model of politics necessitates an extension of control over all facets of the globe

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\*Edited for clarity.

**Important strands of international relations scholarship** have followed the intellectual ascendance of economics and **focus attention** **largely on the putatively controllable world of risk, while largely neglecting the uncontrollable world of uncertainty. By doing so, they train our sight only on control power, sideline protean power, and are unable to analyze the unpredictable.** For example, in her authoritative and sophisticated analysis of risk-taking in international politics Rose McDermott writes that risk inheres in any situation where there exists uncertainty.59 She combines both risk and uncertainty as she identifies underlying mechanisms of risk propensity that occur under conditions of “high” uncertainty. While it is impossible to scale the magnitude of uncertainty, it is possible to distinguish between two different kinds of uncertainty. Known unknowns create operational uncertainty, which, given more or better knowledge and information, may transform into calculable risk. Far from being a panacea, however, in situations of operational uncertainty more or better knowledge or information, as in the squeezing of a balloon, simply pushes radical uncertainty into some other, unrecognized part of the political context. Unknown unknowns are unknowable and cannot be converted to risk. Although she does not make the distinction between the two kinds of unknowns, McDermott acknowledges the importance of operational unknowns. She writes “most complex choices fall under the framework of judgment under uncertainty and decision-making under risk because it is impossible to predict the characteristics of many different variables simultaneously in advance, especially when they may have unknown interaction effects. Even the nature of many of the critical variables may be unknown beforehand.”60 Yet, in line with current practice of **international relations scholarship**, as she further develops and applies prospect theory, McDermott puts aside the problem of uncertainty. She **thus makes invisible the practice-driven, protean power-generating actor responses to** such **uncertainty.** **The present framework insists on the need for completeness, rather than narrow selectiveness, in studying world politics and offers means of considering approaches focusing on risk-based control power alongside those tracing protean power practices in the face of uncertainty.**61 **The** invention and the **destructiveness of** nuclear **weapons epitomizes the quest for control.** The core idea of nuclear **deterrence is “the threat that leaves something to chance.”** Based on the previously noted mistranslation of Weber, “chance” here is understood to describe risk rather than risk and uncertainty. Possible protean power effects are thus rendered invisible. Articulated and developed by Thomas Schelling in the 1950s and 1960s, **a risk-based understanding of chance has had a pervasive influence on the theory and practice of** nuclear **deterrence for the last half century**.62 **The idea** is based on Schelling’s highly creative conceptual move that **reduces uncontrollable uncertainty to manageable risk and thus from a problem to a solution for the issuing of credible** nuclear **threats.** For Schelling, **uncontrollable, accidental factors feed seamlessly into an escalation of controlled, competitive risk-taking. Accidents**, in this theory**, are drawn from a known probability distribution that is said to increase as each party draws closer to the brink. In Schelling’s theory** nuclear **accidents do not exist. For accidents do not cause nuclear war; decisions do. Accidents are reduced to decisions to manage risk in a particular manner. They are** no more than **appendices of rational decisions. And decisions are constrained by** the **logic** that deterrence theory articulates. Schelling does not allow the theoretical possibility of accidental nuclear use or nuclear accidents to impose any limits on risk-based deterrence models. In this reading, “**the threat that leaves something to chance**” **is so only in terms of probabilities transforming** nuclear **weapons into means of control, wielded by actors with select attributes, rather than creating room for unanticipated challenges to existing rules of interaction.** It squeezes out of the model unacknowledged, unfathomable unknowns, contingencies and indeterminacies. **Establishing the power of full control over “the** ultimate **weapon” upholds the claim that the theory explains the uncontrollable.** Probabilistic and possibilistic thinking are not interactive and co-evolving but fuse into a double mask. By transforming, in one theoretical move, uncontrollable uncertainty into manageable risk Schelling offers a compelling theory of control power.63 With the elaboration of the concept of an organizational doomsday machine subsequent scholarship on nuclear deterrence has taken this approach to its (il)logical extreme.64 **Schelling’s work has had large consequences** not only for the study of nuclear deterrence but **for the study of war.** In the last two decades, **students of security studies have developed and tested extensively what is now known as the bargaining model of war. It offers a risk-based view of war that highlights control power and mostly disregards uncertainty and protean power dynamics.**65 **This is made possible by the bargaining model’s first core assumption: the parties to a conflict subscribe to the same understanding of how the world works.**66 This is vital for the model to work. **Yet it is often wildly implausible to believe that parties locked in possibly deadly conflict share the same understanding.**67 **Imagination and potentiality of how the world might work, central to protean power analysis, thus escape the attention of the bargaining model. Uncertainty is key** in allowing competing models of the world to be sustained. I**t leads to irreducible and consequential deviations away from expectations created or implied by risk-based models. Convergence of views around one model thus does not occur. Based on the implausible assumption of convergence, rationalist models proceed to think about actors with different preferences.** If they decide to fight, each side will pay a cost while fighting**. These costs open up a range of bargained solutions that both sides should prefer to war. For the bargaining model, the puzzle of war is why the two parties fail to settle within the range of bargained solutions before war breaks out, knowing that war is always inefficient after its outbreak. The answer** to the puzzle **lies in the existence of imperfections in information and the incentive to misrepresent,** on the one hand, **and the inability to credibly commit to an agreement that prevents war**, on the other. **The model introduces a second core assumption: updating of information will select out inferior models of the world. But in security affairs, misperceptions, the fog of war, and a host of other factors prevent the emergence of a succession of probability-based, improved models.** There exists no urn from which to pull red or white balls; players are color-blind; and there is no way of updating expectations based on the number of balls left in the urn. Instead, **there is a lot of bluffing and interpretation. Crises are generators of uncertainty rather than risks with associated probabilities that are known or knowable**.68 In short, **on issues of war** and peace **world politics simply does not offer**, as the bargaining model assumes, **a sufficiently large number of trials to select out inferior causal models. Even if all actors shared the same model of the world, which they do not, these models would fail.** By making strong but implausible assumptions, **the bargaining model of war focuses on the calculable directionality of control power and overlooks the** creative imagination, or even **improvised coping that generates protean power and transforms the surrounding uncertainty further still.** **The bargaining model holds that different conclusions about future outcomes are possible, but only because of differences in information not because of differences in worldviews about the salience of risk and uncertainty. The probability of victory in any conflict and the cost of fighting are assumed to be calculable and subject to known or knowable probabilities by all parties to the conflict. However, disagreements are unavoidable when actors put the same information to work in different worldviews.** As is true elsewhere**, in world politics rationality takes the form of many situationally specific kinds of reasonableness.** And **standards of reasonableness differ in worldviews populated by** different cosmologies, different historical memories, different conspiracy theories, different emotions, and **different** moral **prescriptions. For example, during the Cold War many American analysts and decision-makers believed that they had reached an understanding with the Soviet Union about the stability-inducing effects of a robust arms control regime. Russian archives opened after the end of the Cold War revealed a starkly different picture.** In the mid-1980s, **the Soviet Union had deployed a near-automatic nuclear strike force, which had been decades in the making. Because it was kept totally secret, this doomsday machine lacked the rationality of nuclear deterrence that makes contingent irrationality look rational.**69 “**The Soviet Union**,” writes David Hoffman, “**was looking through an entirely different prism than the United States**.”70 **It is a stroke of luck that today we are in a position to study this near-calamity.** Conversely, **the period of détente in the 1970s rested on a bedrock of illusions that US and Soviet decision-makers shared about each other**. “**The superpowers**,” writes Eric Grynaviski, “**were simply wrong; they did not understand each other as well as they thought**.”71 Misunderstanding in this instance secured cooperation that accurate information would have stymied. Filtered through different worldviews, shared information can be destructive or constructive. It is not the information but the worldview that drives actors toward war or peace. Worldviews that incorporate constitutive elements of risk/uncertainty and actor experiences can capture protean power dynamics; information models that exclude those elements cannot. Furthermore, many bargaining models typically suffer from the problem of multiple equilibria – solutions a rational player would not depart from voluntarily. The folk theorem establishes that the existence of multiple equilibria is unavoidable in repeated games with incomplete information and an appropriate discount for future payoffs. More complicated models that include uncertainty do exist. But the practical challenge of building models that can handle non-Gaussian distributions is formidable. In Lance Taylor’s words, “reliably estimating parameters that specify the form of distributions with fat tails is difficult if not impossible – one reason why this approach has not been widely pursued.”72 Put simply, because models that incorporate uncertainty are messy and technically intractable most scholars of international relations who have adopted the bargaining model do not work with them and thus make us overlook the relevance of uncertainty in shaping actor responses in world politics. Because of these shortcomings, scholars relying on the bargaining model of war systematically bias political analysis toward the management of risk through control power. One of the original proponents of **the bargaining model of war**, James Fearon, **conflates risk and uncertainty when [it states]** he writes “**given identical information, truly rational agents should reason to the same conclusion about the probability of one uncertain outcome or another**.”73 **This conflation of the two concepts has become deeply engrained in many theoretical extensions and empirical applications of the bargaining model**. Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, for example, build their analysis of different strategies of terrorist violence on the bargaining model of war.74 In doing so, they implausibly assume that terrorists are impelled by the same signaling and commitment logic as are states. Trafficking in uncertainty, they are not. Matthew Kroenig’s analysis of nuclear bargaining implicitly equates risk with uncertainty.75 He argues that coercive nuclear bargaining and nuclear brinkmanship rest on the manipulation of risk through “anguished” calculations of probabilities in situations of uncertainty and incomplete information. Page Fortna’s analysis of ceasefire agreements is similarly inattentive to the difference between risk and uncertainty.76 Fortna argues that war is risky since there is always a chance of losing rather than winning; uncertainty can undermine cooperation even when perfect information should yield cooperation automatically. Her empirical analysis relies on statistical models and significance tests that operate entirely in the world of risk.77 Finally, relying on the language of the bargaining model of war, Debs and Monteiro argue that power shifts can be explained by information problems. Their model “provides specific probabilities for each event. The fact that the deterrer and target are uncertain about each other’s actions is realistic.”78 In sum, **important analyses of nuclear deterrence, terrorist violence, nuclear brinkmanship, ceasefires in civil conflicts, and power shifts are either reducing uncertainty to risk or treating the terms as synonyms.**79 **This is odd in light of the models’ focus on bargaining which is conducted by specific actors with specific experiences and balancing unique, locally anchored but broadly influential understandings of reality. Hunches and intuitions** **may be hard to measure and cannot**, by definition, **be systematized into a single model; nevertheless, they can play important roles in shaping bargaining outcomes**. In their inattentiveness to such dynamics the authors of existing models differ from Napoleon who, acknowledging risk and uncertainty, had strong feelings about his generals. Although many of them were smart, he was partial to the lucky ones. The problem lies in the realm of theory rather than its application to questions of security. Hedley Bull noticed long ago that **the central ideas** in Thomas Schelling’s work **were not derived solely from formal game theory operating in the world of risk; they also represented “an imaginative conceptual exercise” dealing with the problem of uncertainty**.80 In contrast to Schelling himself, scholars applying the bargaining model of war have overlooked the centrality of imagination. “In the final analysis,” Schelling writes, “**we are dealing with imagination as much as with logic ... poets may do better than logicians at this game ... Logic helps ... but usually not until imagination has selected some clue to work on**.”81 **Bypassi**ng **the technical virtuosity of formal models of war**, Jonathan Mercer similarly **stress**es **the importance of creativity. Neglecting the importance of creativity** political scientists **risk[s] “turning sophisticated political actors into lab rats ... They have done so because predicting creativity is difficult** and perhaps impossible – if one can predict creativity it cannot be very creative.”82 In short, **imagination and creativity are integral to and constitutive of a world that mixes risk with uncertainty and control with protean power.**

### L: NATO Co-op

#### NATO cooperation shores up racial capitalism---empirics prove alliances are sustained by colonial interventions and media campaigns---err neg on impact analysis because their threat inflations are connected to propaganda to secure Western interests

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The celebration of **NATO’s 70 years of existence provides** another **opportunity to unearth the real history of the ideas, practices and destruction wrought by this military alliance. Even with** the clear **exposure of the cooperation between NATO, the CIA and the British MI6 to spread terror and psychological warfare** in Europe immediately after the formation of this military alliance, the **mainstream media, academics and policy makers remain silent on** activities of the ‘stay behind armies’ and **‘false flag’ operations that distorted the real causes of insecurity** in the world after 1945. The evidence of the manipulations of the peoples of the world to ensure the continued survival of NATO has been well documented in the fraudulent interventions and bombings in the Balkans right up the present multiple wars against the peoples of Iran. Vijay Prashad had **identified NATO as the prime defender of** the Atlantic project. This Atlantic project, he noted was, “a fairly straightforward campaign by the **propertied classes** to maintain or restore their **position of dominance**.” This Atlantic Project was anchored in the military alliance called NATO with its principal work, that of reversing the South Project; the struggles for peace bread and justice by the poorer citizens of the planet, especially those who had emerged on the world stage after the decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. **The ostensive reason for the founding of NATO was to ‘thwart’ Soviet aggression, but in practice the organization was a prop for western capital and** after the fall of the Berlin Wall, became the core prop for **Wall Street**. In this year, there will be many commentaries on the fact that the existence of NATO reflects a Cold War relic, that NATO is obsolete and lost its mandate, but very few will link the expansion of NATO to the military management of the international system. Prior to 1991, the planners of NATO could justify the existence of NATO on ideological and political grounds, but with the threat of a multi polar world and the diminution of the dollar, NATO expanded to the point where this author joined with others in labelling this organization Global NATO to reflect its current imperial mandate. **The Global thrust of NATO now comprises 29 members from Europe and North America along with 41 ‘partners’ that had started off under the banner of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council** (NACC) in 1991. **Since that time, NATO has launched a lengthy war without end in Afghanistan, colluded in the destruction of Iraq and conspired with militarists to forge ‘Partnership for Peace’** (**with** most **members of the former Warsaw Pact states**). The core 29 members are now enmeshed with treaties and undertakings from states involved in the Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. There are also **the ‘partners’ from across the globe: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan**. This enlargement **served the military purposes of encircling China and Russia** who military planners in the West targeted. There is no shortage of literature on NATO and its milestones, but very **few have documented the real crimes of this global network of anticommunist operatives who precipitated real terror and psychological warfare** against the citizens of Europe and North America **while supporting** mass **atrocities from Algeria to Indonesia**, and South Africa. Books such as that of NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe by Danielle Ganser and The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War, by Stephen Kinzer used rigorous research techniques to uncover the dark history of NATO. These two books can be distinguished from the bland international relations texts that discusses NATO inside the old calculations of ‘strategy,’ ‘concert of democracies’, ‘security cooperation’ and the balance of power,’ and spheres of influence. Most recently, this IR rendering of the history of NATO has been served up in a document entitled, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Published by Harvard University with one of the coauthors being a former US ambassador to NATO. This document spelt out ten challenges.[1] However, in a testimony before Congress, Nicolas Burns boiled down the challenge of NATO to one objective; that the current role of NATO must be to contain Russia and China.[2] On the day before the actual 70thanniversary, on April 3, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivered an address to a joint session of the US Congress advocating an expansion of the alliance while promoting a military buildup against Russia. [3] European progressives will have to reflect deeply on whether the current sanctions regime and the special propose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), is ushering in another round of inter imperialist rivalry reminiscent of the currency wars of 1929-1939. Then, the **shifting alliances yielded confusion among working peoples who ultimately went to fight against each other in Europe, spreading barbarism throughout the world, from Auschwitz to Hiroshima.** The continued struggles for bread, peace and justice ensure that it is only the authoritarian leaders from the Global South who are compromised on the real meaning of the existence of NATO. In the present era, **there is a new capitalist competition while** North Atlantic Treaty Organization (**NATO**) **serves as an integral part of the Pentagon’s world command structure.** Recent experiences have demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya that **the moguls of Wall Street are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve the dominance of US capitalism. The destruction of Libya was a classic example of the convergence of finance as warfare, the weaponization of information and incessant bombing to destroy a society.** Where at the start of NATO the war scare was the propaganda method, **In the** current **digital age, brain hacking and the engineering of smart phones have placed** the **giant technology firms** of Apple , Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook **at the forefront of the new weapons platform of NATO and Wall Street.** This analysis is in three parts spelling out the rationale for the call for all progressive forces to join together to concentrate their energies in the dismantling of NATO. NATO at Birth: Stay behind armies, directed terrorist organizations and psychological warfare against Europeans. In the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall there were major press reports on the role of NATO’s stay behind armies that had been operating inside Western Europe since 1949.Ten years earlier, when **the kidnapping and killing of the former Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro** rocked western Europe, it emerged that his demise **had been authored by** clandestine paramilitary network code-named **“Operation Gladio”** that was a false flag operation of NATO. Danielle Ganser’s book, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe had meticulously documented how **NATO funded and often even directed terrorist organizations throughout Europe in what was termed a “strategy of tension” with the aim of preventing a rise of the left in Western European politics**. NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. In the specific case of Italy, Aldo Moro had committed the unforgivable crime of contemplating a government that included Italians who belonged to the Italian Communist Party Right from the start of the Cold war, **the CIA and MI6 had worked closely with former fascists to oppose** citizens and **organizations** in Western Europe **that were anti-capitalists**. Under the leadership of US planners such as Allen Dulles, William Colby, Frank Wisner and later James Angleton, these operatives weaned and nursed a network of agents and secret arms dumps across Europe, a network that would remain secret but active throughout the Cold War. [4] Ganser elaborated on the extensive operations of Operation Gladio all across Europe with the explicit aim of subverting the democratic wishes of European citizens who were opposed to oppression. It is worth quoting at length the role of the secret armies. **“NATO’s “secret armies”** engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. **In Turkey** in 1960, the stay behind army, working with the army, **staged a coup d’état and killed Prime Minister** Adnan **Menderes; in Algeria** in 1961, the French stay-behind army **staged a coup** with the CIA against the French government of Algiers, **which ultimately failed;** in 1967, **the Greek stay-behind army staged a coup and imposed a military dictatorship**; in 1971 in **Turkey**, **after a military coup**, the stay-behind army **engaged in “domestic terror” and killed hundreds**; in 1977 **in Spain, the stay behind army carried out a massacre in Madrid**; in 1980 in Turkey, the head of the stay behind army staged a coup **and** took power; in 1985 **in Belgium, the stay behind attacked and shot shoppers randomly in supermarkets**, killing 28; in Switzerland in 1990, the former head of the Swiss stay behind wrote the US Defense Department he would reveal “the whole truth,” and was found the next day stabbed to death with his own bayonet; and in 1995, England revealed that the MI6 and SAS helped set up stay behind armies across Western Europe.”[5] The mainstream media and University commentaries have not been able to confront this history in so far as the manipulation and deception that gave rise to the birth of NATO is still at work against the citizens of Europe and the United States. War Scare, NATO and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America. **At the end of World War II, the defense Industries in the USA had been faced with the choice of conversion and retooling** the **factories that made weapons or continue** the **massive subsidies for** the **industries vested in military** and armaments **production. The choice was** eventually made to **embark on** **a propaganda war scare to justify the need for an expanded army and it was in this context when NATO was conceived. To sustain the WW II armaments enterprise, there needed to be a cycle of war scare and the fabrication and inflation of threats and enemies.** It was in this context that Lawrence D. Bell, President of Bell Aircraft Corporation, in a statement to **the U.S. Air Policy Commission** Finletter Commission) on September 29, 1947, **stated that “as soon as there is a war scare, there is a lot of money available.”** [6] According to Andrew Cockburn, “The aircraft corporations that had garnered enormous profits during the war on the back of government contracts had discovered by 1947 that peace was ruinous. Despite initial high hopes, the commercial marketplace was proving a far harsher and less accommodating environment than that of wartime, especially as there were far more companies than required by the peacetime economy. Orders from the civilian airline industry never lived up to expectations, while efforts to diversify into other products, including dishwashers and stainless steel coffins, proved disappointing and costly.” [7] **In** the spring of **1948, the U.S. Secretary of Defense** James Forrestal and top officials of the Harry Truman administration **began to sound alarm about a looming Soviet attack against Western Europe. It is** now **known**, **from declassified documents, that the officials were aware that there was no credible evidence** to back up their war scare. Some analysts have argued that the war scare of 1948 was devised to save the aircraft manufacturing industry from plunging into bankruptcy. And this goal was achieved. In the book Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948, Frank Kofsky states thatwithin 2 months of the emergence of the scare, the Trumanadministration revamped the aircraft industry by embarking on a 57% increase in purchase of military aircraft, and the total budget of the Pentagon was increased by 30%. **NATO was born** on April 4, 1949 **out of this propaganda war to deceive the US citizens about a pending attack of the Soviet Union** on Western Europe. **The task of organizing the deception** of the citizens of the West **was assigned to the C**entral **I**ntelligence **A**gency. There are now so many books and articles on the role of the CIA in deception, propaganda and psychological warfare that we will not spend a great deal of time on the role of the Covert agencies in giving legitimacy to the idea of a Soviet threat. Stephen Kinzer and David Talbot are two writers who have documented extensively how the Dulles brothers ensnared every major profession in the USA in this deception. [8] It was especially chilling how **Universities were suborned to be surrogates for this psychological warfare**. Noam Chomsky has dealt with this aspect of the period of the birth of NATO in the work on the Universities and the Cold War.[9] Racists and anticommunists in the propaganda war It was not by accident that **the thinkers and planners of these secret operations were known racists and Nazi sympathizers.** Frank Wisner who hailed from Mississippi in the USA was a good example of the upright US citizen who was an architect of the false flag operations and the deception associated with NATO and western intelligence agencies. After the War, in 1948 Frank Wisner was appointed director of the Office of Special Projects. Soon afterwards under the direction of Allen Dulles, this Office of Special Projects was renamed **the** Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). This became the **espionage and counter-intelligence branch of the C**entral **I**ntelligence **A**gency. Later James Jesus Angleton was to take this brand of counter intelligence work to the highest levels of state assassinations. Wisner **had been mandated** told **to create** an organization that concentrated on **“propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.”** It was from this opaque sounding name of Office of Policy Coordination where the brainwashing and virulent anti-communism of the Cold War era was refined. Evan Thomas reported in The Very Best Men: the Daring Early Days of the CIA, the OPC’s charter gave it responsibility for “propaganda, economic warfare; preventative direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.” NATO as the principal prop for international capitalism today. In the celebratory events to memorialize the founding of NATO in 1949, it is usually forgotten that when the North American Treaty was signed in April 1949 most of the founding members were colonial overlords. **Colonialism and imperialism took a new form under the leadership of US capitalists defending the dollar and Wall Street.** At that historical moment in 1949, **the justification** for starting this organization **was** that it constituted **a system of collective defense** whereby its member states agreed to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. The external party in question at that time was the USSR; insofar as NATO had been formed as an alliance ostensibly to defend Western Europe against ‘communist expansion’. In the Treaty’s renowned Article 5, the new Allies agreed “an armed attack against one or more of them… shall be considered an attack against them all.” **The US military and industrial leaders studied the terror and propaganda tactics of the Nazis** in order **to learn the lessons of how to develop an efficient military machine.** James Whitman in the book, Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law, outlined what the fascists had learnt from the eugenics movement in the United States.[10] Although many anti-fascist scientists from Germany had found a place in the US academy, **the top planners of the Cold War linked the US primacy to the global history of racism to the efficient, bureaucratic and professionalism of conservative Germany.** One of the unspoken aspects of the first years of NATO was the question of containing the possible revolutionary impulses of the German working peoples. To forestall such a possibility, **the thinkers and planners of NATO collaborated with the former fascists to learn their skills.** The details of this alliance have been spelt out in the book on the CIA by David Talbot in the book, The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government. **The merging of fascist ideas with** the ideas of **Jim Crow in the United States were refined in** the secret operation called, **Operation Paperclip**. Anne Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program to Bring Nazi Scientists to America, [11] elaborated in great detail the secret program of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) largely carried out by Special Agents of Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), in which more than 1,600 German scientists, engineers, and technicians, such as Wernher von Braun and his V-2 rocket team, were taken from Germany to America for U.S. government employment, primarily between 1945 and 1959. Many were former members, and some were former leaders, of the Nazi Party. These elements were the foundation of a military program that has brought us the weaponization of space. **The creators of NATO simultaneously mobilized the colonial and fascist elements in Belgium, Spain, Italy and France**. Of the twelve **founding members**, six **were** **outright colonial powers and** at **that** moment, countries such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain and Portugal **looked to the USA to support their plunder of colonial societies**. In the specific case of France, **in order to assist French colonialism, Algeria was named as a territory of NATO.** Sixty years later when the President of France, Macron, apologized for the crimes of killing more than one million Algerians, there is no reflection inside western academic institutions on this role of NATO in Africa. Currently, the French have been the most aggressive in promoting the fiction that the defense radius of Europe stretches 4000 kilometers out from Brussels, up to the arctic, well across the Russian frontier and down into central Africa. It is not widely known that, initially, the **Portuguese fascists were some of the principal beneficiaries of the membership of NATO, with major deployment of nuclear weapons in the Azores as reward for the NATO support for colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea and other Portuguese outposts of colonial domination.** Prior to the formation of NATO in 1949, the 1947 document of **the State Department** on Cooperative Development of Africa had **stipulated that colonialism would assist the recovery of European capitalism.** [12]The State Department had been explicit in outlining how cheap foodstuffs and raw materials from Africa would assist Europe’s recovery and create the basis for unity and economic regeneration. **The USA set about creating a number of international institutions to guarantee the survival of Europe and of capitalism, the IMF**, IBRD (**World Bank**), the **NATO**, GATT, to **guarantee the strength of the USA in international trade and finance**. By the time NATO was formed in 1949, the US planners had already made their plans with Britain and France to extend their military control over Africa. France was bequeathed the task of maintaining order in western Africa while the British sought to maintain naval power incorporating the British facilities from the Suez Canal down through Aden (Yemen), to Mombasa (Kenya), Simons town **South Africa** across to Malaysia. [13] The racist **apartheid regime** had **persuaded NATO that it was necessary to integrate the South African military into the western defense planning in order to protect the ‘Cape route.’** After the Suez crises of 1956 and the 1967 war this alliance with the racist regime deepened. **Throughout its existence NATO assisted in the refinement of the racial status hierarchy in which whites are dominant and people of color are subordinate.** [14] **This incorporation of racist ideas into western defense continued a long tradition that shaped the outlook of NATO and reinforced the outlook of Frantz Fanon**: “Colonialism is violence in its natural state.” France and Britain excelled in this violence with the Belgians cementing their communications and logistics coordination to kill Patrice Lumumba and later support the killing of the Secretary General of the United Nation, Dag Hammarskjold. [15] Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal deepened their links to NATO but in 1956, Dwight Eisenhower halted the planned offensive of the British and the French in the Suez war. After this war, both the currencies of Britain and France suffered sharp declines with France seeking cover inside the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), while the British pound accepted its place as a prop to the US dollar in the global economy. Within a year after the Suez debacle, France had pushed for the Treaty of Rome that paved the way for the European Economic Community to be a competitive force with US capitalists. Within the context of the competition between European capitalists and US capitalists, Charles De Gaulle exhibited pique at the organization of NATO that supported the armaments culture of US capital. Charles De Gaulle partially pulled France out of this alliance in 1966 after it became clear that this military organization was dominated by the United States and Britain (supporting their military industries). De Gaulle argued for an independent nuclear arsenal while remaining a signatory to North Atlantic Treaty and participating in the North Atlantic Council. Nicholas Sarkozy ended the farce when France returned to the fold of the NATO military structures in 2009. The duplicitous actions on the part of the French leadership were always based on calculations meant to preserve the dominance of French capital in Africa. When the US devalued the dollar in 1971 and broke the agreements of the Bretton Woods Treaty, it was the French who complained about the Exorbitant Privilege of the Dollar. For a short period, both the President of France and the Chancellor of West Germany had chafed under the privilege and had worked hard to bring into being the Maastricht Treaty and the Europe Union to end the dominance of the dollar in the international capitalist system. It was known than the one necessary aspect of this emerging common currency in Europe would be the dismantling of the military occupation of Europe by US military personnel. Hence, both Giscard de Estaing and Helmut Schmidt had linked the common currency, the European Central Bank and common foreign and security policy (CFSP), with the expectation that ultimately Europe will break from the traditions of NATO. It was in the face of this threat and the fall of the centrally planned economy that the forward planners expanded NATO. Emergence of Global NATO and the myth of ‘humanitarian intervention’ **Usually, when an alliance is formed for a specific purpose such as halting the spread of communism, that alliance is folded when the mission is complete.** Hence, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was expected by those seeking the ‘peace dividend’ that the mission of NATO would be scaled down. **Instead, NATO expanded, seeking to encircle Russia by extending its membership to include former members of the Warsaw Pact countries.** Progressive scholars have documented the cynicism of the **US military planners who orchestrated the ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the Balkans in order to advance the hegemony of US capitalism** **after the fall of the Soviet Union.** The scholarship on this manipulation of the European working peoples to entrench NATO is rich and needs to be revisited at this moment of the celebration of the 70thanniversary of the founding of NATO. Richard Aldrich in the book, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence’ brought out evidence to expose how the massacres in the Balkans, helped give a new impetus to US hegemony.’ [16] David Gibbs had argued, “How the Srebrenica Massacre Redefined US Foreign Policy.” It is worth quoting at length how the Balkans war was used to manipulate public opinion in Europe, “Perhaps most importantly, the massacre helped give a new impetus to US hegemony, contributing to its post-Cold War legitimacy. In bolstering America’s hegemonic position, the significance of **the Srebrenica massacre** cannot be overstated: The massacre **helped trigger a NATO bombing campaign that is** widely **credited with ending the Bosnian war**, along with the associated atrocities, and this campaign gave NATO a new purpose for the post-Soviet era. Since that time, the Srebrenica precedent has been continuously invoked as a justification for military force. **The perceived need to prevent massacres and oppression helped justify later interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, as well as the ongoing fight against ISIS.** The recent UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which contains a strongly interventionist tone, was inspired in part by the memory of Srebrenica.” [17] The more nefarious aspect of this manipulation of humanitarianism was the ways in which elements such as Bernard Kouchner used their credentials as former members of the left and progressive forces to give cover to US imperialism. Since the war in the Balkans it is now accepted by the military planners that humanitarian intervention acts as a force multiplier. [18] This position was explicitly stated by General Colin Powell who noted, “Just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.” These observations can shed light on the relationship between NGOs such as Doctors without Borders and the International Rescue Committee in global militarism. The fiction of collective western security was effectively broken while **after the Asian economic crisis, US capital mobilized NATO to defend Wall Street.** In this defense of Wall Street, **NATO incessantly bombed Kosovo for 79 days in 1999 as it gave itself a new mission to enlarge US military power right up to the doorstep of Moscow.** Gingerly, NATO expanded under US President Bill Clinton from 12 members to 16, then to 19, then to 26 by 2004 and by 2009 to 28 members. Despite vocal opposition from Russia, **the discussion of expanding NATO now proceeded to develop the idea of Global NATO**. In 2019 there were 29 members of NATO. In his presentation before the US Congress Stoltenberg advocated for a further expansion of NATO and boasted of the high state of readiness of the NATO Response Force (NRF) which had been created in 2002. NATO and the Weaponization of finance **Global NATO was the preeminent force to orchestrate the weaponization of everything.** Michael Hudson has **outlined** finance as warfare and **the weaponization of finance in the current phase of imperialism.** It will be important to grasp the present sanctions regime of the USA as a form of warfare. In the current literature on imperialism, the term weaponization of finance refers to the foreign policy strategy of using incentives (access to capital markets) and penalties (varied types of sanctions) as tools of coercive diplomacy. The **multiple wars agains Iran represent a model example of the weaponization of finance, the weaponization of information and the weaponization of trade.** Under the Presidency of Barack Obama,Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, noted that the weaponization of finance offers to the US “a new battlefield…one that enables [the US] to go after those who wish [the US] harm without putting [US] troops in harm’s way or using lethal force.” Instead of fighting countries militarily, the US can now “cripple them financially. The Obama administration had retreated from a full scale weaponization of finance with Iran by signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA ) with Iran in 2015. Under the terms of this agreement in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany),[a] and the European Union, it was agreed that Iran would accept the P5+1 would ensure that Iran did not develop nuclear weapons. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel had opposed this agreement. When Donald Tromp became President of the United States, his administration renounced the JCPOA in 2018 and then signed an executive order reimposing sanctions on any foreign company that continues to do business with Iran. The order gave companies 90-day or 180-day grace periods to extract themselves from existing Iranian contacts or face punitive US measures. Those NATO partners of the USA who signed the JCPOA refused to accept the sanctions imposed on Iran and in 2019 agreed to create a special purpose vehicle to manage their trade with Iran. Britain, Germany and France rolled out INSTEX in February 2019 as one way to break the weaponization of Finance by the USA but in the cat and mouse game of economic warfare, the Foreign Ministers of Europe have not yet been transparent on the full mandate of the special purpose vehicle. These developments mirror the weaponization of trade [19] and finance within NATO and the problems of inter imperialist rivalry in West Asia. The threats against the countries that created a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to help facilitate trade with Iran must be taken very seriously, especially in the context of the political insecurity generated by BREXIT. This period reminds the world that of the depression when trade wars and currency wars eventually fueled open fighting in World War II. Finance as warfare **Since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, there have been efforts by countries holding US debt to limit their exposure to the dollar. In 2009, the Russians and the Chinese worked to establish** an alternative international institution involving Brazil, Russia, India and China, later including South Africa and called **BRICS**. Within the context of BRICS, the Chinese set about a slow process to internationalize its currency, the RMB and undertook currency swaps to avoid the US dollar. After failing to negotiate successfully within the Bretton Woods institution for an increase of its drawing rights commensurate with its volume of international trade, the Chinese embarked on major economic and financial ventures under the banner of One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. When the AIIB was launched in 2015 with 57 countries, the former Treasury Secretary of the US, Lawrence Summers noted that the launch of the AIIB was a turning point and ‘the creation of the AIIB will undermine the leadership role the U.S. has long enjoyed in global finance.’ Both Russia and China intensified their swap trading efforts and Russia settled its crude sales to China. “In March 2018 news broke that Beijing is planning a pilot project for the second half of the year to pay for imported crude oil with renminbi instead of dollars. The two countries allegedly selected for the pilot are Russia and Angola, with rumors that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may become involved. If this venture is successful, it will act as a spur to similar schemes for other imports and primary products.” China was joining the leaders of Europe and the countries in Asia and West Asia who were calling for a multi-currency financial system. Many progressive economists noted that it was not a matter if more countries would flee the dollar, but when. One economist writing from Singapore wrote, “the emergence of a multicurrency or multi-asset international payments system will take time. It doesn’t portend a collapse of the global payments system, but does point to a redistribution of global wealth. The seigniorage harvested by the US as the world’s banker will gradually fall, narrowing the room for maneuver in US economic policy, which for the last 70 years has had the greatest influence on markets globally. As the power of the dollar wanes, the US will be pressured to adjust to a world economy vastly changed since 1945.” [20] The German financial leaders along with France were maneuvering to speed this change with the establishment of the special purpose vehicle to continue trading with Iran. At this time of writing the specific details of the specific purpose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) is still being worked out, but the statements of former Ambassador Nicholas Burns before Congress on March 26 made it clear that the Foreign Policy establishment in the USA will not retreat from the weaponization of Finance, especially since INSTEX allows members of NATO to continue trading and financial arrangements with Iran, China and Russia. In so far as Global NATO is serving the task of defending the dollar, the extent to which China has created an alternative clearing system in the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) will be seen as another blow to US financial hegemony. Although in its first rollout of the CIPS system, the Chinese went to great length that it would cooperate with the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system, the current US intelligence war against the Chinese telecom firm Huawei point to the integration between Finance, information warfare and cyberwarfare. [21] In the book, The Perfect Weapon, David Sanger discussed the debates within this highest levels of US intelligence and the Federal Reserve of whether the USA should use its Federal Reserve and cyber warfare to backdoor into the Russian Central Bank to make money disappear. It is in this context where one can note in the planning of NATO strengthening the cyber capabilities is at the top of the Agenda. The Harvard study emphasized the importance of winning the Technology Battle in the Digital Age. **The convergence of cyberwarfare, economic warfare and information warfare is being taken to new levels under the current administration with its wide ranging sanctions against countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Caribbean.** Traditional books on NATO had surveyed the integration of diplomacy, sanctions and weapons procurement, but **the new push of the USA in formulating its position of unrivalled dominance is turning out to be another front for defending the dollar. In a world where the USA had imposed sanctions on Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Turkey, North Korea, Syria, Sudan along with individual sanctions against individuals in Somalia, South Sudan, Libya, Ukraine and Zimbabwe, the logic of these sanctions** enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Treasury has **now clarified to** the allies of the USA in **NATO the importance finance was warfare.** It was the former Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew, who had warned that the over use of sanctions could dull their effectiveness. His logic was simple: Sanctions work because they cut targets off from dealing with U.S. citizens and American financial institutions—a complete severance from the world’s largest economy and its most important financial center. If Washington used this power idly, Lew suggested, it could encourage countries to find partners outside of the United States, and undermine sanctions’ deterrent effect. **What Lew did not acknowledge was the relationship between the Treasury, Global NATO and the financial wars.** Much of the scholarship on the printing of dollars miss the way in which the infusion of capital in emerging economies further enmesh these societies into the instability of the system. Ultimately, the export of the oscillation of the US economy deepens social and political challenges on the world and reinforces the militarization of the international political economy. Michael Hudson outlined three ways in which flooding of dollars through debt leverage and QE supported the military: (1) the surplus dollars pouring into the rest of the world for yet further financial speculation and corporate takeovers; (2) the fact that central banks are obliged to recycle these dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bonds to finance the federal U.S. budget deficit; and most important (but most suppressed in the U.S. media, (3) the military character of the U.S. payments deficit and the domestic federal budget deficit. He continued, “Strange as it may seem and irrational as it would be in a more logical system of world diplomacy the “dollar glut” is what finances America’s global military build-up. It forces foreign central banks to bear the costs of America’s expanding military empire effective “taxation without representation.” Keeping international reserves in “dollars” means recycling their dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bills U.S. government debt issued largely to finance the military.” After the financial crisis in Europe, Quantitative Easing was extended to the Eurozone and Japan, but in the continuing re alignment, of global capitalism, US capital is working hard to decapitate Russia and China as opponents of Global NATO. **The currency wars and weaponization of finance is now accompanied by the weaponization of trade and the weaponization of information.** Sanger’s The Perfect Weapon War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Agehas opened one window into how **full spectrum dominance and the militarization of space is now linked to the weaponization of information and cognitive hacking. We now have new terms of warfare, terms such as “fake news”, “disinformation,” “weaponized information,” “post-truth” and “alternative facts.”** Weaponized information (WI) **defines a new method messaging and dissemination of content that contains falsehoods, facts taken out of context and pieces of truth strategically released, in an attempt to manipulate knowledge and beliefs.** The NATO destruction of Libya was one clear example of how falsehoods were refined to lull workers in Europe to support the destruction of Libya The weaponization of Finance and the Destruction of Libya **Not enough is being done to expose the real role of Global NATO and the role of so called humanitarian operatives in ensuring that humanitarian interventions become a force multiplier.** Currently, many countries of the EU collaborate with France in the North African region in the fabrication of terror to ensure the deployment of the US Africa Command and French forces in Africa. **In Western Europe, NATO has been very successful in ensuring confusion, demoralization,** paralysis, **and apathy in relation to western imperialism in Africa.** African scholars and progressives are very clear that while calling for the dismantling of NATO there must be a call for the EURO to break from the CFA franc zone. Nicolas Sarkozy was very clear that the intervention in Libya was to save the Euro. Africans cannot have a Newtonian view of the struggle against imperialism to assure those from the European left who want solidarity with Africans while supporting French imperialism in Africa. Global NATO and French machinations are involved in a delicate dance and there is silence from the left in the EU when it comes to Europe’s 4000 km strategic radius that covers the entire area of West Africa, North Africa and down through East Africa to Somalia. It is beyond this commentary to delineate the ways in which German scholars, religious organizations, German foundations and non-governmental organizations are now implicated in the criminal acts of France in Africa, especially the war on terror. It is the task of the progressive movement to penetrate the areas of cooperation and conflict between European capitalists and Wall Street so that European workers do not continue to complicity support ‘humanitarian interventions.’ **When 200 African scholars wrote the open letter on the impending crime against the peoples of Libya, there has been and continue to be silence on the part of the left in Europe and the United States.** Barack Obama had described the intervention in Libya as a mistake and the British Parliamentary Committee outlined how the Libyan intervention had been based on lies. Obama may have considered the intervention a mistake, but his understanding of the process did not reveal how Goldman Sachs was thoroughly implicated the destruction of Libya. The case in the London High Court of the Libyan Investment Authority vs Goldman Sachs brought out revealing evidence of how **firms such as Goldman Sachs and others involved in the financialization of the energy markets sought to mobilize the resources of oil rich states** with Sovereign Wealth Funds **to keep alive the** private equity, hedge funds and structured derivatives **markets of the global capitalist economy.** Most societies and peoples in the world want these banks to be brought under control. But Goldman Sachs benefitted in the ruling because in 2014, two and a half years after the case was brought before the High Court, there was a war in Libya and there was no government therefore one could not represent the Libyan Investment Authority in this arena. We see therefore that the financial institutions are direct beneficiaries of the warfare that is going on in Libya. When the United Nations passed Resolution 1970 and resolution 1973 in 2011, those who had signed these resolutions did not understand then that the resolution was for regime in Libya.[22] The current fighting in Libya remains one of the most inglorious aspects of the 70 year history of NATO but there is silence among those celebrating 70 years of NATO. [23] **Since the writings on Finance capital over a century ago by** Rudolph Hilferding, Vladimir **Lenin,** Rosa **Luxemburg, and** Nikolai **Bukharin the role of finance in the international system has grown beyond the parameters outlined by those who linked finance capital to modern imperialism**.[24] After the collapse of the dollar/gold system of 1944 **the financial industry of the West has become the axis on which international capitalism spins**.

### L: A2 “Realism”—2NC

#### The K is a prior question to understanding IR---the assumption of rationality *intrinsic* to “realism” hyper-inflates threats to justify military aggression in a circular process of preemption and escalation---that’s Bourbeau

#### Err neg on realism---

#### 1---Complexity means realism is wrong

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There is a growing literature on **complexity theory** that has fundamental implications for how we think about the real in social and political terms (Cilliers, 1998; Richards, 2002; Urry, 2003; Harrison, 2006; Geyer and Rihani, 2010). Borrowing from its origins in the natural sciences (specifically the work of Nobel Prize winning chemist, Ilya Prigogine), complexity **focuses on the chaotic blend of the orderly and disorderly in social and political life. This implies that phenomena cannot be properly understood through experimentation in controlled environments such as the laboratory.** Instead, **complex environments are much more dynamic with a plurality of actors engaging with phenomena in a multiplicity of different ways and generating effects that are unknown to each other.**

Complexity in the social sciences suggests that **the issues we engage with are in a constant process of development rather than being static entities – ‘facts’ – that just have to be acted upon.** Moreover, **the effects of political action are not linear, given that multiple other parties are acting on the same issue simultaneously**. Thus, **action on an issue with a specific outcome in mind does not guarantee that intended result** as the actions and behaviours of other interested parties may interrupt the linearity of action and outcome. For this reason, **the actual nature of things is dynamic and always in a stage of complex temporal development so that a snapshot of what reality actually entails can only be momentary** (Connolly, 2010, pp. 17–42).

Complexity theory also suggests that **the complicated interaction of a plurality of actors on social phenomena will always generate emergent properties that we may not** fully **comprehend.** Part of the reason for this epistemological slippage is that **we are largely beholden to established modes of understanding to make sense of the things we encounter**. **This path dependence can limit the horizons of possibility and bind us to particular methodologies** for looking at specific issues. When it comes to social issues, **political actors are always playing catch-up as they try to maintain traditional modes of understanding and action as a means of dealing with emerging problems.** Ultimately, in terms of dealing with emerging complexities, **it may actually be politically advantageous to relinquish path dependent modes of behaviour to develop new approaches to** the **fresh problems** that we encounter.

On this account, **the poverty of traditional forms of realism is clear because they rely on depicting the obvious ‘facts’ as the real. This ties us into existing understandings of what are often emerging issues and implies that we should rely on path dependent technologies inherited from the past to deal with things that** might **require fresh thinking**. The **epistemological blind spots of** ‘fact-derived **realism**’ **in complex environments imply that a more realistic politics might emphasize the sheer unknowability of all relevant phenomena when it comes to policy making in a simultaneously orderly and disorderly complex environment** (Little, 2012). From this perspective, **systems are always struggling reactively to contain issues that are constantly changing and evolving in relation to a multiplicity of actors engaging with them**. In short, **this complex temporality engenders an epistemological gap that undermines the claims of ‘fact-derived realism’ to a patent on what is actually real and challenges the methodological assumptions on which these theories are based**.

#### 2---competing theories---decades of scholarship proves realism is up for debate---it is impossible to establish a singular, unitary theory for how IR works, which means you should be skeptical of the aff’s ability to predict risk and the actions of policymakers

#### 3---Realism is a white supremacist fantasy---that turns case by creating a cycle of paranoia that generates tensions

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Professor of International Affairs at the Julien J. Studley Graduate Programs in International Affairs, The New School [L.H.M. Ling]

Anna Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling, “Transforming World Politics: From empire to multiple worlds,” Routledge, 2009, 49-54, https://www.routledge.com/Transforming-World-Politics-From-Empire-to-Multiple-Worlds/Agathangelou-Ling/p/book/9780415772808

THE ROLE OF THE ACADEMY

**IR**, we argue, **operates like a colonial household.** **This House of IR shouts to the world: it’s “I vs You!”** Like the singular, patriarchal, and colonial household that stands for the colonial state**, the field theorizes about itself from a position of imperial sovereignty. Staking out “civilization”** in a space that’s already crowded with local traditions of thinking, doing, and being yet proclaimed, **in willful arrogance, as a “state of nature” plagued by fearful “anarchy” and its murderous power politics, the House of IR aims to stave off “disorder” by imposing “order.”** Directing Others with declarative statements, **the House of IR assumes to know both the problem (i.e., “power for the few over the many”) and its solution (“more power for the few over the many”).** **Such suffocation of Self and Other leaves a multi-generational legacy similar to the actual colonial household’s.** That is, **erasures and violences that flip the household’s original intent: order turns into disorder**, repulsion into desire, purity into hybridity. In the House of IR, especially, another practice rules: the treatment of the academy’s institutional power as an extension of political power, regardless of empire’s devastations and/or secret indulgences.

IR HOUSEHOLD RELATIONS

Our understanding of the colonial household comes from Ann Laura Stoler (2002). Her study of colonial management in Indonesia and Indo-china under Dutch and French rule, respectively, tracks the “genealogies of the intimate.” She asks: how do racialized categories of identity emerge and become naturalized into the lexicon of colonial governance? Given the potent politics of categorizing identities, Stoler examines “the histories of their making, the exclusions they enabled, and violences they condoned.”

**The House of IR exhibits a similar politics of exclusion and violence**. **It clearly identifies who’s “in,” who’s “out,”** and who’s precariously “on the border.” It also stratifies who’s “upstairs” and who’s “downstairs.” **This hierarchical division of space reflects the House’s participation in and complicity with material relations of production and its uneven distribution of social wealth.**

Inside the Household

Pater realism

**As its “founding father,” realism heads the House of IR.** Though labeled a peculiarly **“American social science”** (Hoffman 1995), realism claims an intellectual lineage that dates to ancient Greek history, especially that recorded by Thucydides (5 bc) (cf. Lebow and Strauss 1991; Garst 1989; 5 Jansson 1997; Monten 2006). Subsequently, realists have added luminaries of power politics like Machiavelli and Hobbes to their roster. But it was a generation of scholars from post-World War II Europe, Britain, and **the US that gave realism its distinctive voice**. **Power**, they asserted, **reflects objective laws of calculated** (sometimes amoral) **self-interest for all states across time and space**. John Herz, George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and Hans J. **Morgenthau** each **saw “political realism” as the cure to what they considered the fateful cause of war among nations:** “legalism,” “utopianism,” and “idealism” (Keohane 1986: 9). Abstract **individualism pivots realism’s understanding of the world**. **Primordial individual units (states) struggle in eternal competition over resources that confer power and wealth. In this way, realists justify instrumental reasoning and behavior**. But then how do realists explain the existence of an interdependent international political economy in a world of conflicting nation-states? **Hegemonic stability theory comes to the rescue** (Kindleberger 1973). **It posits a dominant state or hegemon that willingly bears the asymmetrical cost of global leadership so the inter-state system may survive peacefully and prosperously despite anarchy and competition**. Game theoretic models explain such cooperation under anarchy as a prisoner’s dilemma. Still, these approaches preserve realism’s basic premise in abstract individualism. They place outside the realm of realist inquiry issues like ideology, the social bases of state power, its practices, political struggles, and strategies for reproduction (Rupert 1995).

Yet **realists openly accept their origin in the white colonial/imperial state**. They invoke and canonize Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War as the genealogical text for IR. The book details Athens’ struggle against Sparta for hegemony in the ancient world, interpreted by realists as a cautionary tale on the uses and abuses of state power. **This teleological and political move disciplines IR**, in effect, **by deciding who and what counts in not just the study of world politics but also its practices through statecraft**. Accordingly, some are included, recognized, and legitimized at the cost of the many. Realists constantly echo what they claim to be Thucydides’ key lesson in power: “The strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must.” **In this way, realists rationalize empire’s brutal legacy, turning it into an ideological and political commitment.** **Expect violence and colonization, some realists trumpet, for it is integral to empire**. And **empire, they add, is what international politics is all about.** Conveniently silenced is another reading of this text that tells of empire as a crisis not only for world politics but the empire itself.

**Realism stems from** another lineage, rarely acknowledged: i.e., **the global capitalist economy. It accounts for realism’s birth into the world and** its growth, sustenance, and eventual **dominance in the House of IR**. In turn, **realism generates an ideational infrastructure for global capitalism’s public, political face: the modern, capitalist state**. What is all this warring imperialism for if not more wealth and resources for national elites? **Global capitalism delivers what the white colonial/imperial state seeds**.

Mater liberalism

**Liberalism naturally allies with realism**. **They share common roots in the white colonial/imperial state and its relationship with global capitalism, albeit with a conceptual division of labor**. Whereas realism commands the House of IR by focusing on the state (“power”), **liberalism organizes, manages, and reproduces it by emphasizing the market** (“interest”) (see Gilpin 1987). Liberalism started out as a proud tradition of defiance against authority, such as Martin Luther’s fiery repudiation of Catholic Church hegemony in sixteenth-century Europe. Since then, it has evolved into an ideological instigator of “free trade,” “open markets,” “instrumental rationality,” and other pillars of global capitalism (Polanyi 1944; Hirschman 1977).

**Realism and liberalism work in tandem by drawing on the mirage of “politics” and “economics.”** Publicly, **they convince “contemporary statesmen** [like] the mercantilists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries **[that] power is a necessary condition for plenty,** and vice versa” (Keohane 1984: 22). Privately, **realism–liberalism maintains an infrastructure of elite, bourgeois rule by seeming to care about democratic peace, prosperity, and freedom – but not really. Realism–liberalism’s abstract, ahistorical conceptions of the state**, the market, **and the individual are bound by particular cultural expressions (Western, white, male) that result from concrete political struggles** (bourgeois, colonial). Yet both the “world” (materiality, structured inequalities) and “politics” (practices, discourse) disappear from world politics (Agathangelou 1997). Classical liberals like Kant, Locke, and Woodrow Wilson, for instance, advocated a legally-based “perpetual peace,” “limited government,” and a “league of nations” to forestall global warfare that, by extension, preserves the realist–liberal inter-state, commerce- based system, in principle, if not in form. Similarly, contemporary liberals like Hedley Bull (1966) and David Held (1995) talk of an “international society” or “cosmopolitan democracy,” respectively, but without regard to the worldviews or participation of Others in these processes.

Today, **liberalism reinvents itself into a new family of arguments labeled neoliberalism**. Without losing the liberal logic of public vs private, individual vs collective, Self vs Other, neoliberalism professes good intentions for the masses while complying with elite demands for new ideas for and methods of preserving colonial–patriarchal–capitalist structures and their necessary subjectivities. Take the treatment of “third-world” women, for example. Liberal and standpoint feminists end up colluding morally and politically when they seek to “protect” brown women from brown men by helping them become more like “white” women.

Still, nothing is what it seems. As we see below, mater liberalism and daughter neoliberalism each has sought to convert Others with missionary zeal but ended up, instead, with hybrid progeny...

… Heir apparent: neorealism

Son #1 intrigues the most. **Heir apparent to the House of IR, neorealism springs not from the union of realism and liberalism but an open affair between realism and its gold-digging neighbor, economics**. Mistress of her own house but impatient with opportunistic ambitions, **economics merges almost giddily with realism to produce neorealism**. Waltz (1979), for instance, constructs the international system as a market and states as individual firms, **magically accounting for “order” without an “orderer” in an international system that is posited, a priori, as anarchical**. On this basis, **Waltz infers that only great powers matter since they alone account for change and consequence in world politics.**

Similarly, **neorealists** and their cousins, rational choicers, **have stormed the House of IR**. Like Jimmy Cagney’s dying psycho gangster in White Heat (1949), they crow manically: “Look, Ma, I made it! Top of the world!” They find no contradiction in denying legitimacy and rights to others, be these involving intellectual debate, hiring/promotion/grants, or publications, **while failing to deliver on their own golden promises of, among others, “prediction,”** “law-like” regularities, **and “causal explanations”** (Green and Shapiro 1994).

Yet **neorealists remain insecure**. **Their own zero-sum logic induces a paranoid worldview that treats Others as competition only for legitimacy and resources** – in this case, in the House of IR. As Stoler notes for colonial governance in southeast Asia, “it was not the progeny of [cross- category] unions who were problematic but the possibility that they might be recognized as heirs to a European inheritance . . .” (Stoler 2002: 39). For this reason, **tensions between neorealism and the other progeny of the House of IR remain severe.**

#### Even if they win realism, vote neg on presumption---either it decks aff solvency---it means there are inevitable motivations for conflict escalation built into IR or there’s disincentives for conflict escalation because of MAD

### L: A2 “Realism—No Prior Questions”

#### Interrogating what constitutes the “real” is a crucial prior question

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**The issue at stake is how to unsettle the grounds on which discourses of realism are constructed if political theorists are to develop a meaningful account of what is** actually **possible in terms of political action.** Potentially **this** could **provide the basis upon which new formulations can emerge that** can help to **challenge and reconstitute the terms of the real.** Thus, **rather than getting embroiled in standard debates about what realism does and does not mean as an approach to politics and international relations, this** contribution **focuses on a more narrowly defined topic – the constitution of the real – and suggests that there are** at least two **significant fronts on which the process of reconstituting realism can be enacted.** The first front is the systemic limitations of existing political institutions in dealing with complex plurality, and the second is the inability of prevailing constructions of ‘the real’ to provide an appropriate understanding of the emotive and psychological dimensions that may guide political activity.

### L: A2 “Realism—Real World =/= Theory”

#### Epistemology shapes the “real world”---trying to disentangle the two creates bad policies

**Little et al. 15** – Adrian, Professor of Political Theory and has been Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences since 2007; Alan Finlayson, Professor of Political and Social Theory at The University of East Anglia in the United Kingdom; Simon Tormey, political theorist based in the School of Social and Political Sciences, 2015 (“Reconstituting Realism: Feasibility, Utopia and Epistemological Imperfection,” *Contemporary Political Theory* (Vol. 14, 3, 276–313), August 2015, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Palgrave Macmillian)

In **arguing for a process of reconstituting our understanding of realism in politics**, this contribution **seeks to break down** some **established understandings of** the terms of **political theory and ‘real politics’**. **It argues that political theory should be politically engaged**, that the reason that it is political theory rather than ethics is precisely because **it has implications for how the world is organized and raises action-based questions of how to achieve objectives**. The challenge here is not only that political theorists need to think about the application of their work, but also that **we need to think more clearly about what constitutes the ‘real world’ of politics to which it is applied. To unnecessarily distance the two, is an easy trap to fall into.** For example, while Swift and White (2008) argue that political theory has a vital role to play in practical issues, they still **differentiate theory from a real politics**, which is depicted as the things politicians do and the strategies they employ to gain election.

While this activity is undoubtedly part of real politics, it **does not entirely constitute what is real**. In short, far too many **political theorists readily accept an intuitive version of the ‘real’ without sufficient interrogation of that reality and the** sometimes **flimsy epistemological interpretations underpinning it**. **By failing to address the epistemological foundations** of what constitutes ‘real politics’, **commentators** such as Swift and White **–** **despite** their **arguments for political theorists to make modest contributions to real politics** – **actually reinforce an artificial divide between political theory and real politics.** Thus, at the same time as Swift and White recognize that political theorists need to be more engaged with practical issues, their **division between the two encourages a culture in which non-engagement is viewed as a sustainable position for theory**. **This provides an opportunity for realists to avoid serious challenge to what they consider to be real** (Geuss, 2008, pp. 59–60)

# Impacts

### M: Root Cause—War

#### Security politics are the root cause of warfare---it creates the necessary conditions for unending conflict through propaganda to naturalize militarism

**Boggs 11** – Carl, Ph.D. Political Science, University of California, Berkeley (“The Global IndusTrIal Complex”, Published by Lexington Books, 2011, ISBN 978-0-7391-3697-3) RMT

**As the American people are asked to endure burdensome costs and sacrifices of war** and preparation for war, **mechanisms of legitimation take on new meaning**. Empire, a bloated war economy, recurrent armed interventions, **hardships on the home front**—all these **must be made to appear “natural,” routine, even welcome if not noble.** The historical myth of national exceptionalism, combined with hubris associated with economic, technological, and military supremacy, contributes to this ideological function. To translate such an ideological syndrome into popular language and daily life, **to fully incorporate it into the political culture, is the task not so much of a classical state-run propaganda system as a developed hegemonic ideology reliant** more **on education and the media**. In the United States, **media culture has evolved into an outgrowth of megacorporate power** that sustains the most far-reaching ideological and cultural network in history. **Hollywood films** alone have for many decades **served as a crucial vehicle for legitimation of Empire**. The repetitive fantasies, illusions, myths, images, and storylines of Hollywood movies (not to mention TV and other outlets) can be expected to influence mass audiences in rather predictable ways, much along lines of advertising and public relations. **One popular response to the flood of violent combat**, action-adventure, **sci-fi, and horror films** (with their companion video games) **is stronger readiness to support U.S. military operations that, in an intensely patriotic, violent milieu will require** little **overt justification except where American casualties are deemed excessive**. Such ideological legitimation is needed in a context where even the ensemble of corporate, military, and government power cannot suffice.

Despite its command of institutional power, tools of violence, and material resources, therefore, **the system requires something along lines of a culture of militarism**. In the United States, **militarism has indeed evolved into an ideology forged by media culture**, **political messages, academic discourses**, **and patriotic indoctrination**. If the linkage between militarism and daily life goes back in history, it has taken on new dimensions with the dramatic growth of the media and popular culture over the past few decades. **If the culture of militarism endows warfare with a popular sense of meaning and purpose**, **it also constitutes the hegemonic façade behind which the power structure can** more or less freely **operate**, **domestically and worldwide**. **The decay of American** **economic, political, and social life cannot be understood apart from this destructive cycle**—**likely to worsen as the elites strive to maintain the advantages of Empire against new challenges**. By the early twenty-first century it was obvious that **war, and orientation to war**, **had become a way of life in the United States**, **a society in which both leaders and general population could be said to have grown addicted to war**. **If the United States fails to qualify as a full-fledged “warrior society**” **at the level of ancient Sparta**, Nazi **Germany**, interwar Japan, or even Israel today, **the military influence is perhaps even more pervasive**—**though not always recognizable as such**—owing to the global presence of American power.

Who could expect otherwise, as the Pentagon dominates the globe with its military, technological, and communications presence, with its hundreds of bases and sites, and its status as the world’s biggest landlord (overseeing 300,000 housing units globally)? **The** **U.S. military runs its own vast propaganda network** with scores of **newspapers and magazines**, **invests in hundreds of movies and TV programs**, develops state-of-the-art video games, **and is by far the largest sponsor of research and development**, allowing it to influence such fields as nuclear physics, chemistry, astronomy, and electrical engineering. What might be called **the militarization of the academy is reflected in the capacity of the Pentagon to shape research goals at such respectable universities as UC Berkeley, MIT, Stanford, Johns Hopkins, Penn State, and Carnegie Mellon**—**a few of the more than 350 institutions that routinely get military contracts**. Under the familiar guise of national security, **American society has seen a convergence of military, corporate, and academic centers of power**.

Tens of billions are targeted annually for higher-tech warfare agendas: urbanassault counterinsurgency methods, satellite technology, nuclear modernization, robotics and other forms of remote combat, laser-guided weapons, war-gaming, and database collections among others. 19 In **a militarized society the armed forces experience is bound to touch the lives of tens of millions of people, often in the most intimate ways**—and **often outside the ranks of the military itself.** In her study of the “homefront,” Catherine Lutz comments: “In an important sense . . . **we all inhabit an army camp**, **mobilized to lend support to the permanent state of war readiness** that has been with us since World War II. **No matter where we live, we have raised war taxes at work,** **and future soldiers at home lived with the cultural atmosphere of racism and belligerence** **that war mobilization often uses or creates, and nourished the public opinion that helps send soldiers off to war.** . . . **All experience the problems bred by war’s glorification of violent masculinity** an**d the inequalities created by its redistribution of wealth** **to the already privileged**.” Lutz adds that “**we all** have **lived with the consequences of the reinvigorated idea that we prove** and regenerate **ourselves through violence.”** **This reality turns out to be even more all-consuming for military personnel** and residents of Fayetteville, North Carolina—home of the sprawling Fort Bragg army base—that Lutz chose as the focus of her research. Here **all the contradictions of U.S. militarism came home to roost**—a “dumping ground for the problems of the American century of war and empire.” Here **we have exaggerated problems of poverty, crime, child abuse, alcoholism, prostitution, homelessness, and a wide array of physical and mental injuries**. **These are the fruits of a permanent war system that transfigures daily life for those within and close to the “homefront” of Empire.**

**This is a world geared to warfare, preparation for warfare**, **killing**, **and refinement of the instruments for killing**. In her classic work Military Brats, Mary Edwards Wertsch brilliantly weaves together narratives of life in the military, focusing on two lingering motifs—the warrior ethos, and the authoritarian character of social relations. She writes: “Growing up inside the fortress [as she did] is like being drafted into a gigantic theater company. **The role of the warrior society, even in peacetime, is to exist in a state of perpetual ‘readiness’**: **one continuous dress rehearsal for war.** The principal actors are immaculately costumed, carefully scripted, and supplied with a vast array of props. They practice elaborate large-scale stage movements—land, air, sea exercises simulating attacks and defenses.” All this is part of a deep socialization process that Wertsch expertly unravels. Well before 9/11 and the subsequent wars, she could remark that “**this is a society prepared to wage war with the same relentless attention to detail it brings to every moment of every day.”** 23 22 **In such a culture authoritarian values inevitably prevail**: “The Fortress, in short, is an authoritarian society. The masks worn there are authoritarian masks, each exactly like the others of its rank, each subservient to those of high rungs. The notions of conformity, order, and obedience reign supreme.” She adds: **“The great paradox** of the military **is that** its members, the selfappointed **front-line guardians of our cherished American democratic values, do not live in a democracy themselves**. **Not only is individuality not valued** in the military, it is discouraged. There is no freedom of speech, save on the most innocuous level. **There is no freedom of assembly** for anything that is not authorized. **There is not even a concept of privacy** . . .” God, community, family, nation—everything is glorified through the mediations of warfare, violence, hierarchy, and aggression.

**The permanent war system undermines democracy at every turn**: imperial projects lead to authoritarian controls domestically and globally. **Militarization gives rise not only to a warrior ethos but to hierarchy, discipline, secrecy, surveillance, lopsided allocations, and narrowed debate in government operations.** Richard Falk writes of a shift toward **fascism** in the global order that, he argues, **permeates American domestic politics as power** and wealth come to dominate the field of decision-making. **An imperial arrogance that champions U.S. exceptionalism** and **subverts universal norms of legality on the world scene,** that strives toward full-spectrum dominance, sooner or later **generates a regime of lawlessness and violence at home.** **A Hobbesian universe,** after all, **is predictably rife with fear and hate**. Falk observes that **an authoritarian scenario will be momentarily disguised as necessary security adjustment to** the threats of **global terrorism.”** 27 26 While this “scenario” has surely gained new credence since 9/11, the pattern was set during World War II with solidification of the war economy and security state. Further, as discussed in the first two chapters, **the United States has throughout its history worked tirelessly to defeat democratic possibilities outside its own borders.** The **neocons**, as we have seen, **embrace an uncompromising global authoritarianism** (while preaching “democracy promotion”) driven by U.S. entitlement to world supremacy. Falk argues: “ . . . I consider it reasonable to think of something one might call global fascism as the mentality of those seeking to regulate the world, from either above or below, according to their I went on to demonstrate how the libertarian principle of self-ownership supports PIA and why people cannot be responsible for all effects of their actions:

### M: A2—Util

#### The K turns case---securitization is a necessary precondition for their impacts---it creates a culture of paranoia to legitimize military expansion, creating a cycle of perpetual insecurity that makes conflict inevitable

#### Even representations of catastrophic nuclear war neurologically re-wires debaters into anxiety politics---err neg because you’re psychologically predispose to favor the aff’s impacts

**Lybarger 18** – Jeremy Lybarger, American Psychological Association, March 2018, ("The threat of nuclear war", American Psychological Association: Monitor on Psychology, Vol 49, No. 3, Available online at https://www.apa.org/monitor/2018/03/nuclear-war, Accessed 9-4-2020)

On Jan. 13, **Hawai’ians received a terrifying text**: "**Ballistic missile threat inbound** to Hawai'i. Seek immediate shelter. This is not a drill." The alert was triggered accidentally, but **chaos reigned for nearly 38 minutes** until a correction was issued. The state’s governor later reported that ­children sought refuge in manholes, stores closed and denied shelter to terrified customers and cars drove at high speed. **Three days later**, Japan’s public broadcaster, **NHK**, **mistakenly sent a similar alert warning** that North Korea had just fired a missile. **A correction was issued in five minutes. The mishaps further intensified the anxiety** of many Americans **who were** already **alarmed by the elevated tensions** between the United States and North Korea. Last November, **North Korea tested a missile that experts believe can strike anywhere** in the U.S. mainland. **The rhetoric** between the two nations **has escalated as well**. Last September, **Pyongyang threatened to reduce the United States** to "**ashes and darkness**," while President Donald Trump has promised to deliver "fire and fury" to Kim Jong-un’s regime. Such nuclear brinksmanship hasn’t been seen since the twilight of the Cold War. For the first time in at least a generation, Americans are confronting not only the possibility of a nuclear attack, but also a 24/7 news cycle transfixed by that possibility. Last August, **a CBS poll found that 72 percent** of Americans **are uneasy about a possible conflict** with North Korea. That same month, **the Chicago ­Council on Global Affairs reported that 75 percent** of Americans **consider North Korea’s nuclear** **program a top threat**. In perhaps the most dramatic example of simmering panic, **the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists** **set the Doomsday Clock**, which symbolizes the likelihood of global catastrophe, **to two minutes to midnight** in January. The last time it was this close was in 1953. While no one knows what the future holds, people’s fears are very real—and the threat appears to be cropping up more often in psychologists' offices. Although there are no hard numbers to report, anecdotally psychologists say they are seeing more anxiety over a possible nuclear showdown. 'Clinically significant anxiety' People were particularly uneasy in Hawai’i, even before the false alarm. Last December, the state tested its nuclear warning siren system for the first time since the Cold War. The Hawai’ian Islands are about 4,600 miles from North Korea. A nuclear missile would make landfall in 20 minutes and kill an estimated 18,000 civilians. Molly Bahr, a licensed therapist in Honolulu, says that never in her 10-year career has she seen such an increase in the “frequency and intensity of fear and clinically significant anxiety,” even among clients who haven’t previously experienced such symptoms. Unlike during the nuclear scares of the 1950s, ’60s and ’80s, **today’s anxiety ricochets nonstop between cable news, social media and online forums**. **In an age of breaking news alerts** on smartphones**, simply being an informed citizen** **means volunteering oneself for continuous stress**. Graham Davey, PhD, an emeritus professor of psychology at the University of Sussex in England who specializes in anxiety disorders, notes that **contemporary news consumers are experiencing ­trauma-like symptoms** **because of their exposure to broadcasts** **and breaking news.** “One of the effects that we’ve researched is that **exposure to negative news causally influences your own personal worries by making you catastrophize them more**,” Davey says. (In a 1997 study, Davey and his colleagues found that people exposed to negative news reported feeling sadder and more anxious after, and they also tended to obsess over their own worries more.) Internalizing negative news is especially prevalent in the United States, where APA’s 2017 Stress in America survey found that 95 percent of Americans follow the news regularly. One in five Americans, or 20 percent, report that they check their social media constantly, a significant increase over 2016. More than half of those surveyed said that the news causes stress. Nobody knows the potential long-term psychiatric effects of nuclear anxiety. Clinical studies on the matter are scarce, and because America hasn’t grappled with a serious nuclear adversary in decades, the pathology of this anxiety has yet to be fully documented. Davey suggests that the anxiety is temporary and tied to negative news reports, but **when the news is overwhelmingly negative**, as many patients feel it is today, **anxiety is a chronic response**. Advising patients Laura Brown, PhD, a psychologist in Seattle, was 10 during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. She believed then that her hometown of Cleveland was a target, so she practiced a prayer ritual and wrote imploring letters to President John F. Kennedy. “I still remember how frightened I was and how frightened the adults were,” Brown says today. “I was fearful that the world could end at any moment.” More than a half-century later, Brown once again lives in a city that she believes could be in the crosshairs of a rogue regime. Seattle, one of the most populated metro areas on the West Coast, has strategic value as a nuclear target. It’s near the Whidbey Island and Kitsap naval bases and the Joint Base Lewis-McChord (formerly Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base). In addition, Boeing Aviation operates several facilities in the area. “I’ve never experienced so much discussion from people who are feeling anxious and fearful,” Brown says. She advises clients to reduce their time online and read news when they’re less likely to feel vulnerable: midafternoon, for example, instead of just before bedtime. **These strategies are the starting point for recommendations** of psychologists now **counseling an unprecedented influx of patients worried that America is careening toward disaster**.

# Alternative

### L: A2 “Reflexivity”

#### The aff isn’t reflexive---it does not change the fundamental nature of security

**Steele 7** (Brent, Professor of Political Science – University of Kansas, “’Eavesdropping on Honored Ghosts’: From Classical to Reflexive Realism”, Journal of International Relations and Development, 10, p. 284-285)

This skeptical view of the eschaton means that **rather than being biased, like neorealism, toward the status quo**,30 **reflexive realism is instead perpetually skeptical of the authority exercised by state elites**, and **specifically the ‘big ideas’ that become a part of elite discourse** which can lead to dangerous policies.31 **Rather than reifying power, reflexive realism asks us to challenge the manner in which power is projected**. Scan the words used in this reflexive presentation of realism. Far from being the dominant, mainstream, status quo monolith that we were trained to recognize in graduate school, **it is** instead ‘**inevitably antagonistic toward political power** y [**a] rebellion against the seduction of prevailing structures of power, identity, and knowledge’** (Williams 2005a: 179, emphasis added).32 Budding IR scholars may tend to forget that what motivated especially the post (World War II) realists in their seemingly contrarian positions was their concern for the republics in which they wrote. Morgenthau was attempting to ‘perform’ a ‘service for his adopted country’ (Lebow 2003: 242). With reflexive realism, we look back at classical realist writings for evidence of such contemplation about contemporary problems. Morgenthau and Niebuhr not only buck the common portrayal of ‘hawkish’ realists, they provided some of the most insightful arguments against the Vietnam War. Writing in 1969, Morgenthau stated that his: concern is justified not only historically, in view of the shortcomings of our [American] foreign policies, but also pragmatically, with a view toward avoiding the mistakes of the past. It is now generally admitted that our Vietnam policy has failed, but, if we were to let it go at that, we would risk applying the same faulty assumptions and principles that have brought the Vietnam disaster upon us to other situations with similarly disastrous results (1969: viii). According to Jace Weaver (1995), Niebuhr was a proponent of American exceptionalism until this war. Despite the fact that Niebuhr recognized how certain religions and patriotism blinded nation-states from their own limitations, he still viewed the US’ mission as one of necessity during the Cold War. Yet this view would quickly change,33 so that by 1967, ‘The contradiction between our [American] ideal aims of a peace of conciliation and such an imposed peace, which only a defeated enemy would accept, can be understood only in the light of an ironic self-deception — ironic because we are the victims of our own ideology’ (Niebuhr 1968: 11, emphasis added). And by 1969, Niebuhr would assert that anti-communist ‘fanaticism y ha[d] caused [the United States] to stumble into the most pointless, costly and bloody war in [its] history’ (Niebuhr, quoted in Reinitz 1980: 120). Like the classical realists they resource, **reflexive realists** now **provide a particularly salient, effective critique of contemporary foreign policy, but one that is unique when compared to that made by mainstream realists**. **The current debate over the Iraq War between neoconservatives and mainstream realists** in the US has appeared in various forums, most notably in the neoconservative publication Commentary (Rosen 2005). Stephen Walt (2006: 4) stated in a future issue thAT Realists were in the vanguard of the opposition to war with Iraq in 2003y Today, with thousands of Americans and Iraqis killed and wounded, a price tag that will eventually exceed $1 trillion (!), and no end in sight, which group seems to have the clearest vision of our national interest? For all its limitations, realism remains a more valuable guide to U.S. foreign policy than the idealistic fantasies offered by its primary intellectual opponents. **Walt’s is a cost/benefit analysis of policy**, one echoed in the ISG report noted at the beginning of this article. **However, it fails to comprehensively challenge the philosophy that has driven the Bush administration’s** Iraq **policy**. **A critique** of the Iraq War set in the mold of Niebuhr and Morgenthau’s critique of Vietnam **would begin by asserting how hubristic impulses for American hegemonic expansion actually hastened American demise**. The inability to recognize the limits of power in international politics was a strategic miscalculation — demonstrating the cyclical pattern of human history rather than the linear trajectory assumed by eschatologies. The abnormal (and thus imprudent) behavior, according to reflexive realism, was to invade Iraq.

# Theory

### Theory: A2—PIKs Bad

#### 1---PIKs are good---

#### a---best middle ground---if policies matter, then finding the best policy option includes a critical interrogation of their reps---it’s a strategic cost to the aff’s epistemological choices

#### b---depth---it centers the debate on the aff’s representations---that’s the best test of the 1AC, they should be prepared to defend the foundations of the aff

#### c---argument development---it’s the best test of the 2ac’s strategic thinking---forces them to be able to defend the truth of their reps

#### 2---structural aff bias justifies neg flex---first and last speech, choosing the focus of the debate, and vast aff ground means PIKs are key to neg strategy

#### 3---counter-interp---the aff gets one PIK---solves most of their offense

#### 4---reasonability---if we didn’t make being aff impossible, you should err neg

#### 5---at worst, reject the argument, not the team---the alt alone still sufficiently solves the aff even if it’s not a PIK

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# K: Security—Aff

# Core

### Core: 2AC Note

This is just a basic outline of what a 2AC to security could look like---supplement as desired/depending on the 1NC shell read (for example, there isn’t specific link defense in this 2AC F/L)

### Core: 2AC Frontline

#### Framework---the neg has to prove the plan is bad on balance---key to clash and fairness by providing a stasis point for the debate---anything else moots the 1AC and means the aff starts behind

**No prior questions---err aff on empirics and concrete action---the neg’s endless questioning causes paradigm wars and means we never take action**

**Isacoff 15** (Jonathan, Associate Professor of Political Science and the Chair of Environmental Studies @ Gonzaga, “Why IR Needs Deweyan Pragmatism,” Perspectives on Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2015, pg. 26-33)

The well-known RCT scholars Shepsle and Bonchek humorously note that while it might not be “rocket science,” the study of politics should be scientific.46 Others, especially postmodernist critics, argue against the notion of political science and IR as science. A Deweyan pragmatist approach would suggest that this debate is not useful. By that, I mean that **what IR is or is not is not nearly as important as what it achieves**. So the question should not be whether IR is scientific, but rather, how scientific does it need to be to get the job done? To this, there are many answers, but I suggest a line of reasoning: the scientific method in the most general sense is useful in helping to explain how and why, all else equal, causal processes work. Put differently, **if we want to know how and why some states go to war and others do not, it would be more useful**—**in** the sense of **getting logically coherent, empirically verifiable answers**—**to analyze historical cases systematically** than it would be to consult with a shaman or use a crystal ball to obtain an answer. **This is not say that there is not an important role for textual interpretation in the process of studying war and other international phenomena**. Indeed, I elsewhere argue that interpretation of historical texts is crucial to making valid claims about wars.47 **But** the main point here is that **interpretation is a means toward an end**, namely, the process of coping with the world via human experience. **Toward that end, interpretation is** necessary and useful, but it is **not the end itself**. A second point is that **there is clearly a pragmatic and justifiable need for certain types of quantitative methods**, namely, statistics, though not necessarily formal models, in some segments of IR. Taking a simple example for illustrative purposes, if one wished to study the effect of speed limits on motor vehicle fatalities, the use of aggregate data statistically analyzed would be far superior to standing on the corner waiting for an accident to observe or reading several diary accounts of individual accidents. **The key point** here, however**, is not that** statistical **methods are inherently better, or more “rigorous”** than any other type of method. Rather, **the use of statistically analyzed data to find answers to problems** of highway fatalities **creates knowledge that if properly applied, would alleviate “concrete human woes,”** which is to say it would help to save lives. That is pragmatic political science.48 What Is a Problem? **Many** political scientists **believe in** the idea of having **a “problem orientation”** for the field. For example, Atul Kohli asserts that there is a strong consensus among leading experts “that comparative politics is very much a problem-driven field of study.” “What motivates the best comparative politics research are puzzles of real-world significance,” writes Kohli, in “The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium.”49 Similarly, Ian Shapiro, **responding to the question of what would be a better alternative** than RCT **asks** the question: “**What is the phenomenon to be explained?**… **The formulation of alternative explanations**, in other words, **should be a problem-driven activity**.”50 This is clearly consistent with Deweyan pragmatism; in fact, it is inherently pragmatist. “A Deweyan pragmatic approach to political inquiry,” writes Maurice Meilleur, “would transform political science from a discipline, based on a set of methods, into a profession, based on a set of problems.”51 But what, more specifically, is a “problem orientation?” First, it is clear that Kohli and his colleagues mean an empirically driven problem orientation. That is, the study of **politics should be driven by empirical, not theoretical or methodological problems**. Careful not to push this point too far, a Deweyan pragmatist would suggest that **theorization is** an **important** activity, **but it must not lose its link to** problems of human experience, which is to say **empirical problems**. However, Kohli and **others advocating** an empirically driven **problem orientation have little to say about how to identify and value problems**. After all, there is a limitless supply of political problems only a fraction of which can be studied. In response, I would argue that **some problems are more significant to the detection and response to human suffering and thus more deserving of study, than others**. This is itself a tricky ethical problem, for who is to say what is or is not a “real problem?” One reader of this manuscript suggested that “What is really going on here, when one scratches the analytical surface, is not that IR theorists aren't discussing problems; it's that they are discussing problems that the author does not feel are worthy of attention. But why should we accept that the author's “problems” are more important or privileged? Why does the author get to decide what a “real” problem is?” This is a good question but it is a misreading of the argument. **Nowhere does** Dewey or **this** author **imply that any individual could or should decide or dictate which problems matter and which do not**. To the contrary, **the question of “who decides” is** a **public** deliberation problem, a subject Dewey addressed exhaustively in his classic The Public and Its Problems.52 According to Dewey, **problems are the direct outcome of a public's determination of its common good**. A full analysis of how this works, or in some cases, fails to work in practice is beyond the scope of this article. But it is important to note that there is no argument here for the privileging of one private individual's notion of what constitutions “real problem” versus that of another. That is for the public to decide. Human Woe and Issues That Matter The final point to be made about reconstruction stems directly from the previous discussion: **some problems matter more than others with regard to the alleviation of concrete human suffering. Which issues matter** the **most** in our world? Ultimately, per Dewey's political philosophy touched on above, **that is for the public to decide**. Assuming that there ever could be a “common good,” we can hypothesize that **people might choose to focus on** issues that affect them daily, **issues such as climate change**, poverty, health care, education, racism, and sexism, as well as **war and peace**, all issues **that are of grave importance to humanity**. IR, especially in its American form, with its disproportionate emphasis on global security and great power war, has given scant attention to too many other issues, and when attention is given to the “lesser” topics, they are relegated to sub-sub-specializations within the discipline, “Gender and IR,” for instance. More problematic from the standpoint of pragmatism, **the approach-driven wing** of the discipline **is more concerned with which paradigm has scored more points in the epic contest for paradigmatic supremacy than with the matter of how the world could or should respond** to climate change or why hundreds of million of children lack basic nutrition and medical care. **The interpretivist/linguistic wing**, in contrast, **is more concerned with how texts are interpreted in graduate seminars than with the fact that children in inner cities cannot even read a text at all.**53 **Many** IR scholars are still fighting over whether and to what extent “unit-level variables” should be taken into consideration in understanding international politics (and if so, whether one might still rightly be accepted in the club of realism).54 Others **are trying to demonstrate** that IR constructivism is really “**liberalism in disguise**.”55 **This is** not a stab at “why realism is (yet again) wrong.” It is **a critique of the self-definitionally obsessed, paradigm-driven culture** of academic IR. I would not go so far as to claim that there are no scholars who study everyday politics; many clearly do.56 Rather, the problem is that that **the incentive structure to contribute to the “big debates” of the discipline**, namely, those **at the paradigmatic level, is a project that drifts ever afar from the problems of “concrete human woe” that affect** the other **millions** of people who happen not to have graduate degrees in IR.

#### Util comes first---extinction is the only *irreversible* threat and makes desecuritization impossible

#### Case turns the K---any risk we’re right about war means conflict is inevitable in the world of the alt---turns their impacts because hypersecuritization is more likely in times of warfare

#### PIKs are bad—they steal aff ground killing fairness and education and justify perm do the alt because it proves the plan is a good idea

#### No link and no root cause---prefer the particularities of how our reps were deployed

**Shim ‘14**

(David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen – As part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times, MSNBC.com., Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. Routledge Book Publication –Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing – p.24-25)

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; Campbell 2003b; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle (2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .] to express them’. As a consequence, visual images have political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them. Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action. The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other. However, **particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as,** for instance, **proponents of the** so-called **'CNN effect’ would argue** (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. **There is no causal relationship between a specific image and** a **political intervention**, **in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act).** David **Perlmutter** (1998: I), for instance, **explicitly challenges**, as he calls it, **the 'visual determinism' of images,** which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the **formation of opinion**s by individuals **depends not on images but on** their **idiosyncratic predispositions and values** (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).

#### Perm do both---we can do the plan and orient ourselves towards desecuritization

#### The alt fails---there’s no alternative model to IR offered and no reason the alt can desecuritize all international actors---even if they’re right that securitization isn’t perfect, it’s how policymaker make decisions

# Links

### L: No Prior Questions—1AR

#### No prior questions

**Jackson**, professor of IR – American University, **‘15** (Patrick Thaddeus, “Must International Studies Be a Science?” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* vol. 43, no. 3, p. 942-965, June)

These **diverse methodologies have different approaches to causation, to case comparison, and to explanation in general; those differences**, in turn, **mean** that **different** scientific **methodologies generate different kinds of valid claims with different epistemic statuses, and should not be regarded as poor approximations to or deficient forms of one another.** While neopositivists look for cross-case covariation as the truest mark of causation, critical realists look for dispositional causal powers, analyticists apply ideal-typical models to disclose the specific features of individual cases, and reflexive scholars ground their claims in their own social locations. There is no reason why this plurality has to lead to relativism, but neither should it be misunderstood as creating a simple, homogenous account of the world; translation challenges persist, and **the result of a pluralist science is a variety of warranted knowledge-claims.**22

But for all of this internal diversity, there are important commonalities among these varieties of scientific methodology that serve to distinguish them, as a group, from other forms of knowing. Following Max Weber, we might characterise all four of these scientific methodologies as aiming at a ‘thoughtful ordering of empirical actuality’,23 or, to put it another way, as participating in a form of knowing that emphasises systematic claims, public criticism intended to improve those claims, and a specific kind of ‘worldliness’ that excludes references to divine commands and magical forces. This is not to say that a claim has to achieve some specific level of systematicity, publicity, and/or worldliness in order to be regarded as ‘scientific’; the commonality I am highlighting here is not a candidate for a demarcation criterion that would allow us to distinguish science from non-science in any kind of definitive fashion.24 Instead, I am suggesting that in the space marked out by these methodologies, questions about a claim’s systematicity, its susceptibility to public criticism, and its worldliness are in some sense appropriate questions to ask. In effect, to regard ourselves as being engaged in scientific inquiry is to invite these questions, and to submit our claims to evaluation in terms of these criteria.

The kind of knowledge that is supposed to be produced by efforts to be as systematic, public, and worldly as one can be is knowledge of a particular kind: factual, propositional knowledge, or what we might call ‘knowing-that’.25 This is the kind of knowing that Wittgenstein had in mind when he suggested, in the opening sections of the Tractatus, that the world ‘is all that is the case…the totality of facts, not of things’.26 It is what Aristotle called epistemic knowing: ‘universal, invariable, context-independent’ and ‘based on general analytical rationality’.27 It prizes relative impersonality in connecting claims to their warrants, in that the validity of a claim is not subject to idiosyncratic impressions but is instead articulated in a way that is understood as generally established.28 In Weber’s formulation, the goal of this kind of knowing is to produce a set of factual claims that even someone who did not share our values would find compelling.29

Here again it is important to note that this is not some kind of absolute standard that these methodologies necessarily meet. **It is unclear to me that we ever have perfectly impersonal knowledge, or that any claim whatsoever achieves anything like universal generality. But this is not the point.** Instead, the point is that **epistemic claims advanced in the methodological modes of neopositivism, critical realism, analyticism, and even reflexivity are accompanied by standards of validity that purport to be something other than an arbitrary whim** binding only on the speaker. **The logical condition of possibility for** Sandra **Harding’s suggestion that** the accumulated body of what we call ‘**scientific knowledge’** **is thoroughly marked by cultural particularity and a colonial past**, and her call for a ‘strong objectivity’ that brings previously marginalised perspectives back into the conversation, **is precisely the notion that there is something illegitimate and untenable about this unacknowledged partiality**.30 **And the claim that some account of things is Eurocentric or androcentric is no more and no less reliant on similar definitions and procedures shared by a community of speaker and audience than is the claim that dyadic democracy and war frequency are inversely correlated**—and as such, **the very form of the claim** **opens the possibility of questioning just how impersonally, epistemically valid it is. ‘Epistemically valid for me/for us’ does not make any sense, because the very idea of epistemic knowing implies validity independent of any conceptual scheme**, **even if** **the** **vocabulary** within which the claim is made **is itself local and contingent.**31

### L: Realism Good/True—2AC

#### Realism is the most ethical paradigm—it accepts the inherent insecurity of the nuclear age as a precondition for genuine hospitality. Rejecting the nation-state lapses into liberal interventionism and global nuclear civil war.

**Lundborg, 19**—Swedish Defence University (Tom, “The ethics of neorealism: Waltz and the time of international life,” European Journal of International Relations, Volume: 25 issue: 1, page(s): 229-249, dml)

Conditioned by the trace, **survival is** thus **inseparable from** finitude and **the constant threat of erasure** (Derrida, 1976: 167). According to Derrida (1984b: 65, emphasis added): ‘it belongs to the trace to erase itself, to elude that which might maintain it in presence’. In this way, the trace also points to the elusiveness of life, and to the fact that nothing can ever guarantee the infinite existence of anything. It tells us that **life is nothing but a ‘play of traces’, which lacks an absolute origin and is inherently mortal** (Derrida, 1984a: 15). **This** play of traces brings us back to Hägglund’s notion of the ‘time of life’, which **highlights the central importance of temporal finitude for grasping the general conditions of life**. As he puts it: ‘This radical finitude of survival is not a lack of being that is desirable to overcome. Rather, **the finitude of survival opens the chance for everything that is desired and the threat of everything that is feared**’ (Hägglund, 2008: 1–2). There is, then, an important ‘double bind’ to the tracing of time. On the one hand, it is because nothing is infinite, immortal or present in itself that new life can emerge. On the other hand, the lack of self-presence means that life can never be immune to alteration, contamination and death. **In order for anything to live, it must consequently be mortal and open to unpredictable change** (Derrida, 1976: 143). Even if an infinite and immortal life, free from dangers, might seem desirable, it would be a self-refuting desire since it implies desiring the end of the possibility to desire anything at all. More precisely, it would be the same as desiring the end of the continuous flow of time that allows new life to emerge while exposing everything that lives to the threat of coming to an end. Immortality cancels out the time of mortal life and renders survival obsolete. Counterintuitively, Hägglund (2008: 32–33) thus notes, mortality can be seen as the ‘best’ or most desirable, while immortality is the ‘worst’ or least desirable. **While this may seem like a rejection of life, it is, in fact, an affirmation of life. It positively affirms the chance to live precisely on the condition that inherent in any movement of survival is the risk of life coming to an end. Refusing this risk would be the same as refusing to live, since to live is to negotiate the relationship between life and death.** Temporal finitude is significant, moreover, not only for grasping the general conditions of life, but for explaining why **any act of survival must encounter the uncertainty of the future**. Returning to Waltz for a moment, **it is precisely this uncertainty that makes it impossible to know if today’s friend will stay a friend or suddenly turn into an enemy**: ‘In the absence of an external authority, a state cannot be sure that today’s friend will not be tomorrow’s enemy’, writes Waltz (2000: 10). **If we were able to acquire full knowledge of if and when a friend becomes an enemy**, we would bring the future under our control. However, then the future would no longer be a genuinely open future, in which the chance of survival is inseparable from finitude and mortality. **Survival would then lose its value and become redundant as life turns into nothing but a calculable formula**. So, what are the implications of Derrida’s notion of survival and his critique of the ‘calculable’ for our understanding of ‘ethics’? First of all, it means that **ethics cannot be translated into static ethical ideals**. As Derrida has elaborated on in relation to a wide array of issues, including justice, responsibility, hospitality, friendship and the gift, **ethics** rather **depends on maintaining openness to the perpetual coming of the future**. This openness means that **none of these issues can ever be linked to something pure, uncontaminated and incorruptible that is immune to unexpected alterations.** To take one specific example, hospitality is, for Derrida, crucial for thinking about ethics (see Derrida, 2000). This is because an **act of hospitality suggests that the self does not simply exist in pure isolation of what lies ‘outside’ the self, but must always negotiate its relation with** the non-self, that is, **the other**. Ethics is, for this reason, inseparable from hospitality since both terms highlight the necessity of relating to and opening up space for others. At the same time, **hospitality cannot be ‘absolute’ or ‘pure’ in the sense of conforming to a static metaphysical ideal**. For Derrida, **not only would such an ideal be impossible to achieve** in the Kantian sense11, **it would be essentially undesirable**. This is because **the very aspiration towards a pure metaphysical ideal would have as its aim the closure of the uncertainty that makes the self–other encounter possible in the first place. The welcoming of strangers must therefore always involve a chance as well as a threat: the chance of some sort of positive and friendly transformation, and the threat that the other turns into an enemy doing harm to the host** (Derrida, 2000: 15; Hägglund, 2008: 103–105). The only way to eliminate the potential threat inherent in any act of hospitality would be to make the self completely immune to the other. Such immunity, however, would close down the self–other encounter before it could happen at all. Derrida (2003: 129) thus rhetorically asks: The visit might actually be very dangerous, and we must not ignore this fact, but would a hospitality without risk, a hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality? Derrida’s point here is that **hospitality categorically cannot correspond to something pure, like a universal ideal situation beyond violence**. This is because **without the threat of violence, the very act of welcoming the other would not be possible in the first place**. In order for this act to be ‘possible’, it must simultaneously be ‘impossible’, in the pure metaphysical sense (see also Bulley, 2017: 12; Vaughan-Williams, 2007: 121). **While ethics is often linked to a seemingly self-evident desire to reach an absolute metaphysical ideal, Derrida’s philosophy contests the desirability of such ideals altogether and offers a stark warning against any attempt to immunize the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’, ‘peace’ from ‘violence’, ‘friends’ from ‘enemies’, and so on**. This is why, in Derrida’s view, **there has to be a violent or non-ethical opening of ethics** (Derrida, 1976: 140; 1978: 128). **To desire the closure of this opening would be the same as desiring the elimination of that which makes any ethics possible at all: its exposure to the uncertainty of the future, and the indestructible threat that inheres in all encounters with others**. Rather than linking ethics to a desire for the purely good, **ethics** in the Derridean sense **is** therefore **tied to an affirmation of the uncertainty of the future, which opens up to the ‘good’ as well as the ‘bad’.** The ethics of neorealism **Derrida’s notion of** the violent opening of **ethics fits remarkably well with** the two core assumptions of Waltz’s theory of international politics: **the anarchic structure of the international political system and states’ desire to survive within this system**. On this basis, it can be argued that **there is**, indeed, **an ethics of neorealism**. It is found in the ‘Waltzian baseline’ rather than in attempts to use that baseline to establish law-like patterns of behaviour.12 To grasp the ethics of neorealism, **it is** therefore **necessary to shift focus** from causal laws and testable hypotheses, **to the structural conditions that shape and affect the behaviour of states in a non-deterministic manner**.13 Hence, **the ‘structure’** in Waltz’s theory has **to be grasped as an open structure that leaves ample room for chance and contingency**. Crucially, **if we could know for certain what states will do on the basis of either the structure of the system or some predetermined motives of the subjects within the system**, the uncertainty of international life would disappear and **the ‘politics’ of international politics would lose its meaning**.14 Rather than trying to rectify the lack of certainty by creating a stronger sense of certainty, **it is** therefore **imperative to affirm the uncertainties created by the system. It is important**, moreover, **to oppose the distinction between ethical desirability and political possibility, since the reproduction of this distinction blocks from view the conditions of international life that make ethical thinking and action possible in the first place.** Positivist social science and liberal interpretations of Kant are thus, very crudely put, the main obstacles to grasping the ethics of international life. In resisting both moves, **neorealism does not seek to close down the violent opening of ethics inherent in the structure of anarchy**, for example, **by formulating metaphysical ideals informing states how they should act or how they ought to become friends rather than enemies. There can be no absolute friendship between states, and no state can ever offer absolute hospitality to another state. At the heart of every inter-state relation, there is mistrust, uncertainty and incalculability. To positively affirm the latter is not to say that uncertainty or incalculability is good per se. Rather, it implies that they are seen as basic and irrefutable conditions of international life, which, consequently, are not even desirable to overcome**. Hence, it also implies that as long as there is international life, there must be ‘the ominous shadow of the future [that] continues to cast its pall over interacting states’ (Waltz, 2000: 39). Crucially, Waltz’s reference to **this** shadow **should not be read as an expression of determinism. It expresses rather an affirmation of uncertainty: the ‘uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions’** (Waltz, 1979: 105). **In order to give friendship in international politics a chance**, so to speak, **the possibility that a friend suddenly becomes an enemy must never be eliminated. Attempts to create absolute trust in inter-state relations are therefore not only impossible to achieve in the practical sense, but essentially undesirable**.15 Along similar lines, Derrida explains how **friendship is possible only if one remains open to the deception of the other, since it is precisely the unconditional openness to whatever may happen in the encounter between self and other that makes it possible to develop any sort of friendship in the first place** (Derrida, 2005: 219). Even if we were to accept Alexander Wendt’s (1999) distinction between different ‘cultures of anarchy’, some of which are more ‘friendly’ than others, **it is not self-evident that a culture in which friendship is prioritized over enmity is actually a better one**. This is because in order to exclude the possibility that a friend may suddenly become an enemy, one must first eliminate the time of international life that makes the self–other encounter possible in the first place. For the same reason, the key message of democratic peace theory — that all states should become democracies in order to minimize or eliminate the possibility of wars — is not only practically impossible, but also ethically undesirable. It is impossible to verify because there is no democracy that is immune to corruptibility (Waltz, 2000: 10), but, in addition to that, it can be seen as undesirable since **the notion that all states must conform to the same universal ideal cancels out their freedom to act, to take moral responsibility and so on**. The undesirability of **a system that eradicates violence, borders and discrimination** is further underlined by Waltz (1979: 111–114) in his discussion of the ‘virtues of anarchy’. Therein, he attacks the idea of transforming the international system into a world government. Not only **would** such a transformation **‘be an invitation to prepare for world civil war’** (Waltz, 1979: 112), **but it would take away the constitutive violence at the heart of inter-state relations in the structure of anarchy.** **The constant possibility of war in the international system means that states will always be wary of provoking others in the search for security**. As he puts it: **The constant possibility that force will be used limits manipulations, moderates demands, and serves as an incentive for the settlement of disputes. One who knows that pressing too hard may lead to war has strong reason to consider whether possible gains are worth the risks entailed**.… The possibility that conflicts among nations may lead to long and costly wars has … sobering effects. (Waltz, 1979: 113–114) In this way, **the conditions of peace in the international system can be said to rest on the constant possibility of war**. In making this point, Waltz argues against moral universalism. Hence, unwittingly or otherwise, he also opens up space for ethical negotiation by recognizing the finitude of **the political subject**, who **is free to interact with others only on the condition that self and other do not have to conform to the ‘same’ universal ideal.** **The subject is thus able to take moral responsibility and ponder on how to make ethical decisions, which, without difference and alterity, would turn into a strictly formal procedure based on the ‘mechanical application of rules’** (Zehfuss, 2009: 146). **Responsibility and ethical decisions are**, thus, **made possible precisely by the impossibility of predetermining what is the ‘right’ decision in any given context**. As Derrida argues, **irrespective of how thorough the decision-making procedure is, and regardless of how much knowledge is acquired before taking a decision**: the instant of the decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise, there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the person taking the decision not know everything. Even if one knows everything, **the decision**, if there is one, **must advance toward a future that is not known, that cannot be anticipated**. (Derrida, 2002b: 231) **The impossibility of anchoring the decision in rational calculation is**, in this sense, **what creates the chance for any decisions to be taken at all**. The instant of the decision belongs, then, not to a fully present moment in which the subject calculates the future consequences of the decision, but to a future that is incalculable (see Derrida, 2002a). **It is precisely this incalculability, and the uncertainty of the future, that** Waltz’s conception of **anarchy positively affirms. Rather than making the instant of the decision obsolete by transforming the decision into a mere application of rules, anarchy makes the ethical decision ‘possible’.** Even if Waltz repeatedly claims that the desire to survive is a purely pragmatic assumption made strictly for the purpose of constructing an explanatory theory, it is not neutral or innocent. First and foremost, Waltzian **neorealism expresses an ethics due to the way it affirms states’ desire to survive by stipulating the necessary conditions of their survival**. More precisely, **it affirms the uncertainty of international life by refusing to reduce the play of relations between states to a calculable formula or a regulative ideal, and that rather embraces chance and contingency as central features of the anarchic system — features that make states simultaneously free and insecure**.16 In this light, **the primary significance** of Waltz’s theory **is not as an explanatory theory, but as a theory that affirms** the time of international life, defined by **the uncertainty of the future** and the logic of the erasable mortal trace.17 **It is this notion of the future that makes it possible for states, as finite political subjects, not only to survive, but also to try to take moral responsibility and make ethical decisions**. Why universal ethical ideals are both impossible and undesirable What are the implications of my reading of Waltzian **neorealism** as an ethics? First of all, it **contributes to a new understanding of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to theorize what it might mean to replace the structure of anarchy with an international or world political order that is supposedly ‘more’ ethical**. If ethics is inextricably interlinked with the structural conditions of survival, then **any attempt to challenge neorealism from an ‘ethical’ perspective must do so by replacing one structure of survival with another, and there can be no guarantees that the new structure will be less violent**. While this does not in any way prevent such attempts from being made, it does highlight the risky nature of trying to resolve problems of war and violence in international politics on ethical terms. For example, **the idea of creating a new form of political community that transcends the exclusionary borders of states may seem naturally desirable** (e.g. Linklater, 1982). **Yet, regardless of how sophisticated theories become in terms of articulating the content and meaning of such a community, there can be no guarantees that attempts to actualize it will not result in even more violence. There are no guarantees**, as John Mearsheimer (1994: 44) puts it, **that ‘a fascist discourse far more violent than realism will not emerge as the new hegemonic discourse’.** Moreover, it is important to point out that the value of a neorealist ethics is not that it provides a ‘coherent ethical theory’. One interesting attempt to create such a theory is found in Frost’s (2009) Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations. For Frost, the point of developing a coherent ethical theory is to demonstrate how international relations can be grasped primarily in ethical terms, rather than as a struggle for power and survival. His assumption is that ‘to engage in international relations at all … is to make ethical claims for oneself and to recognize the ethical standing of others’ (Frost, 2009: 19). Frost links his theory partly to the diverse practices that shape international interactions, and partly to an ‘ethical background theory which justifies the whole set of rules which constitute the practice’ (Frost, 2009: 27). While the background theory is based on an English School-inspired notion of the anarchic system/society of states, the practices added to it have the potential to shape international relations in a direction that is ethically desirable. Arguing for and against the ethical standing of our interlocutors, ‘we construct and reconstruct the social practices within which international relations are conducted’ (Frost, 2009: 94). The main goal of these practices, according to Frost, should be nothing less than resolving the tensions within the current international system between citizen rights and global human rights (Frost, 2009: ch. 3). In contrast to cosmopolitan theories, however, he argues that this goal is attainable within the anarchic structure of the system, through the ethical adjustment of that system (Frost, 2009: 113). This adjustment involves renegotiating the relationship between citizen rights and human rights through practice. Frost (2009: 173) writes: ‘Participants in global civil society and the society of states need to take their own values seriously and need to attempt to make them real for everybody everywhere’. **According to Frost,** **the segregating borders of states are thus meant to persist, while the violent forms of exclusion** that these borders enable **are to gradually fall away through the aspiration of a common goal that embraces everybody everywhere**. From the perspective of my reading of a neorealist ethics, however, **the notion of a common universal goal underpinning Frost’s ethical theory is not only impossible, but also undesirable. This is not because the ideal itself is ‘bad’**. Rather, it is because **it is precisely the absence of a common goal beyond segregating borders that makes ethical negotiation possible in the first place.** **As soon as such an ideal has been formulated, and the guidelines for how to attain it have been articulated, the incalculable future in which the encounter between self and other is allowed to play out is cancelled out**. As previously noted, **while this encounter might result in more or less violence, it is the uncertainty of the future that makes the encounter possible in the first place.** Frost’s **attempt to formulate a universal ethical ideal that embraces everyone everywhere while, at the same time, retaining the** segregating borders of the **international system is thus problematic**. The primary reason for this, then, is that in articulating a universal ethical ideal, his theory works to undermine the conditions of international life. In brief, what Frost fails to recognize is that **what makes international ethics possible is also what makes impossible the aspiration of a universal ethical ideal that is applicable to everybody everywhere** — like that of a perfect alignment of citizen rights and human rights. **Rather than seeking to resolve these tensions, the tensions should be kept alive. Only in this way can we, moreover, maintain a distinctly international ethics without reverting to a ‘global ethics’**. For **the latter** to make any sense, it **has to be based on ideals that transcend** the **borders** of states, whether those ideals are linked to a specific goal or just to a general attitude of openness to political negotiation and contestation (Hutchings, 2010: 215). **Irrespective of what precisely they are supposed to entail, the ideals associated with a global ethics become problematic as soon as the attempt is made to transform difference and the plurality of wills into one and the same will**. It is problematic for the same reason that philosophical attempts to create a new metaphysics that is supposed to resolve the violence of metaphysics. **Such attempts can only have as their aim the ultimate destruction of the very possibility of philosophical thought** and writing, **which**, per definition, **are metaphysical and therefore violent** (see Derrida, 1978). The temporal horizon of neorealism **To argue against the desirability of universal ethical ideals is**, essentially, **to recognize the importance of finitude for thinking about international ethics**. Waltz’s neorealist **conception of international anarchy and of the desire of states to survive therein offers one way of affirming this notion of international ethics. This is not to say**, however, **that international anarchy** in Waltz’s theory **should be seen as a perfect ideal that all politics and ethics must aspire to maintain**. In order for my deconstructive approach to the ethics of neorealism to make any sense, **the international must also be seen as something finite and deconstructible, rather than as an end in itself**. To think of the finitude of the international, **we do not have to look for something that ‘transcends’ or comes ‘after’ the international, like a world government or cosmopolitan community**.18 **We only have to focus on the principles that**, according to Waltz, **are meant to keep the international order alive: the structure of anarchy and states’ desire to survive**. While these are mutually dependent, **they** also **point to a situation in which the struggle to stay alive might threaten the system in which this struggle takes place**. To illustrate this point, **consider** the issue of **nuclear deterrence**, which Waltz controversially saw as a possible method of creating a more peaceful international order (see Waltz, 1990b). For Waltz, **only if nuclear catastrophe remains a real possibility will states need to actively deter the nuclear threat**.19 Thus, **nuclear deterrence ‘works’ only if nuclear war remains a constant possibility, hence only insofar as the problem of nuclear war is not permanently resolved** (Waltz, 1990b: 743–744). **What creates the possibility of nuclear war constitutes**, in this sense, **the conditions of international security and peace. What makes the prospect of nuclear war different from other wars is**, of course, **the planetary scale on which its effects are likely to be felt**. As such, **it poses a threat** not only to individual states, but also **to the entire system of states**. On this point, there is another parallel to be drawn between Waltz and Derrida, for whom **apocalyptic discourses** on nuclear war are interesting because they highlight ‘the absolute effacement of any possible trace’ (Derrida, 1984c: 28). Hence, these discourses **raise the stakes of survival even further by pointing to the finitude of everything that lives, as well as to all those attempts at keeping the apocalypse at bay, deferring it through deterrence** and so on (Derrida, 1984d: 29). Understood as a global threat to the entire international order, nuclear war highlights the temporal horizon of the whole neorealist project as conceived by Waltz. This is the horizon of the horizon, or the structure of the structure, which gives meaning to the ‘international’ as a finite as opposed to infinite category shaping the behaviour of states. **Rather than simply reaffirming a static world-view, which perpetually reproduces itself in a circular fashion**, Waltz puts forward a notion of **the international** that **is both finite and mortal. The international continues to live on** in this sense, **but only on the condition that it is exposed to the threat of coming to an end**. Other examples of how the international system may come to an end relate to the increased impact of global capital and global warming. While these are often depicted as typical examples of transnational phenomena, they nevertheless emanate from a system in which states are free to make sovereign decisions, for example, on how to deregulate the emissions of pollutants and financial markets. **Individual states are** thus **free to actively contribute to setting in motion processes that might put an end to the system that conditions their survival**. In this way, **there is a self-destructive potential built into the system, which threatens to make it collapse from within and on its own terms** (see also Frost, 2009: 163–168). Crucially, the self-destructive potential of international politics does not contradict Waltz’s theory. After all, he argues that **the system shapes, not determines, state behaviour**. He recognizes that **as long as states interact within an anarchic structure, they are simultaneously free and insecure**. This freedom and insecurity mean that **survival in international politics can never become a predictable science that is able to ‘remove the uncertainty of politics’** (Waltz, 1990a: 37). **Sometimes, the struggle to survive does more harm than good to the ones seeking to survive. Sometimes, this struggle may even set in motion processes the effects of which will be felt on a planetary scale, provoking an irreversible decay of the entire system of sovereign states.** Conclusion The ethics of neorealism, as argued in this article, stems from the mutual interaction of the two core themes of Waltz’s theory: **the structure of anarchy and states’ desire to survive**. Together, they **affirm** Derrida’s notion of **the violent opening of ethics: the opening to a future that makes new life possible while exposing everything that lives to finitude and the threat of erasure. Ethics and violence are**, thus, **inextricably interlinked, which means that any attempt to immunize the former from the latter is untenable. Before any moral obligations, and before any normative commitments, the ethics of neorealism addresses the more fundamental problem of what it means for states to live and be free in a system that guarantees nothing**. In this way, Waltzian **neorealism articulates the basic conditions of international life, which all attempts to theorize international ethics**, either by remaining ‘within’ the international system or by arguing in favour of its transcendence, **must come to terms with**. One of the main challenges that springs from my reading of the ethics of neorealism relates to how **universal ethical ideals not only become impossible to achieve in the practical sense, but are also fundamentally undesirable**. They are undesirable because **the desire to fulfil them undermines the conditions that make international life possible in the first place**. On this basis, a whole range of **attempts to theorize the meaning and implications of international ethics, which** in various ways **hold on to the notion of ethical ideals beyond the violence of inter-state relations within an anarchic structure, become untenable**. This even includes classical realism and the thought of Morgenthau, whose sharp distinction between ethical desirability and political possibility dissolves in light of the neorealist ethics presented in this article. According to this notion of ethics, then, **the desirable cannot be placed beyond political possibility since it essentially is political possibility**: the possibility of whatever happens in the interaction among states in the structure of anarchy. As was pointed out in the penultimate section of this article, there is also a temporal horizon of neorealism. This horizon is best illustrated by the threat of **nuclear war** and **highlights the possible end of the entire** international political **system. The threat of nuclear war demonstrates why this system, just like the state, ought to be seen as a finite as opposed to infinite category. Stressing the finitude of the system means that there is no metaphysical truth, moral or otherwise, to which it either can or should conform. It also means that there is always space, and time, for an ongoing ethical-political negotiation**. While the latter might very well include efforts to produce a ‘lesser violence’, its main force is that of a perpetual coming of the future. **As long as this future is allowed to play out, there is**, I believe, **reason to be optimistic: optimistic not about the possible fulfilment of universal ethical ideals, but about the future itself, and whatever it holds for international life**.

### L: Realism Good/True—1AR

#### Realism is not interventionism

John J. **Mearsheimer**, 20**18**, Prof of Poli Sci @ UChi, The Great Delusion LIBERAL DREAMS AND INTERNATIONAL REALITIES, Yale University Press, e book page 220-221

**Most students of international politics associate realism with rivalry and conflict. This, of course, is one reason realism is so unpopular in liberal societies**.2 It is also disliked because realists consider war a legitimate tool of statecraft that can be employed to either maintain the balance of power or shift it in an advantageous way. Advocates of realpolitik downplay the prospects for cooperation among states, moreover, because they think countries have to provide for their own security, given that they operate in a world with no higher authority to protect them. To maximize their survival prospects, those states have little choice but to compete for power, which can be a ruthless and bloody business. Realism does not inspire a hopeful outlook for the future.

Nevertheless, **realists are generally less warlike than liberals**, who have a strong inclination to use force to promote international peace, even while they dismiss the argument that war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft. This point is illustrated by Valerie Morkevičius’s observation, in her comparison of the two bodies of theory, that **most realists opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, while America’s three most prominent just war theorists (Jean Elshtain, James Turner Johnson, and Michael Walzer) “viewed the war more positively.” She concludes that “conventional wisdom holds that realists support the recourse to war more than just war theorists. I argue that the opposite is true: just war theory produces a more bellicose orientation than realism.”**3

**Many realists actually believe that if states acted according to balance-of-power logic, there would be hardly any wars between the great powers**. These “defensive realists” maintain that the structure of **the international system usually punishes aggressors** **and that the push toward war usually comes from domestic political forces. Great powers, in other words, most often go to war for non-realist reasons**. This perspective is nicely captured in the title of Charles Glaser’s important article “Realists as Optimists.”4 Other prominent defensive realists include Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, and even Kenneth Waltz, who is sometimes mistakenly said to argue that international anarchy causes states to act aggressively to gain power.5 Two other realists, Sebastian Rosato and John Schuessler, advocate a realist foreign policy for the United States that they describe as a “recipe for security without war.”6

The historian Marc **Trachtenberg, who looks at the world from the perspective of a defensive realist, explicitly argues that following the dictates of realism leads to a relatively peaceful world**, while acting according to what he calls “impractical idealism” leads to endless trouble. His reading of history tells him that “**serious trouble developed only when states failed to act in a way that made sense in power-political terms.” Conflict occurs when states “squander [power] on moralistic, imperialistic, or ideological enterprises.” Realism, he maintains, is “at heart a theory of peace**, and it is important that it be recognized as such.” In brief, “power is not unstable.”7

I do not share this sanguine understanding of realism. The structure of the international system often forces great powers to engage in intense security competition and sometimes initiate wars. International politics is a nasty and brutish business, and not just because misguided liberal ideas or other malevolent domestic political forces influence states’ foreign policies. Great powers occasionally start wars for sound realist reasons.

Still, **even if states act according to my harsher version of realism, they are likely to fight fewer international wars than if they follow liberal principles. There are three reasons why even hard-nosed offensive realists like me are less likely to advocate war than liberals.** First, because **great powers operating under realist dictates are principally concerned with maximizing their share of global power, there are only a limited number of regions where they should be willing to risk a war.** Those places include the great power’s own neighborhood and distant areas that are either home to another great power or the site of a critically important resource. For the United States, three regions outside the Western Hemisphere are of vital strategic importance today: Europe and East Asia, because that is where the other great powers are located; and the Persian Gulf, because it is the main source of an exceptionally important resource, oil.

This means the United States should not fight wars in Africa, Central Asia, or areas of the Middle East that lie outside the Persian Gulf. During the Cold War, for example, realists maintained that American policymakers should avoid wars in the “Third World” or “Developing World” because it was populated with minor powers that were of little strategic significance.8 **Almost every realist opposed the Vietnam War, because Vietnam’s fate held little strategic consequence for the global balance of power**.9

Liberals, on the other hand, tend to think of every area of the world as a potential battlefield, because they are committed to protecting human rights everywhere and spreading liberal democracy far and wide. They would naturally prefer to achieve these goals peacefully, but they are usually willing to countenance using military force if necessary. In short, while realists place strict limits on where they are willing to employ force, liberals have no such limits. For them, vital interests are everywhere.

Second, **realists are inclined to be cautious about using force or even the threat of force because they recognize that balance-of-power logic will compel other states to contain aggressors**, even if they are liberal democracies. Of course, balancing does not always work, which is why wars sometimes occur. Great powers are especially vigilant about their security, and when they feel threatened, they invariably take measures to protect themselves. This wariness explains why Russian leaders have stubbornly opposed NATO enlargement since the mid-1990s and why most American realists opposed it as well. **Liberals, however, tend to dismiss balance-of-power logic as irrelevant in the twenty-first century. This kind of thinking helps to make liberals less restrained than realists about using military force**.

### L: Security Good—Reflexivity

#### Their K is wrong---strategic studies is self-reflexive and transcends problem-solving/critical theorizing dichotomies by re-appropriating concepts for practical outcomes.

Pascal **Vennesson 19**. Professor of political science, Joint Chair RSCAS, the European University Institute, Social and Political Science Department and Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies. “Is Strategic Studies Rationalist, Materialist, and A-Critical? Reconnecting Security and Strategy.” Journal of Global Security Studies, 0(0), 2019, 1–17

Conclusion: Reconnecting IR, Security, and Strategy

By revisiting the conceptions of Carl von Clausewitz and Thomas Schelling, two central, yet distinctive, strategists, I have showed that **strategic studies helps transcend** **the** **rationalism/constructivism**, materialism/idealist, **problem-solving/critical theorizing** **dichotomies** **and bridges gaps** (see also Vennesson 2017). While reason certainly plays a central role in strategic studies, **the field is not dogmatically rationalist and combines material and nonmaterial factors**. **The quest for emancipation is not only compatible with, but** often **necessitates**, **the logics of strategy**. **These dimensions have never been hidden or suppressed (except perhaps in critical security accounts): they have always been constitutive of strategic studies**.

Although these dichotomies prove to be misleading, it does not mean that nothing has been learned by engaging with them. One lesson is that it is important to distinguish strategic studies from related, but distinct, bodies of thought. These dichotomies miss the mark in part because **strategic studies is** at times **conflated** **with weapon-systems-centered operational research**, system analysis, **or even** Kenneth Waltz’s **neorealism**. **Such reductionist perspectives** **lead to a distorted view of the field as a whole**. Critical security advocates are, nevertheless, correct that “hectic empiricism” and the permanent quest of the new fad has been a cause of strategic studies decline. Critics are also right to remind students of strategy that references to strategic thinkers such as Carl von Clausewitz or Thomas Schelling cannot remain shallow and ritualistic. While they should not become the exclusive focus of the field, conceptual and epistemological questions about strategy are important and deserve careful consideration (see for example Nordin and Öberg 2015).

**Breaking out of the conceptual jails in which strategy has been incarcerated makes it easier for students of security and IR to reappropriate strategy**, one of the oldest and central forms of practice and knowledge surrounding international security. **It offers** a distinctive conception of the very nature of world politics and, more specifically, **a theory of political action in international relations**. While I can only sketch a research agenda here, several promising dimensions [are noteworthy.] ~~stand out~~. First, **strategic thinking provides a versatile**, **not military-focused, view of security: it has a core—the threat and use of organized force for political ends—but it can go well beyond**. This is because **strategic thinking can be** (and has been) **used to analyze any security issue** when actors interacting in a conflicting environment are involved and use a range of coercive means. Second, **strategic studies is politics and polities-centered, not state-centric**: **any kind of political community**, large or small, **can develop strategic actions**. Political communities’ political ends provide guiding parameters that are connected to diverse means in myriad ways. Third, **strategy is global**, **not Western-centric**, **in its roots and manifestations** (Vennesson 2017). Fourth, **strategy is about real reason, how security actors actually think and feel, not rationalism**. Fifth, it is social-materialist: it recognizes the reciprocal determination of technology and society. Finally, **strategic thinking can make emancipations possible through problem-solving**.

Showing that **strategic studies is not intrinsically rationalist**, materialist, **and acritical** also **facilitates the intellectual reacquisition of, and critical reengagement with, strategic thought**. **The examination of strategic thought reveals a rich repository** **of insights, concepts, precedents, and categories profoundly well suited to probe current situations and needs in world politics**. Instead of dealing with strategic thinking at arm’s length, security and IR specialists can embrace a vast reservoir of ideas, concepts, and mechanisms available for theory building. **Strategic thinking provides an intricate set of information, knowledge, and concepts, which are partially universal and transhistorical and partially contextual historically and culturally**. This information crystalizes in the discourses of strategic thinkers and in the actions of strategists. Security and IR **scholars can profitably revisit this vast reservoir of concepts and mechanisms forged by strategists and strategic theorists and borrow and reformulate them to serve their purpose**. **Examples include polarity, escalation, grammar of war, freedom of action, stability, indirect approach, threat that leaves something to chance, and political-strategic expectation**.

Moreover, **by focusing on how states use their material resources, strategic perspectives offer a promising path to reconceptualizing power** (Biddle 2004; Seybert and Katzenstein 2018). They notably suggest that capability is not primarily a matter of material resources but how potential capacities are actualized in creative ways. Viewed through these lenses, **the concept of power itself requires more disaggregate treatment, as it is inherently multidimensional and not easily fungible across specific tasks and geopolitical contexts**. Strategic perspectives also suggest a careful examination of differences in the ways in which strategic actors actualize and employ their potential capacities. In addition, the strategic understanding of world politics emphasizes the logics of the situation and their interlocking features—including the tactics of the actors involved—and downplays preconditions, antecedents, or previously existing causes. It recognizes that **international interactions have logics of their own and tend to take off and become independent from the conditions of their genesis**. It seeks to explore what these critical events or processes are made of. In that sense, strategic thinking is indispensable for approaching what Lucia Seybert and Peter Katzenstein call “protean power”—that is, “the effect of improvisational and innovative responses to uncertainty that arise from actors’ creativity and agility in response to uncertainty” (Seybert and Katzenstein 2018, 4).

Finally, **going beyond conventional dichotomies helps reconnect practical and social scientific knowledge** (Desch 2019). **Strategic thought is a central form of enriched practical knowledge about conflict, and international relations** more broadly, **which finds its source over centuries of practical self-reflection and judgement**. **Emptying strategy out of security theories** and policies **that do not involve military force, such as poverty, famine, political oppression, and environmental degradation**— to name but a few—**is** proving **unwise**, **as well as unsustainable**. **These** security **issues might not directly implicate military power, but they** often **involve a set of** mental and physical **operations to calculate, prepare, and conduct finalized collective action in a conflictual environment**.

### L: A2 “AI”—2AC

#### AI is a real threat, but empirics prove that norms solve---legal apparatuses are key

**Maas 19**, Matthijs---Faculty of Law, Centre for International Law, Conflict and Crisis, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark; Center for the Governance of AI, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK (“How viable is international arms control for military artificial intelligence? Three lessons from nuclear weapons,” Contemporary Security Policy, vol 40, no 3, 2019)

More often, **norms—implicitly the “nuclear taboo**” against the (first) use of nuclear weapons (Carranza, 2018), **and explicitly the norms encoded by international legal instruments, including the** Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (**NPT**) **and the** Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (**CTBT)—appear to have served as a factor in constraining nuclear proliferation**, though such norm enforcement is not without challenge (Knopf, 2018). Nonetheless, these global legal instruments can function, in part because they can provide shared normative frameworks that disseminate and promote non-proliferation norms, -interests and -identities at the domestic-political level, tipping the balance of domestic contestation towards coalitions seeking non-proliferation. While one might expect such effects of “norms capture” to be stronger in liberal societies than in non-liberal ones, some scholars have suggested that even in the latter case, state elites who are not accountable to their own publics simply come to internalize the normative characterization of a successful state as one that abides by its treaty commitments (Rublee, Bertsch, & Wiarda, 2009, p. 222), or at the very least, have incentives for compliance with international non-proliferation norms, to foster a reputation for reliability in the eyes of other states (Williamson, 2003, p. 81). Moreover, **global international regimes**—defined by Krasner (1982) as “**sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations**” (p. 2)—**can serve as Schelling Points around which global society can coordinate multilateral collective sanctions or rewards** (Müller & Schmidt, 2010).

To what extent have non-proliferation norms driven nuclear restraint? Of course, it can be hard to disentangle causal connections between membership in normative (legal) instruments such as the NPT and nuclear restraint, since such behavior could reflect existing policy preferences by the states. Some reviews of the nuclear (non-)proliferation records have suggested that “NPT membership and the NPT regime's norms have modest or marginal impacts on nuclear proliferation” (Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 185), though others found that, when accounting for states’ ex ante treaty commitment preferences, state ratification of the NPT treaty regime was “robustly associated with a lower likelihood of pursuing nuclear weapons” (Fuhrmann & Lupu, 2016, p. 530).

Intriguingly, while public norms seem to be able to strengthen the hands of (non-)proliferation coalitions, they do not seem to reliably shift state policymaking where these coalitions do not already exist in sufficient strength. For instance, in 1994 Ukraine chose to join the NPT and renounce its nuclear arsenal in spite of respectable Ukrainian public support for retaining the weapons (Sagan, 1996, p. 80). Conversely, in 1999 the U.S. Senate rejected the CTBT in the face of widespread U.S. public support.

As with all history, it can be hard to distill unambiguous causal chains; yet surveys of the distinct state rationales for nuclear proliferation and of –non-proliferation or the abandonment of ongoing nuclear programs (Garnett, 2012; Sagan, 1996, 2011; Solingen, 1994; van der Meer, 2011, 2014), suggests that, far from proliferation cascades fueled by security and strategic concerns, a far wider array of motives shaped these decision-making processes, with elements of all three models—security, domestic politics, and norms—playing different roles amongst different states, and often contributing to a decision to forego or abandon nuclear proliferation. For instance, Solingen has charted the role of ascendant liberalizing coalitions, in countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Argentina, in shifting towards nuclear restraint, because of the favorable impact of this decision on international trade, aid, technology and investment opportunities, as well as to reduce perceived wasteful budgets for such military programs (Solingen, 1994). The broad history of nuclear restraint suggests that, far from a foregone conclusion, arms races involving strategically appealing technologies can be slowed, channeled, or stopped. This suggests that halting, managing or containing military AI arms races is viable—and hints at a range of considerations for doing so.

In the first place, it suggests that security concerns are conducive but not decisive to arms races, and that a limited number of “first-mover” major powers may share an interest in supporting global legal regimes aimed at the non-proliferation of certain forms of military AI, such as cyber warfare systems, which might otherwise empower conventionally weaker (or non-state) rivals. Given that this group of “leading” states is initially small, bilateral agreements may suffice; however, the unevenly shared stakes in the technology may render eventual multilateral negotiations more difficult (cf. Picker, 2001).

In the second place, **the domestic-politics model suggests that strengthening the hand of domestic coalitions pursuing the non-proliferation of AI weapons is one pathway towards shifting state decision-making away from pursuing more problematic categories of military AI**, even in the face of clear national security interests. Of course, one caveat here concerns the fact that military AI may have far broader appeal than nuclear weapons did, such that it is harder to find domestic coalitions that are clearly opposed to its development in all cases. For instance, the strategic benefits of developing nuclear weapons are almost solely military and relatively discrete—a half-finished nuclear weapon is not even half as useful as a finished one, and the road from starting a nuclear program towards developing, not just a working weapon or small arsenal, but a credibly survivable and deliverable deterrent is long and potentially less useful (because more provocative to well-armed adversaries) than not initiating a nuclear breakout to begin with. In contrast, the benefits of pursuing military AI might be more linear and gradual, with intermediate advances in subfields (e.g., image recognition or drone swarming command and control) enabling not just immediate application to battlefield roles, but also economically productive spin-offs to civilian applications. These features, combined with the comparatively lower reputational costs, may make some forms of military AI more palatable. But not all. Exceptions may be found in high-performance adversarial contexts (such as cyber warfare or aerial warfare) where AI systems or platforms end up directly engaging with each other. In such cases, as Payne (2018a) has argued, “marginal quality might prove totally decisive” because “other things being equal, we can expect higher-quality AI to comprehensively defeat inferior rivals” (p. 24). In such domains, the incentives for parties to independently develop “second-rate” military AI capabilities might be lower. Conversely, where AI systems do not have to “fight their like” directly (e.g., logistics; facial recognition), second-best AI systems still offer military advantage, and could proliferate widely (Horowitz, 2018a, 2018b). This suggests that **the precise appeal of military AI systems to different parties may be more complex—which offers openings for tailored engagement with domestic coalitions**.

Thirdly, **the “norms”-model suggests that, while policy-makers may pursue the development of AI in general because of its “symbolic” value as a marker of global scientific leadership, this may not transfer to the development of AI for military purposes**. Instead, **the degree to which military AI confers status may be mixed**: Pursuing openly autonomous “killer robots” may indeed remain unappealing for states. For instance, over the past years, global surveys of public opinion show that in most countries (excepting India), majorities oppose the deployment of autonomous weapons (Open Roboethics Initiative, 2015; Roff, 2017). An opposition appears to be on the rise: an even more recent survey by Ipsos showed an increase in global opposition (from 56% to 61%) since 2017 (IPSOS, 2019). At the same time, other surveys have shown that public opposition to these weapons can be very context-dependent, and drops off if their usage is framed as being defensive and aimed at reducing casualties amongst friendly troops (Horowitz, 2016; West, 2018). In another U.S. survey, Americans generally expressed mixed support for the United States investing more in AI military capabilities, but also for the United States to cooperate with China to avoid the dangers of an AI arms race (Zhang & Dafoe, 2019, pp. 26–30).

Moreover, **advocacy efforts might well be able to shift these public norms on military AI further—and thereby alter the reputational penalties and rewards of deploying new systems or for complying with restrictive global regulation, respectively**. Indeed, it is important to recognize the considerable efforts that have been put into making “killer robots” normatively unpalatable, notably by movements such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a coalition of 89 NGOs from 50 countries (cf. Joshi, 2019). In fall 2018, both the European Parliament as well as United Nations Secretary General António Guterres called for bans on autonomous weapons (European Parliament, 2018; Guterres, 2018); and at present at least two dozen states are pursuing such a legally binding ban—although states such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia still explicitly oppose such an initiative (Joshi, 2019). Even if such public advocacy efforts have not (yet) produced a ban on autonomous weapons, this does not mean they have not already influenced the normative space around military AI.

However, to what extent will a specific opprobrium on the—important, but narrow—category of autonomous weapons transfer to other types of military AI? Indeed, beyond “killer robots,” it is unclear to what extent states will face a meaningful or strong “military AI taboo” with the same strength as the “nuclear taboo.” After all, the latter norm was possible and potent, because nuclear weapons are a “single” technology with a single discrete, publicly visible and viscerally horrifying use mode. This created a natural and unambiguous “red line” in usage, not to be crossed. Conversely, **the deployment and use of AI in many (non-kinetic) military applications is already a fact**, such that this Rubicon has been crossed. Moreover, **the technology is moreover very heterogeneous, such that whereas visceral applications** (e.g., “killer robots”) **may generate public opprobrium and restrictive activism, more diffuse or less kinetic ones** (e.g., logistics systems; capabilities to track missile submarines) **may not**. **It would therefore be advisable that organizations pursuing bans of the technology, consider the degree to which framings of “killer robots” continue to correspond to developments in military AI, including other usages which are potentially unethical, unsafe, or destabilizing**.

Finally, while public norms or activism against military AI may strengthen domestic political coalitions already opposed to these weapons, they alone are not always able to sway policymakers in the first place. **A key route lies therefore in shaping policymakers’ norms (and indirectly the domestic political landscapes). This relies on the (top-down) norm-shaping influence exerted by global legal instruments and regimes**, but also on the (bottom-up) institutionalization of norms by “elite entrepreneurship in norm change” (Lantis, 2018), and specifically through “epistemic communities” of expert groups.

### L: A2 “China”—2AC

#### Securitizing China war is good---instills caution and risk-aversion in politics

**Wang 20**, Professor of Political Science at Western Michigan University. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. (Yuan-kang, 11/9/20, "Roundtable 12-2 on *Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations*", *H-Diplo | ISSF*, <https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-thucydides>)

Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater? **Chan warns that the discourse on Thucydides’s Trap and power transition can create a self-fulfilling prophecy. If leaders believe in Thucydides’s Trap and act accordingly, it may create the anticipated conditions that make war more likely.** **Talking and thinking in terms of Thucydides’s Trap will influence the state’s construction of its identity as well as its definition of interests and preferences**. The discourse is harmful because it encourages ‘othering’ the opponent and contributes to confrontation. Should we, then, throw out the proposition that war is more likely when the system is undergoing a power transition? It might be worthwhile to go back to what Thucydides’s Trap refers to: “the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one. In such conditions, not just extraordinary, unexpected events, but even ordinary flashpoints of foreign affairs, can trigger large-scale conflict.”[112] **Instead of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, this statement should induce caution from leaders in Beijing and Washington.** **Understanding the danger of war is the first step to avoid being trapped in it**. Like Chan, **Allison seeks to offer** “a set of **principles** **and** strategic **options** **for those seeking to escape Thucydides’s Trap** and avoid World War III.”[113] Obviously, **historical analogies cannot completely capture an ongoing** event. Allison himself cautions against “facile analogizing” and emphasizes that “the differences matter at least as much as the similarities.”[114] **The purpose of analogizing Thucydides’s Trap is not to shoehorn China and the United States into the roles of Athens and Sparta** respectively, as Chan suggests (17-18), **but to underscore the enduring feature of international politics throughout the ages**. **The dynamics of conflict highlighted by Thucydides remain** as **relevant** today as it was two thousand years ago. **Many scholars accuse structural theory of determinism**, as Chan does, (14, 34), **even though structuralists do not adopt it. States can go to war for a variety of reasons**. **Attempting to isolate a single cause for all wars is impossible. T**he **proposition that war tends to break out during a power transition is better understood as a probabilistic—not deterministic—statement. The structural tensions cause by power shifts can substantially increase the probabilities of war, much like dry leaves waiting for a spark, but it does not mean that war will inevitably break out.** Properly understood, **Thucydides’s Trap cautions us to be prepared for the danger of war during a power transition.** Overall, Chan’s book provides a stronger critique of power transition theory than of Thucydides’s Trap. Students of power shifts should take his argument seriously and avoid the pitfalls he identifies. We should not, however, hastily dismiss the warnings of Thucydides’s Trap.

### L: A2 “China—1AR

#### Err aff---the China threat is real

Jacob **Stokes**, senior policy analyst in the China Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace, 8-14-20**20**, "The Chinese Military Threat Is Real," Democracy Journal, <https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/the-chinese-military-threat-is-real/>

**Taking seriously** the prospect of **Chinese aggression does not require viewing Beijing as an avaricious power that is seeking global domination**—the CCP is not the Nazis or the Soviets. China’s narrower goals, however, are still dangerous. **Beijing defines its sovereign territory expansively to include Taiwan**, disputed islands and rocks in **the East and South China seas** along with the waters themselves, **and land on the border with India.** Therefore, **even “defensive” goals seek to redraw the map**, **using force if necessary**, with major implications for the United States and its alliance commitments, **especially with Japan and the Philippines.** Xi told former U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis that China would not compromise on “even one inch” of territory it claims.

**Beijing’s** implicit **long-term goals are also fueling tensions. No one outside of Xi Jinping and his inner circle can know Beijing’s intentions with absolute certainty**. Plus, ambitions can expand over time. But a straightforward reading of China’s aspirations based on scouring statements from leaders and official documents includes revising the political and security order in Asia to reduce the role of Washington and its regional alliances, thereby removing the major constraint on Chinese power. In essence, **China seeks a tacit dominance in a hierarchical Asia** with Beijing at the top. When Xi talks about building an “Asia for Asians” and a “community with a shared future for mankind” that is what he means.

**If Xi succeeds, it would mean a region where power tramples rules**, where **rights are subordinate to Party dictates, and where markets are fixed** **for favored companies** instead of being open and competitive. **Beijing seeks to make the world safe for** the protection and consolidation of **its domestic autocracy**. So, a region and world under China’s sway will likely resemble its domestic system. **The brazen snuffing out of Hong Kong**’s autonomy in violation of Beijing’s treaty obligations, **systematic atrocities against the Uighurs** and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, **and universal crackdown on liberties** throughout the country **give us a preview**

JCS Consult

### L: A2 “Deterrence”

#### Deterrence is the most ethical military posture---it’s fundamentally defensive and views the use of force as exclusively a last resort---there’s zero chance of the aff spilling up to affect overall global peace which makes some middle-ground military solution imperative

Eldridge **Colby 7**, Adjunct Staff Member of the RAND Corporation, formerly a staff member in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and on the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2007, “Restoring Deterrence,” Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 3, p. 413-428

One might ask: **If deterrence is so effective at providing security**, then **why has there been a rush to abandon it in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse and 9/11?** Shouldn’t such a successful policy have earned greater loyalty? **The answer** to these questions **illuminates** the **serious divisions among Americans about** what **the purpose of** our **foreign policy** should be.¶ **Deterrence was not a policy that won** out in **the Cold War because it was the most loved**. **It was**, instead, **the best of a menu of bad options**. **Hard right anti-Communists** **thought deterrence weak**, **a concession of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe** and a failure of Western will. They called for the rollback of Communist suzerainty, even going so far as to advocate preventive strikes against the Soviet Union and China before they were able to field nuclear weapons. **The left**, meanwhile, **detested deterrence as an immoral use of terror as a threat**, **a reliance on weapons whose very existence they decried**. Believing that no state objective could justify the use of nuclear weapons, **the left advocated** reducing our strategic forces, **moving towards abolition**, and a conciliatory policy towards the Soviets. **Since neither the right nor the left could win out**—fortunately—**deterrence arose as an option few liked but all responsible parties could endorse**.20¶ **With the collapse of the Soviet threat, this agreement lost its raison d’être**. Interventionists left and right broke free of the restrictive bonds a deterrence and containment strategy had put in place. **For hard-edged advocates for U.S. primacy, like** Donald **Rumsfeld or** Dick **Cheney**, **a deterrence posture would prevent the U**nited **S**tates **from exercising regional hegemony in the Middle East or East Asia**. For neoconservative and liberal interventionists like Paul Wolfowitz, Tony Blair, or Michael Ignatieff, anxious to spread democracy, halt genocide and other humanitarian crises, and “end tyranny in our world,”21 deterrence was too hesitant about such interventions. And **for pacifist leftists**—and even a few old hawks—**deterrence was a system of terror itself**, one that could be discarded at the end of history. They, therefore, called for abolishing nuclear weapons, the end of using threats for security, and internationalizing security responsibility. **Deterrence was left with few friends**.¶ **Its erstwhile friends should now consider returning**. **Contrary to the arguments of the pacifist-inclined left**, a strategy of **disarmament and conciliation is** **morally irresponsible** in the face of Al Qaeda and its like. Despite what the neo-conservatives and the liberal interventionists had hoped, the high moral rhetoric of liberating Iraq has yielded to a grimmer sense of the moral duties of considering consequences, necessity, and proportion. We have relearned the truth of the critiques of revolutionary France and of Woodrow Wilson—that **even the honest pursuit of high-minded liberal aspirations can** **yield death and chaos**. **History has its own ways and means and we should moderate our hope for its coming with a reverential fear of its wrath**.¶ In between these two extremes, **deterrence** is a security policy that **offers a way forward for the U**nited **S**tates **that is** **not only more effective because more tailored**, **but is** **also more moral**. It is more moral because **a deterrent posture would entail a strategy that is more proportionate, more necessary, more responsive, and**, ultimately, **more just**. Indeed, **deterrence comports with the** **fundamental human intuition** **that it is** generally **only moral to fight when attacked**. In this it complies with the classical conception of just war, which mandates that wars only be conducted when one's cause is just, waged by a legitimate authority, motivated by a right intent, fought with a real prospect of success, conducted proportionately, and undertaken only as a last resort. Deterrence satisfies these criteria. **It is a defensive strategy that responds to invasions or attacks, and is therefore just**; **it sets out** relatively **clear guidelines for when it mandates that the government fight, and**, therefore, **is governed by legitimate authority**. It is driven by a desire to protect, deter, and avenge, and is therefore motivated by right intent; its realistic red lines and threats are backed up by the awesome power of the United States, and therefore likely to succeed; and it responds when attacked and asks from the rest of the international community only respect for its marked out positions rather than revolutionary transformation, and is therefore proportional.22 Finally, **by its nature it is undertaken as a last resort rather than preventively**.23 It was the fundamental moral attractiveness of this position that continually frustrated both Soviet efforts to decouple Europe from the American nuclear umbrella during the Cold War and occasional American efforts to roll back the Soviet empire.¶ But **theorizing about war and peace** **cannot remain at the level of abstraction**. **It must bear moral responsibility for** **actual consequence** and the power of contingency, as Max Weber pointed out.24 **And deterrence, defense by calculation,** **uniquely satisfies the moral requirement** **that leaders**, whatever their benevolent intentions, **are** basically **responsible for the consequences that contingency produces from their actions**. **This it does by grounding a nation's security on its own credible threats**—**not on** either **changing the world through force**, **as** **neo-conservatives advocate**, **nor by hoping that a more peaceful world will emerge, as the left proposes**. Both of **these extremes** **ground security on radical changes in the way the world operates**, **and**, therefore, necessarily **enmesh us in the rest of the world's affairs**, thereby **exponentially expanding our vulnerability to all the permutations that chance and contingency may produce**. **Deterrence**, rather, **narrows our profile, and thereby reduces our exposure to risk**.¶ **A deterrent posture follows** John Quincy Adams’ adage **that** **America should not go seeking monsters to destroy** and the ancient dictum that a moral act is a proportional one.25 Perhaps the greatest sin of the recent strategy is its disproportion, its confusion of the necessary with the desirable. It may be desirable to “end tyranny” and distribute the blessings of liberty worldwide, but its desirability must be carefully balanced against the costs of its enactment. If Iraq teaches us anything, it must be that a moral policy is not only one guided by the best of intentions, but one that is realistic.

### L: A2 “Miscalc”

#### Miscalc is a useful frame---it recognizes the complexity of the international arena, which solves the link

**Nordmann**, Professor of Philosophy and History of Science and Technoscience at Darmstadt Technical University, **‘18**

(Alfred, “Four Horsemen and a Rotten Apple. On the Technological Rationality of Nuclear Security,” in *Jahrbuch Technikphilosophie: Arbeit und Spiel*, pg. 279 – 294)

The apple is rotting. During the times of the Cold War, the precarious equilibrium of strategic threats had its own working order. **It could be trusted** and, in fact, **had to be trusted** in many ways. The weapons were carefully **monitored**, subject to permanent surveillance from many points of view. They were closely watched through the eyes of one's own strategists, technicians and engineers, military personnel, local opposition forces, but also through the eyes of friends and foes, international agencies and monitoring groups. Everyone was attending to the weapons for different, perhaps conflicting reasons, and yet the many observations were maintained in a relation of mutual support. The weapons themselves became fixated and paralyzed at their center of attention.

When the so-called **»four horsemen«** (Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry, Sam Nunn) and political leaders like Barack Obama have called for a world without nuclear arms, it is because they are worried about the **break-down of** this **working order**.24 In their view, the current modes of monitoring, proliferation, negotiation, and sanctioning represent a deviation from the Cold War rationality of deterrence with its system of **mutual checks and balances**. Accordingly, they call for **adequate ways of controlling material flows**, of regulating access, of instituting transparency and accountability. **Their question is a technical question**: Given the half-life of plutonium and given the volatility of systems of government in many parts of the world, how does one institute a robust international system of arms-control? Thus, they worry only secondarily whether the weapons might get into the wrong hands, politically speaking and in the short term. They pose **primarily** a question from within a technologically advanced, economically and politically robust knowledge society — aside from the United States, who can be counted upon to reliably provide the necessary know-how in the long term? Who can take responsibility for the management of what was once and is no longer a denumerable, firmly circumscribed set of nuclear things?

This point can be further developed by briefly considering three other aspects of the current state of debate: First, as Christopher Daase has pointed out, the extension into the future of the nuclear privilege of weapon states in the NPT becomes questionable when this privilege no longer serves to maintain a taboo in times of strategic conflict but when it somewhat arrogantly declares whose hands are the good hands such that they can be entrusted to carry out a managerial process. Inclusion and exclusion can be justified more easily on the criterion of the possession of nuclear weapons, it becomes contestable if the criterion is the cultural competence of handling with due diligence and care a dangerous and globally endangering commodity.25 Second, this may prove to be the reason why some of the non-nuclear states like Norway, Austria, Mexico are seizing the moment to claim that, if anyone, they are best suited to frame the question or redefine the terms of the debate. They wish to bring the humanitarian consequences to the fore and thus the mishandling of the bomb, irrespective of a balance of power or terror.26 Finally, when the question is one of maintaining or recreating a safe working order **for a dangerous technology** and when the arms race is taking place between knowledge societies and their claims that the technology is with them in good hands, the general technical capabilities of these societies become **increasingly important**. The responsibility of diplomats and negotiators in the political and military sphere to create conditions for global security is shifting to the maintenance, broadly speaking, of a safety culture in civil society.

If this diagnosis is correct, the rules of the game have changed as has the rationale for inclusion and exclusion in the club of nuclear-weapon states, and the definition of the community of responsible actors. The global challenge is defined not as **preserving peace** or security in an age of ideological conflict and competing national interests. Instead, the challenge is one of **tending to a working order** of nuclear safety and safeguards. Issues of proliferation and disarmament, transparency and **control** now appear in the collective consciousness as analogous to the global threat of climate change. Both put national and stakeholder interests **into a managerial mode**. The Earth and the Bomb need to be **handled with care** — grounded in the perhaps illusory hope that in good hands, with a technical mindset, and attunement **to the complexity of affairs**, the challenge can be **met** and the danger **contained**.

Hazardous Waste

At this point it may appear as if I wanted to recommend or **valorize an engineering approach** that **abstains from moral and political judgement** but brings to the table the requisite understanding for maintaining, modulating, recreating a working order or technological system. **This is not the case.** I am arguing merely that one need to **take seriously** the **different modes of conceiving the problems** that are **in need of solution** — not only because the definition of a problem **entails a conception of its solution** and the **reasoning processes adequate to it**. **If only for heuristic purposes** we should attend to the implications of a shift from the logic of warfare and deterrence to a **logic of attunement and trust** — attunement to a working order and trust in the good hands of technical expertise. In conclusion, here are some of these implications, briefly stated.

First of all, the acquisition of working knowledge and the ability to **maintain** and **modulate** a working order **does nothing to justify technocratic approaches or to en-throne the expertise of managers and engineers.** As the case of the klu(d)ge served to remind us, deviations from strategic rationality coincide with deviations from top-down engineering or rational design. The situations in which working knowledge comes to the fore are **highly ambivalent**, whether it is the challenge of maintaining a rotten apple or of managing material flows in an ageing nuclear arsenal. In these situations, rational decision making is of the kind where a security **update** is scheduled to the operating system of a computer and users wonder a bit nervously whether it is **really such a good idea** to install the update. Not only the readers of Charles Per-row's Normal Accidents will wonder whether the security updates might **increase** the **complexity**, perhaps **instability**, perhaps **insecurity** of the operating system.27 And of course, with the end of the Cold War, the operating system of nuclear security has been changed, prompting us to ask anew what are the conditions for stability and security.

### L: A2 “NATO”

#### Cooperation with NATO is necessary now to prevent existential risks---threats are real, but cooperation can help mitigate risk

**Kagan 22**, Robert---Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings Institute (“The Price of Hegemony: Can America Learn to Use Its Power?” Foreign Affairs, vol 101, no 3, 2022, https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/fora101&div=54&id=&page=)

Thankfully, that was not to be. But now that Putin has made his mistakes, **the question is whether the United States will continue to make its own mistakes or whether Americans will learn, once again, that it is better to contain aggressive autocracies early**, before they have built up a head of steam and the price of stopping them rises. The challenge posed by Russia is neither unusual nor irrational. The rise and fall of nations is the warp and woof of international relations. National trajectories are changed by wars and the resulting establishment of new power structures, by shifts in the global economy that enrich some and impoverish others, and by beliefs and ideologies that lead people to prefer one power over another. If there is any blame to be cast on the United States for what is happening in Ukraine, it is not that Washington deliberately extended its influence in eastern Europe. It is that Washington failed to see that its influence had already increased and to anticipate that actors dissatisfied with the liberal order would look to overturn it.

F**or the 70-plus years since World War II, the United States has actively worked to keep revisionists at bay**. But many Americans hoped that with the end of the Cold War, this task would be finished and that their country could become a "normal" nation with normal -- which was to say, limited -- global interests. But **the global heg- emon cannot tiptoe off the stage, as much as it might wish to. It especially cannot retreat when there are still major powers that, because of their history and sense of self, cannot give up old geopolitical ambitions** -- unless Americans are prepared to live in a world shaped and defined by those ambitions, as it was in the 1930s.

**The United States would be better served if it recognized both its position in the world and its true interest in preserving the liberal world order**. In the case of Russia, this would have meant doing everything possible to integrate it into the liberal order politically and economically while deterring it from attempting to re-create its regional dominance by military means. **The commitment to defend nato allies was never meant to preclude helping others under attack in Europe, as the United States and its allies did in the case of the Balkans** in the 1990s, and the United States and its allies could have resisted military efforts to control or seize land from Georgia and Ukraine. Imagine if the United States and the democratic world had responded in 2008 or 2014 as they have responded to Russia's latest use of force, when Putin's military was even weaker than it has proved to be now, even as they kept extending an outstretched hand in case Moscow wanted to grasp it. **The United States ought to be following the same policy toward China: make clear that it is prepared to live with a China that seeks to fulfill its ambitions economically, politically, and culturally but that it will respond effectively to any Chinese military action against its neighbors**.

**It is true that acting firmly in 2008 or 2014 would have meant risking conflict. But Washington is risking conflict now**; Russia's ambitions have created an inherently dangerous situation. It is better for the United States to risk confrontation with belligerent powers when they are in the early stages of ambition and expansion, not after they have already consolidated substantial gains. Russia may possess a fearful nuclear arsenal, but the risk of Moscow using it is not higher now than it would have been in 2008 or 2014, if the West had intervened then. And it has always been extraordinarily small: Putin was never going to obtain his objectives by destroying himself and his country, along with much of the rest of the world. If the United States and its allies -- with their combined economic, political, and military power -- had collectively resisted Russian expansionism from the beginning, Putin would have found himself constantly unable to invade neighboring countries.

Unfortunately, **it is very difficult for democracies to take action to prevent a future crisis**. The risks of acting now are always clear and often exaggerated, whereas distant threats are just that: distant and so hard to calculate. **It always seems better to hope for the best rather than try to forestall the worst. This common conundrum becomes even more debilitating when Americans and their leaders remain blissfully unconscious of the fact that they are part of a never-ending power struggle, whether they wish to be or not**.

But **Americans should not lament the role they play in the world. The reason the United States has often found itself entangled in Europe, after all, is because what it offers is genuinely attractive to much of the world -- and certainly better when compared with any realistic alternative**. If Americans learn anything from Russia's brutalization of Ukraine, it should be that there really are worse things than U.S. hegemony.®

# Impacts

### M: Util—card

#### Ethics means you must vote for the team that reduces the greatest existential risk – regardless of all else

**Baum and Barrett 17** – Seth Baum is an American researcher involved in the field of risk research and is the executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI); Anthony Barrett is a senior consultant, data scientist, and risk/decision analyst based in the Washington, D.C. area, focusing on risk assessment, risk management, and public policies in a wide variety of homeland security risk areas and other catastrophic-risk domains (“Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks”, via Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, Oct 2, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3046668> accessed 9/11/19)

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? **Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe**. **This suggests a rather low threshold** for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. **However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe**. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). **Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization** (Beckstead 2013), **that human civilization does not recover from** (Maher and Baum 2013), **that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements** (**Bostrom** 2002, **using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction** (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). **A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others**. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). **Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter**, per Sagan, **humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations**. To paraphrase Sagan, **the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more**. **Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate**. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. **An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time** (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, **the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest** (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), **but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives.** Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, **society should be willing to spend** at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least **$1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe**. Thus **while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes**, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, **as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held**. **People often value some people more than others**, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. **Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others** who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. **This debate is crucial** for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. **While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings**, we find that **the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally.** This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. **Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere”** (Nagel 1986) **or a “veil of ignorance”** (Rawls 1971) **in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be**. **Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.**

### M: A2 “Root Cause”—1AR

#### Root cause explanations fail---causes violence by locking in a static approach to politics

**Bleiker 14** – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement.

For Levine, **the key challenge in** international relations (**IR**) scholarship **is** what he calls **“unchecked reification”**: **the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe** or to which they refer” (p. 15). **The dangers are real**, Levine stresses, **because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war**. **Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can** thus **have far-reaching consequences**. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated.

**Levine** proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he **detects self-reflective and critical moments in** scholars that are usually associated with **straightforward positivist positions** (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge.

The second stage of Levine's inquiry **outlines why** IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, **while explicitly post-positivist** and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing **IR** **scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness**. As a result, Levine believes that many of the **respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that** “**reification is a consequence of all thinking**—including itself” (p. 68).

The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “**sustainable critique**”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is **not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists**. **It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself”** (p. 12).

The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth).

The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. **He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship**. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked.

**Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique**. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates **multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena**. **He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing”** (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, **a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms**, **trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives**. **No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand**. **But each should**, in a way, **recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot** (p. 102). **In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when**—**or, rather, precisely when**—**they are deemed incompatible**. **They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by** **positivist social sciences**.

**The benefit of such** a **methodological polyphony** **is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives**. **Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them**. For Levine, this is how **reification may be “checked at the source”** **and** this is how **a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable”** (p. 103). It is in this sense that **Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but**, rather, **an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another”** (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

# Alt

### Alt: Alt Fails—2AC (Realism)

#### The alt can’t overcome realist preferences – if it does, that’s worse.

**Colatrella, 20**—associate adjunct professor of government and sociology at the University of Maryland University College (Steven, “Solidarity or Human Rights? National Sovereignty and Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century,” *Bringing the Nation Back In: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and the Struggle to Define a New Politics*, Chapter 2, pg 34-38, dml)

**When one is seen by others to be only a human being, without** any of the **social, political or cultural characteristics** that make one fully human, **the result may be compassion and charity but it may also be just as likely** be seen as **an invitation to further abuse**. “**Bare life**,” as Arendt and Agamben term it, **cannot be the basis for human dignity**.

For **human rights still require states to enforce them, just not the same state that is repressing or violating them**. But **the enforcement of rights by** external states or by **“the international community” means war**. Immanuel Kant warned that **peace could not come from forcing a single state that refused to accept even a positive value or policy of the world community to get in line, since that is not peace but war** (Kant). Machiavelli warned that **republics need a plurality of republics, able to criticize each other, encourage each other to best practices, engage in competition. When all republics fall under a single central power—even a collective one—we find an empire, not a republic. A condition in which the world community was unanimous and forced a recalcitrant state into accepting policies it and its citizens had not approved would be analogous to empire**, to **that world polity** that Arendt likewise warned **would not result in a stronger enforcement of rights, but in the greatest threat to them, and one without external recourse for redress** (Arendt 298).

Nor are these abstract problems. Mark Mazower has painstakingly shown that the entire conception of international law has always been based on the “standard of civilization” in which certain states were within such a standard, and so legitimized to enforce their conception of international law, while other peoples and states and communities were outside of it, and so vulnerable to having the will of others imposed upon them (Mazower 70). In short, **colonialism, neocolonialism, and** the current regime of **human rights are closely linked, and it is no accident that the countries that find themselves targets of humanitarian interventions under the “responsibility to protect” are ones that are not within the current updated version of the standard of civilization**—that is to say, not allies of the United States and often opposed to neoliberalism. Thus, even **in shifting from the** older **national** government’s **responsibility** to its own citizens **to** a conception that **the international** community has a **responsibility** to protect human rights, we find that **we have merely changed which fox is guarding the chickens**.

Human Rights and Global Citizenship

As a legalistic concept, human rights require a political authority to define what they are legally. One of the most widely cited works on human rights, Jack Donnelly’s Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice fails from the start on this point with its key analogy: human rights, like property rights, are a preexisting condition. This notion has already been dismantled by Arendt as shown above. By contrast, international relations theorists recognize that **human rights must be granted and recognized by global institutions, but the lack of a central international authority makes this very difficult**. **The realist school** of international relations (Morgenthau; Waltz) **sees anarchy reigning in a state of nature in world politics, making the protection of human rights well nigh impossible**. The so-called English School of International Relations sees an international society as precarious, in which **norms, though real, are enforced by national states that see adherence to such norms as** advantageous for maintaining the international society and **in the interest of the individual states in question** (Bull). These theories are united in that they see international organizations as instruments for carrying out what has already been agreed to by national states. Neither position posits a global polity as existing, and many theorists in each camp would see such a polity as undesirable.

Others are less pessimistic. **Constructivists view human rights as a discourse that has achieved** a certain degree of **autonomy from institutional settings**, though the geopolitical limits on the discourse remain (Risse; Ropp and Sikkinke 16). Some political theorists seek to found human rights solely on the narrow basis of historical liberal theory, with all the baggage that this involves—from class privilege and economic doctrine to the policies of existing international organizations such as the IMF and WTO, and with the historical affiliation with Anglo-American hegemonies intact (Charvet and Nay). Samuel Moyn’s demonstration of the Christian roots of human rights merely shifts the instrument of human rights formation from political constitutionalism to Christian ethos. In both cases, however, **the Western origin of the rights concept belies its alleged universality**. Donnelly’s influential work engages in intellectual gymnastics to find a plausible basis for universal human rights. But **even this work admits that despite all, people must live in determined polities or they would find themselves in a Hobbesian state of nature, and that in the end states have human rights responsibilities only to their own citizens and territorial residents** (Donnelly 30–32).

**Clearly, only global citizenship could address all of these difficulties**, and there has been considerable work done on developing that idea. Robert Paehlke seeks the basis for global citizenship in the movements to limit corporate depravity and U.S. militarism worldwide, hoping ironically that the opposition to the current global governance regime will provide that same regime with a stronger basis for legitimacy (Paehlk 15, 200–02). Andrew Moravcsik instead argues that democratic republican governments have often accepted the limitations on sovereignty imposed by international human rights regimes when the gains in reducing domestic political uncertainty—the risk of having a domestic opposition reverse preferred policies—outweigh that compromise (Moravcsik 217–52). **Efforts at conceptualizing a “global democracy” are perpetually challenged by the lack of any global**, or even international, or even European **demos or people** (Held 220). Aristotle’s criteria continue to matter in the twenty-first century. **It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that even under the most global of human rights regimes, rights remain inextricably tied to domestic politics and national governments. If there is a role for civil society and popular social movements, their impact must be primarily at the national level, and be differentiated in that impact in different countries and political communities. To be effective beyond national boundaries, they must act in concrete ways in solidarity** with brother and sister movements and struggles or **with efforts to bring about analogous gains to those already won or being fought for in each other’s national political communities**. This means that **the struggles, acts of solidarity, and discourses of movements from the pre-globalization era**, especially from the immediately preceding era of anti-colonial and analogous movements, **are surprisingly relevant** to addressing our problems today.

### Alt: Alt Fails—Rejection Bad

#### Wholesale rejection is bad---it makes ethical politics impossible and reproduces violence

**Abraham, 17**—Johns Hopkins University (Kavi Joseph, “Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” International Political Sociology (2017) 11, 221–238, dml)

This passage marks out one of the biggest obstacles to connecting realist and postcolonial thought: race. One would be hard pressed to find in realist theorizations anything resembling a supple understanding of race and racism (Vitalis 2015)— though Carr (2001b, 107) demonstrates a comparatively great deal of reflexivity on postcolonial liberation (see fn. 2 above). Even in Williams’s (2005) “wilful” realist tradition, there is scant discussion of how an embedded ethic of critical self-limitation fared in the context of racial or other forms of radical difference. Absent an engagement with the analytics of postcolonial thinking, or the diverse ways in which white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity inflect past and present liberal imperial formations, willful realism does not address the categories that threaten to push prudential skeptics toward violent responses, that pose limitations to an ethos of limits. As evidenced in Morgenthau, failure to think critically about race opens up the way for Morgenthau’s theoretical practice to be driven toward resentful rather than careful ends. It is at this juncture that **those concerned with contemporary imperial formations are confronted with a number of possible responses: one is to deem realism, in all its complex and contradictory manifestations, as a failed, unethical, and fundamentally racist/imperial project**. A second response is to politically align against liberalism, while holding this partnership at arm’s length. **A third response**, derived from Ayoob’s (2002) subaltern realism, **is to work on an epistemic register, selectively taking insights from realist traditions that help better explain the neocolonial world**. Morgenthau’s racist interjections should be critiqued and confronted—perhaps by outlining the innumerable non-Western contributions to the making of so-called Western modernity (Hobson 2004)—but this **failing does not delegitimize other realist insights**. What is important for Ayoob’s (2002) accommodationist stance is to combine plausible realist insights with other categories that can grasp the extent of global politics, including the dynamics of the postcolonial experience, better. The final response is the one I advance. To adopt a mode of argumentation concerned with **building a counter-imperial machine is to neither dismiss constituencies that become caught up in imperial formations, nor merely to tactically align with them; rather, establishing resonant connections among postcolonial and realist lines of thought, highlighting shared dispositions to difference, is to push the latter toward repositioning itself on new ethical lines that limit contemporary forms of violence. To recover a minor position in realism is not to accept all realist positions, nor is it to synthesize or convert any theoretical line into a coherent framework. It is**, however, **to amplify the shared spirituality that informs both realist and postcolonial thinking, drawing constituencies toward prudential rather than imperial defenses of difference. It is to furnish current research agendas with an anti-imperial focus, to seek the creative possibilities that may arise when divergent constituencies meet, interfuse, and shift**. Thus, our response to Morgenthau, as to other realists, is to cultivate the connections that do exist, not for epistemic reasons but for a political project that strengthens counter-imperial movements. Thinking from the Present By way of conclusion, it is important to reiterate the politics that motivates a theoretical project of linking realist and postcolonial thinking. If the ends of this project were to simply gather critiques of liberalism and its relationship to imperial practices, then certainly a return to classical realist thought adds little epistemic value over and above postcolonial approaches. However, **the ends of this argument are to outline and energize a counter-imperial machine**, to cultivate a shared spirituality **that can gather diverse and divergent constituencies to confront dangerous practices**. In my estimation, **countering an imperial machine that operates in complex ways and at complex sites requires a political strategy as unwieldy and diffuse, linking constituencies that we may otherwise dismiss.** **That a tradition of realism regularly circulates through halls of power across the globe should be reason not to reject righteously but rather to leverage its authorized status. We can talk about imperialism, knowledge production, and race here, while they can talk about anarchy, power, and self-interest there—or we can theoretically work on the lines of thought that reverberate among us**. To reiterate, building a countermachine is not driven to “pragmatic” reconciliation or consensus and, thus, remains distinct from the “eclecticism” of other plural approaches popular in IR today. While the combinatory logic of paradigmatic synthesis has its place, the connections between realist and postcolonial thought articulated here are made in a far more agonistic manner. Rather than produce something like a “postcolonial-realism,” **this** argument **involves pushing contemporary realist scholarship toward new research agendas and new forms of critique** that both capture a spirit internal to its own traditions while confronting the realities of contemporary global politics. It engages with minor positions along the realist canon to orient today’s realism away from the logic of great power politics operating under anarchy toward an understanding of how the logic of liberal order permits forms of imperial intervention. Needless to say, **drawing together realist and postcolonial thought**, as this essay has done, **can be met with analytical skepticism and political hostility. A mode of argumentation that refuses comparisons of theoretical cores or non-truncated readings of select theorists strikes a note of analytical evasion**. To this there is no defense—other than that already discussed at length. On the other hand, if the expressly political purpose of this work is accepted, **the argument anticipates strong political reservations: why align the project of postcolonial theory with realism, an unethical tradition of militarism and realpolitik?** To this I would respond that while a kind of strategic essentialism has its place, **reducing “realists” to a coherent body of thought not only obscures the complexity of their thinking** (see never-ending interpretations of Machiavelli as an example) **but reproduces the narrative of transhistorical unity that some realists use to authorize unethical policy programs in the first place**. More critically, however, **in embodying an unproductive ahistoricism, it poses conventional realist categories of anarchy, selfinterest, and military power as the political problem to confront whereas the present historical context demands attunement to how some of these drives** (militarism, national interest) **connect with discrete problems of liberalism and imperial practices**. In fact, there are good reasons to think that the dominance of (neo)realism in IR is overstated (Walker and Morton 2005; Maliniak et al. 2011) and that the ascension of liberal IR theory is sociologically tied up with the present hegemony of a US liberal world order (Sterling-Folker 2015). In other words, while realism may have been a productive foil in Cold War bipolarity, we must theorize from the present. In doing so, we may find that **countering imperial formations may benefit from resonances established** not just **among** postcolonial, feminist, poststructural, and other “critical” theorists but **contemporary realists who identify links between liberalism and imperialism** (Walt 2013). Indeed, **if realism as a policy program defending the national interest is entangled with current militaristic and imperial interventions, we should push the premise of this statement, that difference should be defended, in anti-imperial and prudential directions. Doing so may allow new openings to emerge in the present sense of closure, new strategies to think and defend alternative politics**. In this way, we may more fully embody postcoloniality by not being satisfied with either narrow critique or brash conversion but rather attentive translation.